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 A B S T R A C T
This exegesis questions and explores the types of identities that are emerging as a
result of human engagement with contemporary communications and media
technology. These identities are communicated, shaped and defined by the way we
appropriate and engage with a smorgasbord of communications and media
consumption technologies which merge in our imaginations to form a technosocial
mediascape. As artist and teacher, consumer and prosumer, I participate in the
technosocial mediascape, along with colleagues, students, artists, friends and family
members.
As we produce, communicate and ultimately co-create that technosocial environment,
how are we changed by this experience? We contribute to a diverse and globally
circulating, but paradoxically transient parade of data and media that apparatuses and
humans together bring into existence. How does this mediascape impact on human
ontology and sociology? What are the different ‘positions’—relationships with the
mediascape—that emerge?
My method derives from analysis of my own experience as an engaged and flexible
‘position-taker’ within the technosocial mediascape. I analyse my own creative practice
with reference to a range of modernist, postmodernist and media theories. The
technosocial enshrines the idea that technology and human behaviour are not
separable, and draws on many theoretical sources, including phenomenology, the
philosophy of language, design theory and digital media theory. All media, and
mediums, are technosocial, because they impact on the praxis of identity. However, a
range of contemporary media and mediums are more explicitly technosocial, and that
is where my focus lies.
I will suggest that the role of language in technosocial contexts is peculiar, important
and under-theorised. Our ‘linguistic apparatuses’ offer an alternate concept of
technology to the ‘heavy modernism’ of Martin Heidegger.
I will explore ways in which technosocial engagement privileges fluid identities which
drift in and out of different but co-existing realities. Various types of
‘immersion’—some neo-baroque and some neo-romantic—contribute to
technosocially-engaged identity construction. Thus, our engagement with the
technosocial mediascape challenges received ideas about personal identity, and indeed,
the nature of the real.
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Preface i
PRE FAC E
In a recent lecture, I asked my Master of Communication students whether they
turned their mobile phones off when they went to bed. Many said they did. However, a
few of them did not. Indeed, one young woman said that if she turned her mobile off,
she would not be able to sleep. Her response is symptomatic, perhaps, of an emergent
anxiety about not being networked.
Our apparatuses1 and the networks they enmesh us within have become intimately
integrated into our lives. It is a connection that runs far deeper than convenience. We
attach ideas of who we are and what we value to the apparatuses we use. The
flexibility of a computer means that ‘we soon consider it less an external tool and
more a second skin or mental prosthesis’, according to Michael Heim (1993, p. 64).
This results in ‘existential-ontological questions’ (p. 61) concerning how reality
changes as a result of our interaction with apparatuses like computers. Indeed, our
idea of reality and our sense of personal identity seem to be the two sides of the same
set of concerns, which range from the ontological (‘Being’2) to the sociological
(‘identity’), and this nexus suggests the need for an analytical perspective that I am
calling ‘technosocial’.
Much of our identity is tied, not only to what we communicate, but to how we
communicate. We have a smorgasbord of options for media consumption. For
example, we can determine what level of interactivity we want (movies versus
computer games), but we can also choose the apparatus through which we will engage
with that media (PlayStation versus PC). We are learning to make conscious choices
between a suite of media and mediums as a result of assessments often concerning
whether a device will promote our evolving aspirations. Whether consciously or
unconsciously, the wealthy, educated, and to some extent, younger members of the
global middle class spend a significant proportion of their time, energy and money
deciding not only what to communicate and what to consume, but also how.
I count myself among the technosocially-engaged global middle class, both personally
and professionally. I am constantly reconsidering my communication options. Until
recently, when I went overseas I would be on the look-out for internet cafes; now I
take my mobile phone switched to global roaming. As a result, my messages back
home are more constant, less important, and brief. Communication works two ways: I
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was in Thailand when the 2005 tsunami hit, and within two hours, my mother was
texting me to see if I was OK. The way we communicate, the content we
communicate, and indeed, the sort of people we are, changes as we renegotiate our
technosocial options.
Meanwhile, as a content producer, I have different decisions to make. Some of them
have political and ideological consequences. The modernist and romantic idea of the
artist/writer that was a cornerstone of my education is challenged by today’s Do-It-
Yourself networked culture. Not only is the artist’s voice drowned among a
cacophony of cultural production in which editorial control has collapsed (unless you
accept Google as editor), but the idea that the individual voice should be given
preference over an emergent, globally networked, ‘hive mind’ seems harder to sustain.
Nevertheless, the ideals of romantic art and its associated subject positions live on,
although perhaps in surprising places. As discussed more fully in chapter three, the
immersed computer game player is arguably on a conceptual continuum with the figure
of the romantic poet who
not only beholds intensely the present as it is, and discovers those laws
according to which present things ought to be ordered, but he beholds the
future in the present, and his thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit
of latest time… A poet participates in the eternal, the infinite, and the one; as
far as relates to his conceptions, time and place and number are not.
Shelley 1980 p. 78
Millions of people daily engage in highly immersive gameplay, excursions into possible
worlds in which ‘time and place and number are not’. However, the romantics tended
to eschew technology as imagined during the industrial revolution. That the apparatus
is the means to a highly romantic experience is just one of the ironies that I grapple
with in my own creative practice and this critical reflection upon it. One of the
ambitions of this exegesis is to suggest ways in which we can reconceptualise creativity
and experience as a function of our engagement with the apparatus, rather than in
spite of it.
A PhD exegesis is required to address, explain, or critically explore aspects of the
project work produced in conjunction with it. In this instance, my project work
includes, but also extends beyond, some artworks that I made and exhibited. The
holistic project that I present is my technosocial practice, which takes several forms
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including communicating with friends and family, my teaching job as a media academic,
and my consumption of other media such as commercial computer games.
Originally I conceived of the project aspect of my PhD as my avant-garde art practice
in isolation from the other ways I engage with media. I have come to view the avant-
garde position as somewhat problematic in the technosocial context that I will
explore. By focusing on my technosocial practice more broadly, I am able to stand
outside that part of my practice which is explicitly and strictly ‘artistic’ and consider it
within a broader mediascape. I can therefore situate the idea of the avant-garde
beyond received ideological positions. Accordingly, a trajectory exists in the evolution
of the PhD project from artwork to practice which is reflected in the structure of the
exegesis.
The other ‘positions’ that I consider part of my project/reflective practice—that of
engaged consumer and prosumer—seem less elitist, but they are also generally less
recognised by cultural arbiters. This exegesis thus explicitly foregrounds the wide
scope of engaged relationships we can choose to express in the technosocial
mediascape, and wonders about their impact on identity and reality. Enroute, issues of
cultural politics arise and are analysed.
The territory of my research intersects with many disciplinary fields, including design,
IT, computer programming, literary studies, cinema studies, philosophy, history and
media studies. However, the technosocial articulates with some of these disciplines
more comfortably than others. For example, the prevalently utilitarian discussion
found in IT circles does not overtly concern itself with human identity and experience
beyond mundane issues such as ‘usability’. I propose that IT research should be more
deeply concerned with ontology, and I will give indicators of such an approach in
chapter four, focusing on mobile phones.
Chapter one will introduce the territory of the technosocial, a realm in which people,
the apparatus and language collide to produce reflection upon identity and reality, and
associated acts of identity-creation. Different ‘positions’ are possible, but some of
them—in particular, those we have inherited from earlier media cultures—are under
pressure to reinvent themselves to more directly facilitate identity experimentation.
In chapter two, I will be concerned with the perspective of the technosocial avant-
garde artist/author/programmer, and the experience of collaboration with the
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apparatus from my own perspective. I will conclude with further observations about
whether the avant-garde and associated cultural politics remain a viable technosocial
position.
‘[O]ur most typical moments are those when we are engaged, absorbed in an
undifferentiated world of involvement’, argues Richard Coyne (1999, p. 146). The idea
of unity strongly flavours technosocial aesthetics, and indeed, some mainstream
debates surrounding appropriate media cultures for young people. I will explore the
nature of immersion in chapter three, using the computer game as the paradigmatic
text-as-apparatus.
In chapter four I will turn to networked media communications, particularly the mobile
phone, the media that is being designed for it, and how it reflects upon, and even
creates, human experience. The conclusion will situate the contemporary technosocial
problematic with reference to aspects of the philosophy of technology.
While tensions between ‘creativity’ and academic rigour undoubtedly continue to
haunt PhDs by project, I will follow Richard Vella’s (2005) advice that
the translation from a creative work to one within a research context involves:
(1) extracting from the work criteria for evaluation; (2) relating the criteria to
some worldview via some exegetical perspective; (3) applying the criteria to
other contexts external to the candidate’s work. These steps are nonlinear and
can operate simultaneously.
p. 2
My exegesis embraces this approach by attempting to holistically integrate the various
types of practices that I engage in within the broader technosocial mediascape. In the
end, I will argue, what makes this engagement so fascinating is that way that our
identity evolves as a function of our relationships with the media we make and
consume.
Introducing the technosocial   1
C H A P T E R  O N E :  I N T R O D U C I N G  T H E  T E C H N O S O C I A L
The term ‘technosocial’ has been infrequently deployed in media studies, but is not
wholly without precedent. Mizuko Ito and Daisuke Okabe’s (2005) focus on the mobile
phone means they use the term ‘technosocial’ to explore locative issues from a
sociological perspective. Their definition bears quoting:
Electronic media have effects that break down certain prior social boundaries
… But they also have effects of constructing and reifying other social
boundaries. We draw broadly from approaches in social and cultural studies of
technology that see the technical and social as inseparable outcomes of ongoing
and historically contextualized practice…
pp. 259-260
In her work on voice chips, Nathalie Jeremijenko (2004 p. 262-3) describes a
‘sociotechnical project’ which is ‘an approach to human (singular)-computer (singular)
interaction that reconsiders interaction as a form of participation and escapes the
simple dichotomy between social and technological’.
As I am employing it, building on these past uses, the technosocial represents both a
problematic and an opportunity. Whether digital or analogue or papyrusian,
technosocial media and communications are not ‘natural’ or given. We choose
between and engage with various media and communications apparatuses, and as a
result, they synthesise our experience of the world. That experience then impacts on
our subsequent technosocial engagements. One small example is the way that the
world became a lot smaller when I started to use global roaming. It also changed the
content and style of my communications.
Technosocial analysis does not presume digitisation, however ubiquitous digitisation
enables media and communications scenarios that privilege a praxis of self-expression
and arguably, self-creation, through media. Issues surrounding identity will be a focus
of my analysis, but this emphasis is not shared by Ito and Okabe or Jeremijenko.
Concepts from diverse disciplines are certainly allied to the technosocial. They include
Paul Resnick’s concept of SocioTechnical Capital, which refers ‘to productive
combinations of social relations and information and communication technology’
(2001, p. 4). Resnick emphasises ‘how [the technical and the social] jointly influence
the ability of people to act together’ (my parentheses). Resnick expands on ideas
reminiscent of Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of cultural capital:
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The notion of capital suggests a resource that can be accumulated and whose
availability allows people to create value for themselves or others.
p. 1
Resnick desires to harness social capital resources for ethical, collective and informed
decision-making. Thus ‘[i]nformation and communication technologies (ICTs) should
also increase people's ability to act together…’ (p. 2)1. He is motivated by a
democratic project, though it is one problematically marked by elements of
technoromanticism (Coyne 1999, pp. 232; 271).
In contrast, my project is not so squarely tied to these kinds of ethical outcomes.
Technosocial engagements include ironies and negative consequences. Our
communications and media devices are important because they are popular, rather
than because of some moral authority automatically consequent upon their use (by
individuals, organisations or governments). Analysing the scope of possible
technosocial engagement may, however, reveal ethical implications. For example, the
ability of corporations and governments to manipulate the types of technosocial
engagements that are possible is an aspect of technosocial analysis (explored further in
chapter four).
Daniel Downes (2005) introduces the term ‘interactive realism’, which is a
methodology and focus similar to the conceptual framework of the technosocial that I
am proposing:
We construct our social world with a variety of tools, languages and material
artifacts, and these tools refer back to our embodied experience of the world
in a process of interactive realism. Interactive realism investigates the
significance of new technologies not from the perspective of determining what
is lost, dispersed, or destroyed by using them but by exploring the
opportunities they offer for new experience.
p. 12
Downes continues:
Technology is significant for the ways it delineates the boundaries and horizons
of our life-world. Technology is simultaneously material and symbolic, as tools
and language combine to create artifacts.
Elsewhere Downes rejects the idea that language creates reality (p. 34)2. It is of note
that Downes gives a ‘delineating’ role to technology, but not to language. I will
question this distinction in chapter two. Technologies, at least digital technologies,
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function because of their linguistic core. In contrast to Downes, I share with Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger a constructivist view that our relationship with the
world is always mediated by language. This constructivism allows me to rehabilitate
the apparatus from the tradition of an essentialising romantic condemnation of
technology, and this, together with the focus on identity, is another cornerstone of
the technosocial approach.
A technosocial approach questions any methodology that opposes technology and
culture. Technology is a human artefact, designed to meet evolving human ambitions,
and none more obviously so than our communications and media technologies. My
approach assumes that humans and technology can not be separated.
Maurita Harney (1985, p. 527) suggests there are ‘two methodological lines of
approach to a philosophy of technology’: one is analytical, and the other is ‘a meaning-
centred approach whose point of departure is our own experience of the
technological milieu and whose chief concern is … the transformation of cultural
meanings and values effected by technological change’.
Squarely tied to a concern with meanings and values—of a personal, as much as an
interpersonal nature, my phenomenologically-informed technosocial methodology
takes as its premise ‘that information technology is best understood through its
involvement in various practices’ (Coyne 1999, p. 145), where practices entail
relationships between humans, and between human and apparatus. The technosocial
apparatuses that I will focus upon privilege performative communications and media
consumption. The technosocial meanings that I wish to explore derive from use. The
technosocial wonders not whether you have a mobile phone, but what, out of the
variety of things you can do with it, you choose to do with it, and how your phone fits
with the other technologies you use. The technosocial is more interested in how you
choose to watch a movie rather than the details of which movie you watch. The
technosocial is interested in your active use of media and communications, and life as
mediated praxis3. How does use, process and performance combine with technical
affordance (a term I will shortly define) to create meaningful experience? A
technosocial approach engages the nexus between culture, history, politics, sociology
and economics, ‘aesthetics’ (form) and technology (Ito and Okabe 2005, pp. 257, 259-
260), in order to reflect upon and understand personal experience. It seeks to avoid
technodeterminism and essentialism. As Malina et al (1999) proclaim:
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We are living in a world in which the arts, sciences, and technology are
becoming inextricably integrated strands in a new emerging cultural fabric. Our
knowledge of ourselves expands with each discovery in molecular and
neurobiology, psychology, and the other sciences of living organisms.
Technologies not only provide us with new tools for communication and
expression, but also provide a new social context for our daily existence.
Technologies extend their influence into the way we think, and what we think about.
Culture and technology co-evolve. As media technologies proliferate, creative
people—everybody except those whom Manual Castells (1996, p. 400) has described
as the ‘fourth world of exclusion’—have a greater range of decisions to make about
creative activity, communication, and ultimately identity.
In other words, the term ‘technosocial’ presupposes a deep relationship between
humans and their apparatuses. This framing of the technosocial is derived from my
reading of work in the phenomenological tradition. According to Don Idhe (1993, p.
34), technology changes human experience, and therefore technology must be
understood ‘... as belonging in different ways to our experience and use of
technologies, as a human-technology relation, rather than abstractly conceiving them
as mere objects’.
The engagement with phenomenology means that I extend ideas about identity—often
tied to cultural studies analysis—into more philosophic, abstract, ontological territory.
Heidegger (1962, p. 312) defines phenomenology as ‘the science of the being of
entities—ontology’. Elsewhere he suggests that ‘[t]he task of ontology is to explain
being itself and to make the being of entities stand out in full relief’ (p. 310).
Heidegger’s complex philosophico-poetic thought explores territory of allusive
complexity, however he engages with issues of technology, art and ontology in ways
that are productive for this project. In particular, Heidegger wonders about the
experience of engaging with art as opposed to the experience of engaging with
technology. This focus (although not necessarily Heidegger’s conclusions) will be taken
up in chapter three.
Heim (1993, p. 66) calls Heidegger ‘the father of information anxiety’. With Marshall
McLuhan, Heidegger believed ‘the most awesome power of technology to reside in its
newly achieved intimacy with language' (pp. 66-7). However, Heidegger considered this
awesome power as a more-or-less negative one: he thought that using a computer to
compose text alienates us from writing, for the word ‘can and must “have” “the hand”’
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(Heidegger (1992) quoted in Kittler 1999, p. 198). Through the apparatus, words are
degraded to a ‘mere means for the traffic of communication’. Heidegger’s reflections
on language and technology represent relatively minor writings compared to the
attention he gives to the ‘big footprint’ technology of modern infrastructure
development. However they issue a challenge to my position that I will explore more
fully in chapters three and four.
In making use of a phenomenological approach I will adopt Gilbert Ryle’s (1932, p.
215) advice that such a method is analytical and critical, but indifferent to empirical
methodology. It ‘enquires into the nature of more or less radical types of mental
functioning’: in other words, phenomenology is about experience, but does not
provide new information about an objective world, separate from experience (p. 217).
My extension of analysis about media to include the relationships between human and
apparatus is partly a response to the phenomenological ideas of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, who argues that the relationship between subject and object is a ‘relationship of
being in which, paradoxically, the subject is his body, his world, and his situation, by a
sort of exchange’ (1964, p. 298). Elsewhere Merleau-Ponty suggests that this exchange
is the very basis for the ‘phenomenological world’, which is ‘the sense which is
revealed where the paths of my various experiences intersect, and also where my own
and other people’s intersect and engage each other like gears’ (2002, p. xxii).
However, while I agree with these general observations, Merleau-Ponty’s belief in the
possibility of ‘direct and primitive contact with the world’ (p. vii) limits his usefulness
to my approach. Likewise, Downes (2005 p. 52) draws on the phenomenology of
perception, which is ‘concerned ... with demonstrating how perception is a body skill-
set embedded in representation, discourse, and technique’. The emphasis of my
project work and this exegesis is not on the phenomenology of perception and
embodiment; instead, my starting point is the necessary mediation of reality by
language. As a consequence, embodiment is a less pressing issue and a fuller
exploration of it is beyond the scope of what is possible to cover in the present work.
This exegesis draws from other writers in the broad phenomenological tradition. The
reflections of phenomenological sociologist Alfred Schutz (1962) on multiple realities
suggests ways in which our devices structure our engagement with the world.
Additionally, Don Idhe’s (1993, p. 7) ‘nonfoundational and nontranscendental’
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postphenomenology is useful in examining relationships between technology and
culture because it sympathises with contemporary discourses surrounding embodiment
and contingency. For me, Idhe’s approach has suggested ways to explore technologies
and practices which not only are transient, but seem to some extent to be about
transience, a theme that will become more important as this work progresses.
As we have already seen, some phenomenologists tend to regret our burgeoning media
technology culture. These include communications theorist Vilèm Flusser’s (2005)
analysis of the impact of technology on human creativity. Such views are countered by
the more contemporary writings of Andrew Feenberg (1999; 2000a and 2000b).
Feenberg offers an antidote to Heidegger (and implicitly, to Flusser) by contrasting
Heidegger’s historically-specific assumptions about technology with the digital
technologies of the late twentieth century. Finally, the frequently cited
‘phenomenology’ of the cyborg4 has popularly reconceived of the relationships
between humans and technology.
To an extent, a phenomenology of the apparatus is pre-determined in negative ways if
the theorist believes technology to be essentially non-human. Feenberg (1999, pp. 203;
xiv) traces a history of romantic-Heideggerian technological essentialism, suggesting
that such an approach inappropriately infers that technology is impregnable and
monolithic. If, however, we agree with Bruno Latour (2005, p. 39; also see Slack and
Wise 2005, p. 117) that technologies are better conceptualised as mediators which are
active and produce transformation, technology becomes part of a human project
expressed most directly during trilogical (a term I will define in more detail in chapter
two) collaboration, and different questions arise. We can focus on ontological
consequences, rather than worrying about (for example) determinism. I agree with
Idhe (1993, p. 34) that technologies must be understood as existing in relation with
humans rather than as discreet objects5. Indeed, Feenberg (1999, p. vii) suggests that
we are politically empowered by conceiving of technology and human behaviour as
interconnected; if they are not connected, our ability to influence technology is in
doubt.
Situating the apparatus in a central, mediating position in human dialogue is unusual
partly because the apparatus (ordinary PCs circa 2006) is not conscious. Why would
we want to privilege the apparatus to such an extent that dialogue—communication
between two humans—needs to be expanded to trilogue? The answer lies in the
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relational nature of communications and media apparatuses. While the apparatus is not
conscious, it is, nevertheless, in Alfred Schutz’ (1972) terms, ‘other-oriented’—it
originates signs for someone else to interpret (p. 150). It also reacts to (not the same
thing as interprets) signs originated by human interlocutors. It operates within an
‘intersubjective motivational context’ in which social interaction takes place (p. 159).
As I will argue in chapter two, fundamental here are the various ways in which humans
and apparatuses use language.
The apparatus employs a type of language suited to a non-conscious entity. Were we
to describe the apparatus as engaging in dialogue, we would anthropomorphicise its
behaviour and capacity. Better, then, to introduce a new term, the trilogue, so we can
acknowledge the communicative status of the apparatus without claiming too much for
its conscious abilities (an error usually accompanied by under-emphasizing the role of
the programmer).
Questions concerning whether non-human entities are conscious bring us to the
centrality of the subject in phenomenological analysis. According to Ryle, ‘”What is it
to be an I?” is perhaps the most general way of formulating the question of
phenomenology’ (1932, p. 219). ‘I’-ness is a quality that even the most optimistic IT
futurologists must concede that the contemporary apparatus lacks, despite the
affectations of Apple’s desktop messages to the contrary. Situating the apparatus
beyond the relationships that form the ‘I’ risks the Heideggerian fallacy of condemning
technology as anti-human. Instead, I will be arguing for a technosocial approach with
discusses hybrid relationships. As a result, the question about consciousness becomes
‘how does technology collaborate in the creation of what it is to be an (human) I?’.
A human-centric concept of agency is implicitly questioned by the trilogue (cf Slack
and Wise (2005), p. 116). Drawing on Latour’s actor-network theory, Slack and Wise
propound:
First, agency does not require human intention, which means that technologies
can also be involved in relations of agency. Second, agency is not a possession
of agents; it is a process and a relationship.
p. 117
Latour’s social actors include technologies (p. 118) which can prescribe behaviours.
For example, the mobile phone ‘does the travelling for us’ (p. 120), but it also
‘prescribes back a daunting range of behaviours’. Slack and Wise continue:
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The prescriptive pressure is to always be in contact… Thus, the cell phone
prescribes the value of always being in contact, of always being ‘on call,’ and
works at obliterating privacy and the idea that privacy might be desirable. A
whole new standard of expectations about being available is emerging as the
cell phone (and e-mail) gradually blankets the planet.
p. 120
Indeed, my transference to global roaming from internet-café based email has other
ambiguous consequences. The cost of immediacy is the terseness of text messaging.
While actor-network theory helpfully repositions technology in terms of relationships,
it is open to accusations of technodeterminism, and perhaps overplays the type of
agency that our (non AI) devices are capable of. The apparatus’ limited agency can be
explored within a trilogical nexus whose bookends are human. A technosocial
approach privileges collaboration and cooperative exchange to avoid overstating the
agency of the device.
The three partners in the technosocial undertaking are human programmer/artist, the
executing apparatus, and the human interpreter. The human roles may be performed
by the same person, but they are different activities. Indeed, one of my own most
revelatory moments concerning the trilogical relationship involved programming a text
which, when performed by the apparatus, had results that I didn’t expect. Thus I
seemed to be performing two distinct activities almost simultaneously—that of
programmer, and that of user/interpreter.
Networked apparatuses may command access to a near-infinite database of
information and media objects, and programs can be written to manipulate that
information in nontrivial ways. Thus, the apparatus is more than a mere tool or
machine, blindly wielded by a human consciousness. It is a performative device of
unique capacity, sensitivity and complexity, which encourages a wide range of human
creativity, interpretation and indeed, collaboration. However, it has few virtues of
interest outside its performative relationships with humans. Studies of trilogical
experiences share with Latour (2005, p. 1) an interest in process rather than finished
product.
The philosophical issues that arise are complex. For example, Downes (2005, p. 74)
wonders where to draw the line between us and the outside world when our
interactions with it are technologically mediated. The solution entails a
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reconceptualisation: our technosocially-engaged selves are not separate from the
apparatus, and the apparatus’ position as mediator collapses the distinction between us
and the world. The line that Downes seems to want cannot be drawn, and is, indeed,
perhaps unnecessary. Marcos Novak describes humans as being ‘within information’
(1992, p. 225). Novak takes this insight into the realm of architecture (p. 226); in
chapter two I take it into the realm of language. With Latour (2005, pp. 5-8), I join in
a project of uncovering connections, in the hope that those connections will uncover
organizing principles, or ways of being, that insightfully reflect upon social and
ontological aspects of technosocial humanness.
A range of conceptual tools and examples will assist an exploration of the technosocial
problematic, its implications for human identity, and the nature of the real that results
from technosocial engagement.
T e c hn o so c i a l  ‘ p o s i t i o n s ’
On the one hand, the technosocial problematic is personal and intimate; on the other,
it is social and even public. As we inhabit, explore and communicate our identities via
the apparatuses that pervade our communicative, media-saturated lives, the
technosocial simultaneously challenges our ideas about social relationships. We feed
the results of our technosocial engagements back into the system that creates the
terms of those engagements. As a result, technosocial systems—combinations of
human behaviour and technical affordances—dynamically evolve.
Bourdieu’s (1993) sociological approach to the structural relations within which
creators produce their work provides a way of understanding the different
relationships that people within capitalist countries have with culture and cultural
products. His typology provides a departure point for the analytic framework of this
exegesis. An artistic work, according to Bourdieu, is not merely a unity unto itself (the
presumption of, for example, literary school of new criticism), but has a necessary
relationship with the world beyond it. Therefore:
To understand the practices of writers and artists, and not least their products,
entails understanding that they are the result of the meeting of two histories:
the history of the positions they occupy and the history of their dispositions.
p. 61
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Analysis of individual dispositions (apart from my own) are beyond the scope of the
current work. However, as an introduction to different types of technosocial
engagement, I will now sketch the technosocially productive ‘positions’ that inform my
own practice but are also reflected in contemporary society. For Bourdieu, three
different principles of social legitimacy may underwrite your identity as writer, artist
or media-maker:
1. recognition by artistic peers (the avant-garde);
2. recognition by bourgeois taste (high culture);
3. popular success (media-makers) (pp. 50-51).
For the avant-garde, recognition outside one’s peer group is almost anathema. The
other two principles of legitimacy rest on the idea of an audience that is distinct from
the producer6. Bourgeois ‘high art’ audiences generally seek cultural products whose
value has been historically reified. Such products rarely as yet exist within the digital
technosocial, and thus I will not consider that principle of legitimacy. However, the
popular productions of ‘corporate media’ and the positions they entail are worthy of
technosocial consideration. I shall also identify another emergent technosocial position
that Bourdeiu’s analysis cannot easily account for, because of technosocial evolution
(combinations of technology and human behaviour). That position is the prosumer.
The following sections outline the sorts of engagements, and media and
communication products, associated with these three positions. Establishing these
positions will allow me to explore my own assumptions of those positions in
succeeding chapters of the current work.
1. The prosumer
The term ‘prosumer’, originally a marketing term to describe the professional
consumer, now enjoys a broad use as a descriptor for creative individuals constantly
collaborating with apparatuses to make and disseminate media and communication,
usually for nonprofessional reasons. Mark Deuze (2003, p. 213) defines prosumers as
‘active instead of passive media consumers … interactivity [is] … the characteristic of
the internet which facilitates association, enabling people not only to receive
information … but also to disseminate it…’. The prosumer’s ‘success’ is mainly judged
by peers. Blogging (weblogging) is a commonly cited example.
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As a teacher, I am also a prosumer. This technosocial position is often community-
based. My students and I form communities of interest; we publish (text, image, audio
and video) on topics of common interest on the Web (most commonly to our blogs).
We refer to each other’s work by hypertextually linking them together, an activity that
is promoted by the built-in affordances of blogging software. We might publish work
elsewhere on the Web, using different software, then link those publications back into
our blogging presence.
The struggles my students have with the idea of networked prosuming often concerns
identity7. My students are not a part of the MySpace generation (see below), and they
often find the process of creating a public self somewhat confronting. How does
prosuming change self? As a result of engaging with these issues, at the end of a
course, many students seem very aware of how their technosocial engagement has
impacted upon their lives.
Indeed, prosumers are making identity into the explicit theme of their publications. A
famous recent example is Geriatric1927 (2006) who posted a video about himself to
YouTube , a networked video sharing website. In that video, Geriatric1927 announces
he wishes to ‘bitch and grumble about life in general from the perspective of an old
person whose been there and done that and hopefully you will respond in some way
by your comments and then I might be able to do other videos to follow up your
comments, I do hope so’.
According to Goldsmith (2006), Geriatric1927 received a half million viewers in the
first week. His success is an example of a strong prosuming impetus to make your
identity public and therefore perhaps convert life itself into a work of art (Bauman
2000, p. 82). Perhaps, as Zygmunt Bauman continues, for prosumers, camcording your
life actually makes it real (p. 84). Indeed, if ‘the search for identity is the ongoing
struggle to arrest or slow down the flow, to solidify the fluid, to give form to the
formless’ (p. 82), our may blogs faultily grasp towards this essentially elusive goal.
However, I will develop a different perspective. I will argue that our technosocial
engagements are about manipulating fluid identities and multiple realities, and any hope
that prosumers have about making a permanent archive of the self tends to quickly
recede.
The technosocial mediascape 12
Prosumer culture threatens to elide traditional cultural boundaries between hobbyists
and professionals. One example is the semi-professional service, the Tsunami Video
Hosting Initiative (Media Bloggers Association, 2005) which ‘was launched in response
to concerns over bandwidth issues facing bloggers doing a tremendous public service
by providing video of the tsunami to the world’. Another example is Now Public (2005)
whose by-line is ‘don’t like the news? Then change it. The news is now public’. As
whole prosumer ‘genres’ such as machinima receive critical acclaim and mass attention
in work such as Red vs. Blue, even media corporations such as News Corp (Murdoch
2005) and the BBC (Sherwin 2006)8 are hitching their star to the prosumer
bandwagon.
Prosumer culture also threatens cultural distinctions between hobbyists and the avant-
garde. The prosumer does not necessarily engage in pushing artistic boundaries in the
manner that Bourdieu (1993, pp. 62-63) or Lyotard (1984, p. 75) suggests, however
some prosumer media nevertheless finds a niche community9, in a way reminiscent of
avant-garde communities. Technosocial networks support niche prosumer media.
Social software10 such as Flickr reveals the large range of publication position-takings
that the network now allows, from advertising of professional photography to more
intimate communities of interest represented by family photo galleries.
Many prosumers have become members of a technosocial club predicated on access to
technology rather than upon pushing artistic boundaries or achieving mainstream
success. Much of the resulting media is peculiarly and even proudly naïve, as one need
only examine the superficial ramblings of most Friendster or MySpace entries and what
Vilèm Flusser (2005, pp. 57-8) would call the redundancy of most of the photos in
Flickr to discover. Most prosumers would fail the criteria for avant-garde membership,
characterized by Bourdieu as ‘no place for naïfs’ (1993, pp. 60). However, the
prosumer position depends on a similar peer recognition value system.
Indeed, to outsiders, prosumer content can be quite disconcerting. It tends to be only
meaningful to other prosumers in the same community. Arguably, you need to be
putting your own content ‘out there’ to appreciate the efforts of your peers. Hans-
Georg Gadamer (1977, p. 25) argues that intersubjective understandings are arrived at
through language. Perhaps prosumer activity extends face-to-face linguistic
intersubjective engagement into peer-to-peer intersubjective convergence. These
technosocially-facilitated media communities stretch the boundaries of Bourdieu’s
Introducing the technosocial   13
positions. While Bourdieu’s theory can accommodate change in particular cultural
forms, it is unclear how it might account for change in the very concept of creative
production.
Prosumer ‘social software’ like Flickr and Friendster developed out of a commitment to
participatory or metadesign, an approach to design which is ‘both a theoretical issue
and an operational methodology’ (Giarccardi 2005, p. 343). Originally conceptualised
by Gene Youngblood (1986) as ‘a strategy for instigating a revolution in the
communication world and overcoming the broadcasting style of mass culture’,
metadesign promotes critical and reflexive thinking about the boundaries and scope of
design ‘aimed at coping with the complexity of natural human interaction made
tangible by technology’. Thus, ‘[m]etadesign seeks to transform this complexity into an
opportunity for new forms of creativity and sociability’11.
Derrick De Kerckhove (1995) describes metadesign as a useful principle for Web-
based applications because it is
the kind of design that puts the tools rather than the object of design in your
hands. The better interactive systems are not those which define the process,
but those which define the conditions for the process of the interaction. The
more tools are in the hands of the user to shape, specify and control the
interaction, the more interactive it will be.
Metadesigners become the ‘seeders’ of a collaborative creative process which is ‘able
to generate endless variations recognisable as belonging to the same idea but open to
change by the client’ (Giarccardi 2005, p. 345). Metadesign and the related school of
participatory design12 are ways in which designers are responding to a technosocial
environment in which prosuming has become an ubiquitous emergent behaviour.
Prosumers are notoriously coy if they don’t feel empowered. They simply go
elsewhere.
The Flickr environment was developed on metadesign principles. Launched in February
of 2004 as a Flash application for chat about photos, user feedback encouraged its
evolution into a photo sharing application. The Flickr team sought to build community
through functionality. One example is their implementation of tagging. According to
Eric Costello:
Tags were not in the initial version of Flickr. Stewart Butterfield wanted to add
them. He liked the way they worked on del.icio.us, the social bookmarking
application. We added very simple tagging functionality, so you could tag your
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photos, and then look at all your photos with a particular tag, or any one
person’s photos with a particular tag.
Soon thereafter, users started telling us that what was really interesting about
tagging was not just how you’ve tagged your photos, but how the whole Flickr
community has been tagging photos. So we started seeing a lot of requests
from users to be able to see a global view of the tagscape.
quoted in Garrett 2005
One of the interactive principles that Löwgren and Stolterman (2004) identify is
‘playability’. The Flickr team intuitively picked up on the importance of playability in
their own work practices and that of their prosumer users:
Our team, led by Stewart, is very playful. We are always having a good time,
whatever we’re doing. We let that carry through into the way we describe
things on the site, the way we talk to our users. It’s all very playful, and that’s
intentional. We want it to be a playful place.
Metadesigned social software like Flickr are in ‘perpetual beta’: always evolving. Being
finished is, indeed, a thing of the past. This is also the attitude of more forward-
thinking professional media makers, such as David Vadiveloo, director of the online
documentary UsMob (2005), hosted by the ABC (Australia). Users can add media and
text to UsMob. Presaging a technosocial prosumer documentary, the ABC is paying for
five years of moderation, giving UsMob an evolving lifespan as users add their own
media to the UsMob networked database.
From the metadesigner/programmer’s perspective, Tim O’Reilly (2003) argues that the
future lies with ‘people who build products based around the deep involvement of a
community’. Projects which succeed in this ‘software paradigm shift’ of pervasive
networked computers facilitating meaningful connections between the self-interested
actions of individuals, attract a critical mass of individual involvement to a site:
There are a whole new range of applications ahead of us. The line between cell
phones and handhelds and laptops and wireless … is going to make computing
that is something that surrounds us and that we interact with in our daily lives
in completely different ways... When all these devices are connected in the
network, it allows a new class of socially conscious software… to be developed
and to be exploited.
A useful concept to help us understand the nexus between technology and human
creativity is that of ‘affordance’. Developed by Donald Norman (2002, p. 9), it
originally referred to ‘… the perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily
Introducing the technosocial   15
those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be
used’. A chair affords sitting; glass affords seeing through (and breaking).
In design, affordance is the range of behaviour that an object allows, and constraints
limit the range of behaviours. A sister concept, mapping, is the notion of the
relationship between the designed object and the effect of the object in the world.
Natural mapping occurs when the object takes advantage of physical analogies and
cultural standards to lead to immediate understanding about its purpose and function
(p. 23). Affordance, constraints and mapping provide the conceptual model of a thing
(p. 13). Feedback—sending the user information about what has been
accomplished—furthers this understanding. Good design entails visible things with
good mappings, natural relationships, between the controls and the things
controlled. Single controls often have single functions. There is good feedback.
The system is understandable. In general, the relationships among the user's
intentions, the required actions, and the results are sensible, nonarbitrary, and
meaningful.
p. 22
Affordance is subjective and psychological. It ties technology to hermeneutics. When I
use my mobile phone overseas to contact my mother, it gives rise to an interpretation
of the world being interconnected regardless of distance. In this way, what our devices
can and can’t do come to signify different things about the world we live in. Thus, the
idea of affordance can be broadened from its design roots to encompass technosocial
praxis. N. Katherine Hayles’ media-specific analysis (MSA) develops an idea similar to
affordance to analysis of avant-garde technosocial artworks. MSA is ‘a kind of criticism
that pays attention to the material apparatus producing the literary work as physical
artifact’ (2002, p. 29).
Affordance also ties technosocial practice to the discipline of design. Prosumers and
professional media-makers alike have become obliged to think like problem-solving
designers, critically engaged with technology. Only then can they contain what Norman
(2002, p. 27) describes as the paradox of technology, which is that ‘added functionality
generally comes along at the price of added complexity’.
A simple example of the idea of affordance as a hermeneutic tool would be to
compare blogging behaviour with behaviour associated with other social software such
as Friendster and MySpace (according to Jenkins (2006) the latter has more than one
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million Australian users). Friendster encourages personal, informal, unstructured and
even intimate writing. It is rarely used in professional contexts, but rather is used to
form new friendships or maintain old ones. Built into the Friendster software is a
mechanism to encourage you to make more friends. The result may well be quantity
over quality of friendships with little real content, however that may be to miss the
point of what Friendster and MySpace promote: the exploration and publication of self-
identity. The different affordances of different social software encourage different
types of human behaviour, human values, and different types of prosumer media-
making.
Despite this apparent media democracy, prosuming is still a cultural tactic for
relatively wealthy, relatively educated people. Prosumer media is often about place,
friends and the quotidian. Prosumers employ technology to surmount or even make a
virtue of transience—travelling, going out. Indeed, prosumer culture seems peculiarly
concerned with ‘not being at home’—physically, but perhaps also emotionally. Perhaps
we have all become tourists, even in our own back yards. How do we maintain a sense
of self when we are not at home? How do we transform not being home into an
enriching experience? Perhaps by publishing it. In chapter four I will explore further
whether prosumer culture and experience of transience are mutually reinforcing.
A technosocial analysis engages economics, aesthetics, cultural knowledge, technical
access and skill, all articulated in the languages which oil the connections between
apparatus and human. In this sense, identity becomes more anchored to your ability to
communicate by manipulating media and media flows. Prosumer behaviour privileges
practice, process and community over received ideas of content, aesthetics, and
completion. This is not to say that technosocial nexus does not promote or lead to
formal sophistication. However for a lot of prosumers, aesthetics seem to have
become of secondary import to the phenomenon of engagement with community and
identity generation per se.
The intensity of technosocial engagement with digital media is often expressed through
the concept of immersion. Immersion—its limits, successes, failures and
consequences—is a theme that periodically arises in technosocial contexts. As an
outsider, viewing prosumer media tends to fail the immersion test: you are usually
aware of the way it is technologically framed, and embedded within another layer of
reality. Indeed, immersion and transparency are probably not a necessary prelude to
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telepresence and ‘virtual community’ as Downes (2005, p. 84) suggests. Production
and dissemination is a collaborative activity, and no prosumer is really interested in
obscuring the technology that enables it. However, when you are making such work,
immersion runs deep. This is immersion in trilogical collaboration.
Identity data is spread across and recombined by the Internet. Search for me and you
will find my blog, my artistic work, my Friendster account, my LinkedIn (2003-2006)
profile. Networked prosumer identities have been described as ‘identity mashups’ by
Jake Shapiro (2006). Shapiro asks what happens when you mash all this identity data
together? The result may include risks, possibilities and unconventional behaviours.
Maybe the apparatus synthesizes an identity you didn’t entirely intend.
Those who seek formal sophistication (at times, including myself) find themselves
alternating between the quite distinct value systems held by prosumer and avant-garde
cultures. The next section explores the latter position.
2. The technosocial avant-garde
In 2006, a star was born. Lily Allen, ‘the postergirl for the MySpace generation’ (Bailey
2006, p. 7), built a huge following for her music as a result of posting her songs on
MySpace . She is not the first to garner commercial success via the peer-to-peer (P2P),
commonly non-commercial nature of prosumer networks. The technosocial is breaking
down distinctions between the creative amateur, the avant-garde artist, and
commercial success (corporate media). Prosumers leverage networked dissemination
to find their community. Whether that community consist of 50 or 5 million, success is
a measure your ability to find the people you needed to find. Increasingly, artists and
corporate media are co-opting prosumer behaviour to their own ends. As such, the
prosumer position ‘bleeds’ into the two other positions I will discuss—that of avant-
garde artist and corporate media producer.
As we examine the three proposed technosocial positions—the prosumer, the avant-
garde artist, and corporate media-makers—we move away from the explicit, direct
(and indeed, naive) exploration of personal identity. Corporate mass media’s
engagement with personal identity has traditionally been quite tenuous. The avant-
garde artist’s expression of personal identity is often indirect and ironic. They often
strive to create work in which their personal situation is obscured. At the same time,
personal renown as an artist seems core to their public personas. Contemporary
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artists such as Abe Linkoln and Jimpunk (see below) obscure personal identity behind
data and pseudonyms. However, success is still measured in terms of fame within their
community. Within the technosocial problematic, tensions arise between the ironic
personas of avant-garde artists and contemporary prosumer ideas of mediated identity.
The artworks of the contemporary technosocial avant-garde can be strange beasts.
They eschew the reassuring solidity we are accustomed to. Made of digital
information, they leave a small footprint. They may evolve in response to aspects of
their technosocial context—for example user behaviour, or automated digital
information supplied by a network/system. Both form and content might be highly
dependent. It can be hard to know where an artwork ‘ends’ (let alone ‘concludes’). If
unity13 is still an important aesthetic principle for technosocial media and art, how do
we interpret a work like Screenfull (Linkoln and jimpunk, 2005), described by Fateman
(2005) thus:
If you like noise bands, dial-up (their browser-slowing tricks tend to frustrate
navigation), or the endurance tropes of experimental work, you'll have the
stomach for this noisy, erratic site. Vandalized screen-grabs, animated
Photoshop layers, Duchamp references, and grafts of high art and advertising
imagery engage both net art practices and the appropriationist strategies of
punk, Dada, Situationism, and remix culture. …. Screenfull's ability to zero-in
on the parodic vulnerabilities of their subjects supports the aim to disrupt the
corporatized conventions of online display, or, in their words, the desire ‘crash
your browser with content.’
The idea of the Web surfer as a flâneur, eternally roaming the ‘streets’ of our
symbolic, virtual world, seeking accidental found objects and experiences in
decontextualised ways (Coyne 1999, p. 191)14 is commonplace. Screenfull ironically
usurps flâneur experience by compiling the accidents of flânerie in one location. The
guiding principle seems to be ‘pixellation’-in-flow15, that is, interpretation becomes
‘pixellated’ as digital objects are programmatically pulled out of their context and
remixed, a process which exemplifies the digital, networked, hypertextual ontology of
databased media (Manovich 2001, Chapter 5), but also, it seems, mocks it. Putting
discreet digital objects into meaningful groups or sequences is the monumental task of
meaning constructors—a human task that the apparatus alone can’t achieve. Trying to
interpret the Screenfull mashup implies the limits of the apparatus.
Screenfull undermines our modernist sensibility of unity to replace it with a (noisy)
meditation upon the arbitrariness of the unities we (human + apparatus) create. If the
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resulting conjunction of information seems transient and contingent,
meaning—successful interpretation—seems at best a lucky break. According to Flusser
(2005, p. 71), photography instigated a period of cultural deterioration in which ‘all
cultural phenomena started to replace the linear structure of sliding with the staccato
structure of programmed combinations’. This heralded the eventual ‘cybernetic
structure such as that programmed into apparatuses’. Screenfull works against unity,
but trades upon the expectations of unity that modernism has enshrined in our
interpretive acts. Its ‘unity’ is thus ironic, as the expectations of formal coherence are
simultaneously betrayed and confirmed.
Screenfull is not necessarily emblematic of all digital and networked artworks, but it
reveals a range of tensions that technosocial artists face. Networked culture is one in
which individual voices tend to be lost in a scrum of media and communications.
Expressions of personal identity generally penetrate no further than your community
of interest: digital works are notoriously unstable, and capitalism has little motivation
to get involved.
Bourdieu argues that the field of cultural production harbours a struggle for legitimacy,
in which ‘…the most autonomous producers naturally tend to exclude “bourgeois”
writers and artists, whom they see as “enemy agents”’ (Bourdieu 1993, p. 41). This
struggle is embedded in popular parlance in the distinction between ‘media’ and ‘art’.
The position of pure artist is a position of freedom (p. 63); it operates beyond politics,
ethics and economics. Such risky positions depend on possession of the economic and
social capital (p. 67) that provide the conditions for freedom (p. 68). These
observations still hold true for the technosocial avant-garde, but within contemporary
technosocial contexts, such artists wrestle with a new range of ironies about their
status.
Being an avant-garde artist is an unstable position. The position is haunted by demands
for innovation and invention. For artists engaging with new technologies, the challenge
of continual invention is even more intense. For this and perhaps other reasons, the
avant-garde position often dissolves into the other creative positions—the hobbyist,
the bourgeois producer or more recently the prosumer.
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3. Technosocial corporate media
The contemporary technosocial privileges user involvement over passive consumption.
Even decisions over the type of device, and the type of software used, presuppose a
certain level of research and engagement (MySpace is not automatically delivered to
98% of people’s living rooms). If the technosocial presupposes active choices about
communications and media, where does this leave a professional media industry,
traditionally predicated on the ubiquitous supply of a producer-consumer model in
which consumer decision-making and power is extremely limited? Corporate media
has been obliged to find ways to engage the active exploration of identity that
prosumer media has promoted. As we shall see in chapter three, one of their solutions
is the computer game.
Corporate media-makers tend to rely on realism, a formal aesthetic based on unity,
simplicity and communicability that replicates the dominant culture (Lyotard 1984, p.
75). The realist aesthetic dominates popular visual culture and has been widely
appropriated by broadcast television. It is also at work in mainstream movies and
computer games. Seamless realism is an aesthetic that privileges an ideology of
transparent, static and coherent identity. Downes (2005, p. 141) suggests that
government and big business have a vested interest in pinning people's mediated
identity to their offline identity ‘as precisely as possible’. However I shall be arguing
that fluid identities come to the fore during the praxis of the technosocial.
Different types of corporate media appeal to the prosumer mentality to different
degrees. For example, performative media like computer games (even those that do
not operate in multiplayer mode) mean that players have choices and therefore can
engage issues of identity (see chapter three). Network television on the other hand, is
rarely responsive to personal taste and struggles to engage with identity issues.
Community television and community radio, which can align itself with a niche
audience, is more successful in engaging with issues of personal identity, but they do
so precisely by refuting the mid-twentieth century Reithian16 belief that mass
broadcasting should promote common national values. Mass broadcasting may be well-
placed to develop (or perhaps, indeed, enforce) group identity, but not to promote
personal uniqueness.
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Much prosumer activity operates beyond the reach of the national political discourse
surrounding broadcast media. Media policy-making is framed in terms of the good of
the nation; this is partly because, in Australia at least, media policy is the preserve of
the national government. As a result, either implicitly or explicitly, the rhetoric
surrounding mass broadcast media promotes the values of the nation-state.
Furthermore, broadcast media in Australia, particularly television, is mainly directed at
an Australia-wide audience. It is therefore not surprising that it should adopt the
Federal government’s national agendas.
On the other hand, prosumer and avant-garde activity tends to operate glocally—the
direct interface of the local with the international. Anecdotal evidence and personal
experience suggests that the Australian technosocial avant-garde has responded to
shrinking opportunities from local funding agencies by engaging with European, Asian
and American partners. Nationalism is rarely an important ideology in prosumer or
avant-garde contexts.
One example of Australian policy discourse which tied mass broadcasting and
corporate media-making to nationalism was the debate about the 2004 Free Trade
Agreement with the USA. This treaty appears to undermine the production of
Australian media content (Lundy 2004). However, the core problem has been
somewhat misconceived because of the ability of corporate media-makers to dominate
the debate: the Free Trade Agreement will not prevent Australians from
communicating or producing their own media. However, it may impact on the content
that receives big-budget, mainstream, mass media distribution. Australian product
circulating in prosumer or avant-garde networks seems unlikely to be affected (indeed,
consumption of prosumer product seems to be increasing), but it is also less likely to
meet the content agendas preferred by nationalistic policy-makers and large media
corporations. In implementing such policies as the Free Trade Agreement, national
policy-makers may inadvertently squeeze out an ideology that confirms their own
central position in the politics of Australian media.
Corporate media of relevance to my focus has been analysed within academic
discourse in a variety of interesting ways. Of particular note is the theory of
remediation, developed by Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin (1999). Remediation is the
result of two cultural mechanisms: immediacy and hypermediacy. Hypermediacy, whose
‘aim is to draw attention to the medium itself, deliberately hi-lighting the fact that
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what we view is not a transparent window on the world but merely a mediated
representation’ (Scott and White 2003, p. 319) is in a collaborative tension with
immediacy, in which viewers forget technological specificity and cultural reference to
engage with the media itself.
Bolter and Grusin (1999) argue that immediacy and hypermediacy are always both
present; together they create media that pays homage to, but also interrogates the
limitations of, prior media. Thus:
Digital visual media can best be understood through the ways in which they
honor, rival, and revise linear-perspective painting, photography, film,
television, and print. No medium today, and certainly no single media event,
seems to do its cultural work in isolation from other media, any more than it
works in isolation from other social and economic forces. What is new about
new media comes from the particular ways in which they refashion older media
and the ways in which older media refashion themselves to answer the
challenges of new media.
p. 15
The complex relationships that result are a mediascape in which, according to Hayles
(2002)
the relationships between different media are as diverse and complex as those
between different organisms co-existing within the same ecotome, including
mimicry, deception, cooperation, competition, parasitism and hyper-parasitism.
p. 5
Scott and White analyse the technosocially interesting Walking with dinosaurs series
(1999), which oscillates between immediacy and hypermediacy (2003, pp. 319-320)17.
Walking with dinosaurs also exists as a cross media, convergent product. Consumers
have a lot of choices about what aspect of the Walking with dinosaurs product range
they engage with, and also how they engage—video, web, etc.
Increasing the range of consumption mediums has become common since the Walking
with dinosaurs series. One local example is ABC Radio National repurposing its
broadcasts as MP3 podcasts18. As a result, programmes such as Late Night Live garner
an international, time-independent audience. Audiences are choosing from a plethora
of modes of consumption. Identity partly becomes a function of how you consume, not
just what you consume.
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Remediation is the guiding aesthetic principle of convergent and cross media. In many
ways, it works counter to traditional realism. Realism seeks a level of ontological
transparency and coherence which this neo-baroque range of choices betrays. We are
always making conscious technosocial decisions. We are told to look forward to a
future of media tailored for multiple devices on a pay-per-view basis from the BBC or
News Corporation, and homes dominated by an ‘entertainment hub’ which serves
media to all these devices (envisaged, for example, by Microsoft’s Media Center PC;
see Ross (2006) and Ross and Martin (2005)).
The aesthetic of cross media, convergent remediation challenges traditional concepts
of copyright, a legal concept that served the legal and commercial requirements of
non-digital and realistic media well. With digital media, copying is particularly easy.
Technosocially well-informed creators practice ‘copyleft’, whether illegally or legally,
often motivated by political and ethical concerns as well as formal experimentation19.
Copyright, and the power relations it enshrines, is a contested site in the convergent,
remediated mediascape. It is one of the main ways in which corporate media clings to
its domination of an increasingly fragmented mediascape.
This fragmentation is facilitated by networked distribution, which has changed the
types of media content that are viable because of its ability to sustain ‘niche media’. A
producer might be more motivated to make niche work if he/she feels confident that a
large proportion of that relatively small audience can be reached via the network.
According to Doug Kaye (2005)
the best blogs and podcasts aren't those that appeal to the largest and most
generic audiences, but rather those that deliver the greatest value to an
audience, regardless of the size of that audience. One might have a blog or
podcast about organ transplants, for example. Wouldn't make the Top Anything
list, but for the intended readers/listeners, it would be #1. Old media can't do
that. New media can and should. Change lives in as profound a way as possible.
The networked facilitation of niche media illustrates how technology, social
relationships and economics interrelate and evolve. Until recently, such media was not
sustainable, because producers were unlikely to reach their community of interest.
One of the challenges corporate media faces is how to commercialise such behaviour
in the face of passionate prosumers willing to give up their time and energy for their
niche, for little or no financial return. Prosumer audiences, likewise, appear forgiving
of poor production values if the content is right.
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The challenge for corporate media is cognitive before it is economic. Lehman-Wilzig
and Cohen-Avigdor (2004, p. 723) argue that ‘[t]ransforming deep-rooted patterns of
thought and consumption undercut the very foundation of the older media...’. An
illustrative example are adolescents, whose mobile phones may consume a high
percentage of their disposable income. It would appear that the social payoff justifies
their expenditure. As Idhe (1993, p. 34) observes, ‘the dimension of technology
transfers are never simply economic or productive, but multidimensioned and involve
cultural and existential interchange’. Indeed, as telcos become content suppliers, the
very identity of corporate media suppliers is changing.
Networked, peer-to-peer distribution is a core technology facilitating changes in
technosocial practices that break down traditional distinctions between audience and
producer. Resnick (2001, pp. 11-13) suggests the strengths of networked information
sharing, some of which are explicit, and others emergent. It
• facilitates information routing;
• helps people to exchange other resources besides information;
• makes it easier for people to provide emotional support to each other;
• enables coordination of interdependent actions.
He locates seven ‘productive resources’ (2001, pp. 13-17) that collude to create
SocioTechnical Capital:
1. communication paths;
2. shared knowledge;
3. shared values;
4. a shared sense of collective identity;
5. obligations, debts that have been incurred during prior interactions;
6. roles and norms of behaviour for people playing those roles;
7. trust.
One of the striking things about this list is its similarity to the early broadcast
television rhetoric. That rhetoric has largely been discredited: when the
communications paths are one-way, assumptions by the creator about shared
knowledge and values must be made. In the broadcast context, any shared sense of
collective identity tends to be at best a statement about successful monocultural
assimilation, or at worst, an alienating experience of ‘identity enforcement’. Resnick
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implies that P2P networks seek to address similar issues of identity, community and
trust, but they do so from ‘grass roots’ power-bases.
As Ingrid Richardson (2005) suggests, when audiences become users, there are
changes in the relationships ‘between individuals and society, private and public
domains, temporal and spatial perception, location and presence, embodiment and
interface’. These are issues that corporate media-makers are struggling to come to
terms with. As we shall see in chapter three, their most successful contemporary
response is the computer game, but even that type of media does not escape a fair
amount of cultural controversy. What affect do the relationships that result from
technosocial praxis have on our sense of who we are?
I d e n t i t y  a nd  t h e  a p p a r a t u s
In previous sections of this chapter, we have considered three technosocial
‘positions’—a term and approach adapted from Bourdieu (1993). Contemporary
technosocial ways of engagement with media and communications give rise to a
prosumer position which throws into relief aspects of avant-garde, and corporate
media-maker positions. The types of positions that have characterised modernism and
capitalism are evolving in the face of technosocial challenges to traditional ideas of art
and media-making and consumption.
Downes (2005, p. 12) argues that functional sociology tends ‘to undervalue questions
about why we might choose to use technologies (computers, for instance) in new or
unintentional ways or why we keep using them as a form of communication and
expression’. My task is to translate such functional observations into reflections about
the way our experience of media communications technologies impact on identity and
our sense of human possibility and thus, to future uses, patterns and opportunities.
Thus, technosocial contexts contribute ‘to a general reconsideration of traditional,
unitary notions of identity’ (Turkle 1996, p. 260).
My approach extends sociological and political insights into philosophical and cultural
realms. Our engagement with technology challenges our sense of self:
A sense of self requires a poetic assemblage of experience. One experiences
oneself not as an entity but as having a place from which one perceives and acts
and where one is perceived and related to ... the self is ecological, artifactual,
and enacted. One also perceives oneself in relation to the groups to which one
belongs—one has a social self.
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Downes 2005, p. 70
The self becomes fragmented, multiple, and engaged with different types of realities,
perhaps even simultaneously. Identity is thus tied to our concept of what reality is like.
The question of what reality is like has been a stumbling-block for new media
theorists. This stumbling-block is signified in the multiple, confused uses of one term:
‘virtual’.
Jaron Lanier invented the phrase ‘VR’ to signify ‘a computer simulation of sufficient
fidelity that a user can operate in the simulation’ (Downes 2005, p. 45). Lanier wasn’t
proposing any kind of fakeness about virtual reality, rather VR was ‘an expansion of
reality, the provision of alternate realities’ (Lanier et al 1992, p. 8). This relatively
harmless term has been somewhat carelessly expanded into ontological realms.
The original meaning of ‘virtual’ is ‘not actual, but just as if’ (Heim 1993, p. 160). It is a
big leap from this meaning to Downes’ idea of virtuality ‘based on the relative
transparency of a technological system that allows a user to experience a
communicative event and to ignore the technology mediating the experience’ (2005, p.
72). Another oft-cited term, ‘immersion’ is often used in this sense20, and I will use
this term in a similar way.
Heim (1993) argues that:
A virtual world can be virtual only as long as we can contrast it with the real
(anchored) world. Virtual worlds can then maintain an aura of imaginary reality,
a multiplicity that is playful rather than maddening.
p. 133
This contrast is extremely tenuous, and opens criticism up to complex ontological
argument definitely beyond the scope of this exegesis. I will argue instead that both
mediated and nonmediated worlds are ‘real’, however the ways in which they are ‘real’
might differ. Introducing the term ‘virtual’ as a way of distinguishing between these
worlds introduces an unhelpful regime of values. In a limited but productive sense, we
can talk instead about worlds that are framed by other worlds (even if, as I will argue
in chapter three, when you are absolutely immersed, that framing disintegrates).
The means to achieving an ideal, unified experience is data, says Coyne (1999, p.
257)—but data is malleable; it transits in and out of ‘existence’. Our technosocial
unities are ironic; they are beholden to language, which itself is a transient thing. It is
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to the ironies of producing transient texts, derived from the play of nonhuman
language, that I now turn.
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 C H A P T E R  T W O:  I ,  A P P A R A T U S ,  Y O U
 Poetry is liquid language.
Novak 1992, p. 229
The aim of this chapter is to theorise the creative process involved in the technosocial
praxis introduced in chapter one, exemplified by my own avant-garde work
Concatenation. The role of language in technosocially rich forms of media structures
specific types of relationships between author/programmer, text, apparatus and
ultimately user. These are relationships I call trilogical, and they will remain important
throughout the current work.
The linguistic phenomena that I will explore ultimately suggest that technosocial
engagements are a distinct type of human activity derived from quite different
relationships to those that humans have with the heavy technology decried by
Heidegger. My approach draws on constructivism, which suggests that our
technosocial engagements collaborate in creating the reality that we live in. The
relatively negative attitude to apparatuses communicated by Heidegger and Flusser is
not a necessary outcome of trilogical collaborations. The impact of our trilogical
engagements are as complex as any other linguistic phenomena, and not, therefore
prone to specific or pre-determined ethical or political appropriation.
Concatenation, a recent creative work produced as part of this PhD project, belongs to
a sub-genre called generative poetics; it has relationships with generative visual art
practices and other algorithmic textual practices. While these works are textual—both
in the programming and in the surface display—the following observations are broadly
applicable to computer-based works that do not wholly, or mainly, result in display of
written language. The trilogue surmounts some traditional genre distinctions by
focusing on the similarities about the relationships between human and apparatus
across computer-based artforms. Such ‘texts’ (understood generically) exist co-
extensively with the apparatus when they are executed; they are described as ‘a single
ideocratic device’ in Talan Memmott’s Lexia to perplexia (2001a). I call such texts ‘text-
as-apparatus’. When used, they perform the technosocial environments in which
interpretation happens.
The project work discussed in this chapter adheres to the idea of the technosocial
avant-garde described in chapter one. I will conclude this chapter with observations on
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the problematic contemporary position of the technosocial avant-garde, before
discussing in later chapters positions that seem less prone to tensions derived in part
from inserting modernist cultural values into a technosocial environment that
privileges inclusivity, interaction and dialogue.
U n b la c k i ng  t h e  b o x
Influenced by Martin
Heidegger, Vilèm Flusser
(2005) was one of the earliest
communications
phenomenologists to consider
the digital apparatus. He argues
that apparatuses supposed to
aid human creativity, like stills
cameras and movie cameras,
stunt human creativity.
According to Flusser, the
apparatus requires and creates
a specific type of culture that
distances humans from
‘nonmediated RL’. Since Flusser wrote in the early 1980s, apparatuses, and particularly
computers—combinations of software and hardware, often connected to the
network—have become ubiquitous.
Flusser made some key assumptions about the nature of the human-apparatus
relationship worth questioning. For instance, he conceptualizes the apparatus as a
‘black box’, a given that the user can not access. Flusser defines a program as a sub-
human and mindless ‘combination game based on chance’ (p. 69). Creative power is
almost wholly in the hands of the programmer, a shadowy figure whose humanity
seems overwhelmed by the technical-manufacturing ‘metaprograms’ that s/he
contributes to and instantiates in her programming work. In other words, the system
obscures humanness.
However, contemporary programmers are not shadowy ciphers conforming to the
grand plan of an apparatus-ruled world. As Florian Cramer (2001) stresses, ‘computer
Image 2.1: Semtexts at the Australian Centre for the Moving
Image, 2004
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code, and computer programs, are not machine creations and machines talking to
themselves, but writings by humans’. The phenomenal success of Flickr is one example
of programmers socially engaged in technosocial creativity. The programmer/artist1 has
peered inside the ‘black box’ and learned to manipulate it, for user-centric ends. The
apparatus is transformed into a technology with a range of affordances, which the
programmer takes advantage of to create a text-as-apparatus: a text which is
coextensive with a machine, and which instantiates performance as its modus operandi.
As Gelernter (1994, p. 115) argues, it is the software, not the hardware, which is of
ultimate interest, because the character and functioning of the apparatus ‘are
determined not by the way it is put together, but rather by the identity it has
temporarily assumed—by the program it is executing’. That is, the apparatus is
nothing, if it is not performing as a text-as-apparatus.
Cramer (2001) alludes to the difficulty of analysing the text-as-apparatus because
program code contaminates in itself two concepts which are traditionally
juxtaposed and unresolved in modern linguistics: the structure, as conceived of
in formalism and structuralism, and the performative, as developed by speech
act theory.
The notion of the trilogue provides a way of thinking about the relationship between
structure and performance inherent in the text-as-apparatus2. John Cayley suggests
analysing the text-as-apparatus in ways specific to its linguistic ‘ontology’
because the code is not necessarily transparent or visible in human-readable
language; because code has its own structures, vocabularies and syntaxes;
because it functions, typically, without being observed, perhaps even as a
representative of secret workings, interiority, hidden process; because there
are divisions and distinctions between what the code is and does, and what the
language of the interface text is and does, and so on.
2002
The code is generally hidden to human interpreters; it is not in itself an object for
hermeneusis (a human activity), and yet it enables the interpreted text. This obscure
but nontrivial textual ‘ecology’ must be unpacked with reference to the human activity
that bookends it—at its conception is the programmer, while its execution is presided
over by the user/interpreter.
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My work Concatenation is a text-as-
apparatus. It was necessarily
created within, and is necessarily
experienced via a computer. This
Shockwave3 program generates
two versions of its single
text—one to be executed by the
apparatus and the other to be
interpreted by a user. These
versions are sensually discreet, but
exist in a relationship of necessary
correspondence. However, while
the program at first glance seems
‘omniscient and omnipotent’ (Flusser 2005, p. 68), depending on the programmer’s
design, execution and interpretation are under user control. In other words, analysis
of the text-as-apparatus outside of its human context is hermeneutically barren.
D i a l o g u e s  a nd  t r i l o g u e s
Programming is addressed to two
different entities—directly, to the
apparatus and indirectly, to the
human user. The programmer
addresses her human audience by
writing something that the
computer can execute. If all goes
well, what manifests is a text that a
human (who doesn’t read
programming) will interpret.
Thus the scope of dialogue is
revised by the text-as-apparatus.
As described by Merleau-Ponty
(1962, p. 453), dialogue constitutes
‘between the other person and myself a common ground’ in which ‘my words and
Image 2.2: Concatenation at the Australian Centre for
the Moving Image, 2004
Image 2.3: Concatenation
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those of my interlocutor … are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of
us is the creator’. It results from the creation of a ‘dual being, where the other is for
me no longer a mere bit of behaviour in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are
collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity’ in which ‘[o]ur perspectives
merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world’.
The trilogue seeks to encompass the synthetic and mediating role of the apparatus in
acts of communication that also possess (at least) two human parties—programmer
and interpreter. The trilogue offers scope for exploration of different types of
communicative acts, which nevertheless also result in a ‘merging of perspectives’ and a
‘co-existing in a common world’.
From the interpreter’s perspective, it appears that the totality of linguistic aspects of a
text-as-apparatus is impossible to know. Only humans can undertake the interpreting
part of the trilogical relationship; while they can trigger textual changes, they are
excluded from the direct text-execution (an algorithmic process undertaken by the
apparatus). The trilogue promotes an emergent text resulting from the co-operation
of programmer, apparatus and interpreter. For example, the interpreter is in a
position to grapple with the questions about ‘intent, identity, history, authenticity, so
on…’ (Coverley 2003) only if the recombinant nature of Memmott’s ‘Self Portrait(s)
[as Other(s)]’ (April, 2003), in which the descriptors of major figures from the history
of art are wittily recombined, is understood. Sophisticated interpreters know there is
more (text) going on than meets the eye. The trilogical relationship discloses an
ecology of texts within texts, of illusion and truth, of revelation and secret that, as we
shall see in chapter three, quickly become suffused with ontological interpretations
concerning the nature of the real. There is no ‘essential text’ distinct from the process
of trilogical collaboration and performative interpretation.
What programming is like
Programming is a species of logical writing whose operational efficacy derives from the
correspondence of surface display (that is, what the screen shows the interpreter)
with coded instruction, where correspondence is not equivalent to representation. In
contrast, natural language works on principles of coherence, empathy and a level of
syntactical forgiveness.
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Texts that simultaneously deliver these two types of language require from
programmer/artists an ability to engage different philosophies of language (that is, not
merely vocabularies) at the same time. Writing for the apparatus alone is ultimately
meaningless and non-communicative, since apparatuses are not interpreters. It is only
in trilogical circumstances that the text-as-apparatus communicates.
However, programming code does possess an aesthetic allure. It has been described as
‘highly recursive and highly architectural, building upon layers of layers’ (Cramer
2001). The computer practices an extreme ‘hypertextuality’ on the code it executes,
by reading functions that may call other functions and other objects, with little regard
to their textual proximity. The aim of the programmer is ‘elegance’—code should be
as brief and powerful and bugless as possible. Programmers spend hours testing their
code by executing the code and putting themselves in the position of human
interpreter. In this quest for power and elegance, programmer/artists may start
thinking they have a productive dialogue with the apparatus itself. However, the
apparatus offers no original thought, but only the surprises of execution, and seeking
dialogue with the apparatus offers limited onanistic satisfactions.
In others words, ‘significance’ for the apparatus is epistemologically distinct from
‘meaning’ in a (human-centric) poem4. Significance has an operational result. When
code is significant, it can be executed without error. Code can only ever ‘signify’ one
thing. It is not open to interpretation, and does not scatter meaning in different
directions. The program won’t signify something different in twenty years time when
the War on Terror is over.
On the other hand, ‘meaning’ is contextual and nuanced. It emerges from the way
specific individuals interpret the text into a multiplicity of elements, then determine
how to unify it again.
The difference between my use of ‘significance’ and ‘meaning’ is further apparent if we
consider the different ways in which humans and apparatuses respond to nonsense.
When the computer encounters a ‘bug’ in the code, no dialogic negotiation takes
place. The program—the performance—stops, and the most the human interpreter
can hope for is an indication of syntactical irregularity that has stymied execution,
performance, and event. That indication will rarely, of course, shed light on meaning,
since the apparatus doesn’t understand the distinction between meaning and
The technosocial mediascape 34
significance. As far as the apparatus is concerned, the monitor is displaying exactly
what was programmed, whether it be an error message or a poem. However, when a
human encounters an apparently nonsensical text, he/she will often attempt to
extrapolate meaning through clues and cues. We may refer to other texts or previous
experience. We might make whimsical and idiosyncratic interpretations inconceivable
to our friends. In other words, computers can’t read poetry; only humans can. Natural
language is not a transparent bearer of meaning in the way that programming code
absolutely must be (Glazier 2000). Even a random script—that opportunity for the
computer to perform ‘unpredictably’—is completely transparent. The apparatus is
never asked to choose for itself.
The apparatus has no concept of multiplicity: it sees only the unity of data. There is no
‘beyond’ the data. The human interpreter engages in a ‘back and forth’ between the
unity of the text and multiple factors in the world that might be brought to bear on
interpretation. The interpreter cannot help reaching beyond the text; the apparatus
has no capacity to do other than stay within its boundaries (even if, because the
computer is networked, those boundaries are extensive). In this sense the computer’s
agency is logical and exhaustive. Even networked texts are finite, and rules determine
behaviour. Human interpretation is potentially infinite, and entails degrees of choice.
Computers can’t practice the ‘prejudice’ that, according to Gadamer (1977, p. 9),
constitutes being.
Concatenation
Through trilogical engagement, questions about identity and humanness arise because
you are always implicitly comparing your own behaviour to that of the apparatus.
These questions ultimately derive from the complex ways that language is used and
manifests itself in the text-as-apparatus. I will illustrate the ways they arose for me in
my own work, Concatenation.
Indeed, in subtle ways, these questions are encapsulated by the title, ‘Concatenation’.
‘Concatenation’ is a programming term for joining things together. The poetic text is
produced on screen via a complex range of rules from the database of possible textual
combinations5. That database is, itself, almost wholly programming code, written in
conformance with the Director software, the PC operating system, and the browser.
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As I progressed in the production of Concatenation, the process of programming it
came to seem like an exercise in applied philosophy of language. One language—lingo
code—could, under certain circumstances, create another language—English. Although
they were both written in the same alphabet, and the programming code contained
(between quotation marks) some of the English phrases that the monitor displayed,
syntactically, linguistically and even, in various instances, symbolically, the languages
were distinct. These distinctions were necessary because of their very different
audiences (Cayley 2002), and the different types of responses those audiences are
capable of—while apparatuses execute , humans interpret.
Not comprehending that these linguistic differences were ontologically interesting in
themselves, I complained as I tried to learn and apply principles of object-oriented
programming that it would be more direct to write my poem on paper, thus avoiding
that extra layer of translation due to the existence of code that had to be executed
before it could be interpreted. Interpretation required programming with a level of
transparency and unambiguity that was alien to natural language—and, indeed, to
poetry. I had to force the apparatus to create a text that humans might want to engage
with. If I was writing a print poem, I could have a ‘normal’ dialogue with my audience. I
needed to discover a reason why the apparatus should intervene.
Interpretation based on human dialogue is open to negotiation, but there is a non-
negotiable core to the apparatus: it can only respond to a limited range of commands
written in specific syntax. Ellen Ullman (1997) describes
something in the system itself, in the formal logic of programs and data, that
recreates the world in its own image... We think we are creating a system for
our own purposes. We believe we are making it in our own image. We call the
microprocessor the ‘brain’; we say the machine has ‘memory.’ But the
computer is not really like us. It is a projection of a very slim part of ourselves:
that portion devoted to logic, order, rule, and clarity. It is as if we took the
game of chess and declared it the highest order of human existence.
p. 89
I learned to accommodate the apparatus’ weltanschauung and make it a part of the
aesthetics of the poem by using the concept of concatenation as an uber-metaphor. I
programmed the apparatus to engage in a to-and-fro process in which human
interpretation is flavoured by the behaviour of the apparatus. In the to-and-fro
exchange that the trilogue establishes, the text-as-apparatus reveals interdependence
and collaboration. The trilogue can oblige the apparatus to yield a poetic, human-
The technosocial mediascape 36
centric interpretive environment that confounds much of the negative attitude of
twentieth century philosophy of technology (including Flusser) concerning the
apparatus imposing ‘systems’-based anti-humanism on social and cultural behaviour.
In Concatenation, the text unfolds according to complex algorithmic rules. A poetic
trilogue results, in which programmer, apparatus and interpreter have distinct and
equally important roles. Interpreters must conform to the operational constraints of a
rule-bound, materially specific, text-as-apparatus. In that act of conformance and
negotiation, interpreters confront the ‘epistemology’ of the apparatus and the
‘ecology’ of the text-as-apparatus. As hands manipulate mouse and brains interpret the
sometimes ‘clunky’ interfaces that mediate our trilogical relationships, these
relationships themselves become part of the text’s meaning. This is the metaphorical
concatenation.
Developing this ‘philosophy of the trilogue’ seemed to be the prior condition for
composing a text like Concatenation. While interpretation is the user’s domain, as
programmer I was still responsible for establishing the trilogical environment in which
interpretation was possible. My previous model had been based on the flawed
assumption that a dialogic relationship between author and user was the only worthy
ideal. Instead, I found I needed to reconceptualise the apparatus as my collaborator.
This was forcefully presented to me when I created my own programming, but was
unable to predict precisely what would happen. Programmer and computer together
created a text specific to the material affordances of the apparatus and the conditions
under which it would be interpreted. Meanwhile, as a performed, generative text, the
apparatus was going to collaborate with the user too. A trilogical nexus resulted
between programmer, apparatus and user6.
The constructivist apparatus
The linguistic complexity of technosocial praxis ramifies on identity and the way we
construct the real. The contemporary apparatus functions by complete dependence on
linguistic invention. Unlike dialogue, trilogical communications are mediated by
apparatuses which can’t respond to a nod and a wink. My mobile can’t tell me whether
the text message I have just received is from someone who is relaxed or nervous. All
communications between me and the human interlocutor who sent me the media or
the message must be exhaustively specified in programming code and data. As a result,
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what I understand is impacted upon, and my view of the world is flavoured by, the
apparatus’ linguistic ‘filter’. Humans have different types of language capabilities, and
different types of understanding than apparatuses, and yet we collaborate7. We
trilogically negotiate the real.
Theories about the connection between language and reality are not new, neither in
the history of ideas, nor in new media philosophy. Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example,
is said to have reinvented philosophy to clear up ‘the confusions caused by the
bewitchments cast by language’ (Monk 2005, p. 2). Wittgenstein is interesting because
the history of his thought shows him changing his attitude to language. That change is
mirrored by the different ways that humans and apparatuses ‘understand’.
The trajectory of Wittgenstein’s thought is encapsulated in his two famous works, the
enigmatic Tractatus logico-philosophicus (2006b; originally published 1921) and the
posthumously published Philosophical investigations (2006a; originally published 1953). In
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s views on language culminate in his famous aphorism,
‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ (2006b, p. 30 proposition #7).
One possible interpretation is that use of language should be limited to communicative
acts that are unambiguous and clear8. Taken literally as a recipe for language use, we
can see it at work in any successful computer program: ambiguous or meaningless
coding results in error messages, if not a ‘crash’. The only statements that are
meaningful are those that are exhaustively defined either within the program, or within
the syntax of the programming language itself (Perl, php, Java, etc).
The initial propositions of the Tractatus can be interpreted as anticipating the
‘ontology’ of a computer program:
1 The world is everything that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts.
1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all
that is not the case.
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into facts.
Wittgenstein 2006b p. 2
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An ‘object’ in object-oriented programming is a type of fact within the ontology of the
program. In a qualified way9, the foundations of computer programming conform to
the ontological predisposition of the Tractatus. In an object-oriented program, the
world is, indeed, the totality of facts. In other words, artificially over-specified
programming code wears its logical form on its sleeve, to adapt a phrase from Monk
(2005 p. 48).
For the early Wittgenstein, language could be reduced to propositions, which are
‘pictures … of what they represent’ (2006b, p. 10 proposition #4.011). Attempts to go
beyond this to the linguistic expression of deep truths (that is, non-objective human-
centric meanings coloured by emotion, aesthetics and ethics) always ‘crash’. You need
to show deep truths, not say/write them (Monk 2005, p. 21). This principle informs the
performative ontology of computers and computer programming. Meanwhile, HCI
(Human-Computer Interface) obscures the code, and the development of ever-more
sophisticated and intuitive HCI derives from the general idea that ‘deep truth’ cannot
be communicated by code itself. The computer, which only ever ‘understands’ the
code, can never understand ‘deep truth’. As a technosocial poet, I came to the
conclusion that it can however, reveal or imply the ‘deep truth’ by collaborating with
the human, in the human-centric version of the text that the monitor displays.
Different languages, different symbols, and ultimately, different understandings exist
for different entities: the deeper a human looks into the layers of code that run our
apparatuses, the more arcane they become. No one reads machine code, and no one
wants to. We agree: there is no meaning in a series of 0’s and 1’s. Rather, the
apparatus interprets digital data back up the hierarchy of code until it breaks into
something that we can read (for some this meaning break-point will happen sooner
than for others). Acts of interpretation, by human interpreters, are generally
dependent on obscuring the apparatus’ coded knickers.
We visit someone’s homepage on MySpace , play computer games, and send text
message poems to our girlfriends. Routinely, we barely acknowledge the bizarre,
coded instructions going on somewhere behind the HCI. The visually and aurally-rich
environments that humans engage with are what the apparatus has to ‘show not say’.
And thus we can return to Wittgenstein, who thought that renouncing language to
‘show not say’ had enormous implications:
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Among those things that ‘show themselves’ are ethics, aesthetics, religion, the
meaning of life, logic and philosophy. In all these areas, Wittgenstein appears to
believe, there are indeed truths, but none of these truths can be expressed in
language: they all have to be shown, not said.
Monk 2005, p. 21
Give to language (code) all that is logical. Everything else gets whipped up in a frothy
mess of emotion and aesthetics that humans do so well. The early Wittgenstein would
have loved the digital, through which language (code) and showing (HCI) can be neatly
decanted into separate activities with different purposes and different audiences.
Ultimately, however, the position expressed in the Tractatus can not be sustained
(except in programming code). The later Wittgenstein himself renounced the idea of
the ‘crystilline purity of logic’ (Monk 2005, p. 61) to replace it with a use-centric
analysis of living language:
I used to believe that philosophy had to give a definitive dissection of
propositions so as to set out clearly all their connections and remove all
possibilities of misunderstanding. I spoke as if there was a calculus in which
such dissection would be possible… At the root of all this there was a false and
idealized picture of the use of language. Of course, in particular cases one can
clarify by definitions the connections between the different types of use of
expressions. Such a definition may be useful in the case of the connection
between ‘visual impression’ and ‘sphere’. But for this purpose it is not a
definition of the concept of a physical sphere that we need; instead we must
describe a language game related to our own, or rather a whole series of
related language games, and it will be in these that such definitions may occur.
Such a contrast destroys grammatical prejudices and makes it possible for us to
see the use of a word as it really is, instead of inventing the use for the word.
Wittgenstein 2006a, pp. 37-38
Thus logic gives way to hermeneusis, atomism is replaced with context, and this
approach to language remains one that still flavours post-structural hermeneusis today.
The idea that computers use a certain type of nonhuman language has been remarked
before, for example, in Heim's (1993, chapter two passim) analysis of Boolean logic.
However, the philosophical analysis of digital experience has been dogged by what I
will call ‘reality fundamentalism’. In this formulation, mediated experience is somehow
not as real as its predicated other, nonmediated experience10. I will arguing against
reality fundamentalism: I would say that the direct thing we are involved with is the
apparatus; and the language that suffuses its workings is as real as any other language
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which establishes the way we interpret the world. Multiple worlds have multiple
languages.
The programmer engages then not only with two different concepts of language, but
with the different ideas of the real that they imply. The apparatus relies on significance
(equivalent to the early Wittgenstein’s scientific and logical idea of language), while the
human seeks meaning (equivalent to the later Wittgenstein’s idea of context and
language games). Human text and human dialogue are embedded within the trilogue,
but the trilogue operates under the terms and conditions of logical languages. The
constructivist approach allows us to describe ontology as flavoured by the various
linguistic philosophies of programming code and human text. The ‘ontology’ implied by
programming is of a (digital) universe that can be exhaustively enumerated; in which
objects in propositions can be precisely defined; in which logic has ultimate value; and
in which binary choices preclude the existence of questions that can not be answered.
There is nothing to explore or question, because nothing can exist beyond its borders.
The ontology implied by human language concerns a world which evolves according to
use. These ideas about ontology are simultaneously embedded within any text-as-
apparatus. It is a creative tension, in which questions of being—being human and being
machinic—are constantly interrogated during composition, performance and
interpretation.
‘[T]he border between language and experience is not a neat and clear one’, according
to Don Idhe (1973, p. 138). He further notes that ‘[e]ven the distinction between
linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena, between words and their referents must be
made linguistically’. Programming code further complicates separations of language
from experience, because it establishes a type of language whose initial object is not
the communication of human experience, but rather the performance of a logically and
linguistically specified universe.
With the intermingling of linguistic ontologies in the text-as-apparatus, it is perhaps
not surprising that a level of irony infuses interpretation: indexicality is completely
unsustainable. Indeed it can be difficult to believe in representation at all, when the
text is shrouded by linguistic filtering and HCI. Handwriting on paper—a signifier of
intimacy and personality (Heidegger (1992) quoted in Kittler 1999, p. 198)—and the
type of dialogue it promotes, is replaced by distance, non-indexical representation and
iterative performance.
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The meaning of concatenation
Some of the earliest non-apparatus generative experiments were carried out by the
OuLiPo (Ouvroir Littérature Potentille) group, notably by Raymond Queneau (1961)11.
Display was determined via the application of algorithms to a database of potential
elements. Such experiments were empowered by the computer (Fournel 1961, p. 182).
A classic work of apparatus-based OuLiPan recombinatory poetics is Florian Cramer’s
Permutations (1996-2000). However, generative poetics have become reasonably easy
to find on the Web. Vivaria’s (2000) random word generator called The Complete
Works of Shakespeare
generates random words endlessly and checks each word against a dictionary of
words that Shakespeare himself used. When a word is recognised, it is
highlighted, and added to the document in the lower portion of the screen.
Over time, Shakespeare's words will collect and form a new work.
Benjamin Gomez’ ci-gît (c.2000-2005) is a shockwave application applying Brion
Grysin’s12 cut-up principle, which allows the user to author text for herself, amongst a
certain range of possible words. Poem dada (2005) by Robin Stein remixes
contemporary newsfeeds.
Further experiments engage the OuLiPan principle in conjunction with the greater
range of user creativity afforded by the network. Noah Wardrip-Fruin et al’s The
impermanence agent (1999) is downloadable software that ‘customizes its story for
each user. The story takes a week to tell, in the corner of your screen, as you browse
other sites on the web’ (Wardrip-Fruin 1999). Content changes according to the
user’s web browsing until the original story is replaced.
Other creators have explored hypertext, which has been regarded as the dominant
rhetorical device for creative writing using the text-as-apparatus. Much interesting
work (at least, in terms of the affordances of the text-as-apparatus) escapes the link-
node tradition of static web pages13. One example is %20 Network by Jodi (c.2003),
which explores the affordances of the browser in somewhat disconcerting
programmatic ways. Such work is removed from literary traditions, and has been
appropriated more by art criticism. Concatenation belongs to this apparatus-enabled
generative tradition.
In creating Concatenation, my aim was to compose a text in which the materiality of the
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text supported its subject matter. ‘Concatenation’ is at work on many levels, including
in the subject matter of the poem. The poetic text explores the rhetoric used to
justify or explain some of the intractable conflicts in the world. These conflicts are
globally concatenated; they may commence in places like the Middle East, but they
‘wash up’ as a refugee crisis in Australian detention centres and a race riot on Sydney’s
Cronulla Beach.
The poetic text communicates transience and sameness—details might change, but the
message of intransigence and hopelessness is constant. Whatever side of a particular
conflict you are on, people suffer trauma, homelessness, injury, confusion. I discovered
that the rhetorical concatenation of conflict and power employed and repurposed by
politicians, and learned and adapted by ordinary citizens with odd changes of noun or
adjective, could be revealed as infinitely available for automatic re-purposing via the
programmed apparatus. I wrote a script that would infinitely recombine this rhetoric
according to various rules and random functions.
You have to perform Concatenation to get this message; no textual chunk ever overtly
makes that point. The programming performs transience and sameness via a database
of elements that can be recombined, but without the possibility of progress,
conclusion or resolution. The performance of these texts is the pivotal difference
between a conventional text and a trilogical one. Via performance, the text-as-
apparatus asserts its unique ‘ecology’.
‘Concatenation’ reveals itself as a way of patterning text, and speech, and the world
itself. In artistic blurbs I have described Concatenation as a decaying elegy. The textual
display within the Concatenation apparatus decays as soon as you move the mouse, and
is washed away if you click—always replaced by more of this part-absurd, part-
comprehendable rhetoric.
Designing textual combinations for generative recombination is very challenging,
particularly if you don’t share the surreal impetus of Tristan Tzara (1920)14 or William
Burroughs (1963). ‘Meaning’ is derived in Concatenation from the database of textual
combinations, and the rules that permit recombination: because the apparatus only
responds to significance, not meaning, it is easy for it to generate nothing but
nonsense (in terms of human meaning). The programmer/artist must engage trilogically
in order to manipulate the environment and successfully create a human-centric
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surface display that gives rise to an illusion of apparatus-interpreter dialogue. Creating
this il lusion may also give rise to the uncanny fallacy, as I will discuss below.
Two other works, Semtexts (2004) and When you reach Kyoto (2004)15 use the
Concatenation engine. Semtexts takes the recombinatory principle to an even greater
level of granularity. Into the engine database I programmed some semantically
suggestive syllables. These meaningful ‘semes’ (to adapt Richard Dawkins16)—meaning-
laden, or at least suggestive syllables—get recombined in unexpected ways. The result
is a Joycean word-engine that takes the stress out of the manufacturing of neologism.
Unexpected combinations of syllables prompt users to new concepts. Apparatus and
user seem to be collaborating in meaning-creation. Jim Rosenberg (c.2000) poetically
conceptualises this type of collaboration:
Computer screen as crystal garden, part of the mind / not part of the mind.
Metamorphosis, migration, evolution, reassembly: substitution may occur at the
play of super-words one for another, bonds broken and reattached elsewhere
in the mixing of the atoms at higher energy, a fractally point-sharp force of
surprise....
Rosenberg (1994) postulates new hypertextual principles like simultaneities (‘literal
layering on top of one another of language elements’) and polylinearity (‘stringing of
word skeins in a graphical space where normal print conventions establish no clear
ordering among the skeins’—a device I sometimes employ in Concatenation). Such
experiments lead Rosenberg to conclude, in the tradition of Vannevar Bush (1945) and
Theodore Nelson (1965), that hypertext is not merely ‘a medium of organising
thoughts, but … a medium of thought’ (Rosenberg 1994).
The uncanny fallacy
The history of critical responses to the text-as-apparatus has been ridden with
misconceptions about the trilogical relationship. For example, over-estimating the
importance of specific rhetorical strategies, such as hypertext, means that critics have
failed to explore the ontological issues that lie at the heart of the trilogical
relationship and its hermeneusis. An undercurrent of woolly, somewhat superstitious
thinking about the apparatus’ consciousness sometimes results. Thus the text-as-
apparatus becomes uncanny17—always on the verge of being alive, because we are
always on the verge of granting consciousness and purpose to it, without recognising
that its agency is attributable to collaborations involving human programmers,
The technosocial mediascape 44
engineers and designers. The apparatus becomes undecidable, as Nicholas Royle (2003,
p. 15) says.
One example of uncanny interpretation is this reading of Ray Kurzweil’s cybernetic
poet which is apparently able to
‘read’ poems by selected authors and from that create its own, original poem.
To create this poem, the algorithm first creates a ‘language model’ based on
mathematics closely resembling neural networks, known as markov models, and
with this language model, the computer can write a poem.
Kurd c.2001
Kurd anthropomorphicises the apparatus by conflating the apparatus and its human
programmer. However, Kurd cannot wholly be blamed for his uncanny interpretation,
because Kurzweil consciously sought the ‘Eliza effect’ (Aarseth 1997, p. 130). Kurzweil
(1996-1999) describes the cybernetic poet as a ‘narrower concept of a Turing test’ in
which a computer imitates a particular domain of human intelligence. As he puts it,
‘[o]ne such domain-specific Turing test [is] based on a computer's ability to write
poetry’. Kurzweil challenges us to determine which poem is by a human author, and
which is by the cybernetic poet, and suggests that works like I think I’ll crash pass the
Turing test:
I think I’ll crash.
Just for myself with God
peace on a curious sound
for myself in my heart?
And life is weeping
From a bleeding heart
of boughs bending
such paths of them,
of boughs bending
such paths of breeze
knows we’ve been there
Kurzweil’s cybernetic poet, 2000
Meanwhile, according to Hayles (2005), in Memmott’s Lexia to perplexia (2001a) ‘[c]ode
erupts through the surface of the screenic text, infecting English with machine
instructions and machine instructions with English, as if the distinction between natural
language and computer commands has broken down’. This language-mingling is also an
example of an uncanny interpretation of the apparatus, and was a common response in
the now receding period of text-as-apparatus novelty.
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While programmer/authors are free to try to create an uncanny affect, a hermeneusis
of the uncanny fails to come to grips with the complex linguistic-ontological questions
that the trilogue poses. Other possible hermeneutics revolve around the rhetoric of
convergence, which, while prone to technoromanticism, implies a technosocial
worldview. Another promising ‘meta-hermeneutics’ concerns patterning. From
experience of patterns arises meaning:
Textual and written languages are subsets of the pattern flows that inform an
embodied knowledge of the world. The variety of language use enables and is
enabled through hybrid constructions. Each new context adds another layer of
thought and experience to the accretive nature of meaning
production—generating a hybrid of hybrid of a hybrid, etc. Thus, an assemblage
of instances informs identity production as an ongoing process.
Seaman 2005a, p. 13
At this point in history, we are moving to a stage of ‘using patterns to reflect on
patterns’, according to Bill Seaman. The computer itself is implicated, because it
functions as a pattern-producing semiotic machine or extended linguistic
mechanism that enables both the ongoing production of sensual patterns as
well as the interactive manipulation of these patterns. In this light I would
suggest that the computer can potentially extend our definition of language and
in turn, linguistics. I call this more expansive take on linguistics Pattern Flows.
This understanding of linguistics enfolds computer-based perturbations as well
as other forms of environmental perturbations into an accretive participation in
meaning production.
Seaman 2005a, p. 15
The ‘ontology’ of the trilogue is replete with patterns—linguistic, coded and
structural. Indeed, the computer’s pattern-production allows the juxtaposition of
different types of media—different types of patterns—which Loss Pequeño Glazier
describes as ‘a metonymy that comes from overlaying, collage, juxtaposition of visual
elements, and forms of mapping’ (Glazier 2000). Perhaps as a result, digital media and
digital art is increasingly dominated by the aesthetics of collage and montage (Mirzeoff
1999, p. 15).
Multi-modal patterning is exemplified in Memmott’s Lexia to perplexia (2001a) which
‘must be considered not only as text but as a fully multimedia work in which screen
design and software functionality are part of its signifying practices’ (Hayles 2002, p.
57). As a result of a more in-depth conception of the trilogical relationship, second-
generation electronic literature ‘experiment…[ed] with ways to incorporate narrative
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with sound, motion, animation, and other software functionalities’ (p. 27), all
implications of the multi-model pattern flows described by Seaman. These are viable
hermeneutic responses to the trilogical relationship. Seaman’s understanding of the
pivotal nature of digital pattern flows in the service of evocation has similarities with
my use of concatenation as uber-metaphor for the text-as-apparatus.
C o nc e p t u a l i s i n g  t h e  t e c hno so c i a l  a v a n t - g a r d e
Having established a theory of
the trilogue that is at the core
of technosocial textuality, I will
now consider other critical
reflections about the
technosocial avant-garde,
preparatory to my own
thoughts about the cultural
politics of this position.
Although critical frameworks
for computer-based creative
work are available, and several
high-profile critics have focused on the materiality of the text, what I seek is a
philosophy of the relationships between creator, user and apparatus, which inform this
materiality. My focus on relationships is suggestively presaged by N. Katherine Hayles
(2002) and Espen Aarseth (1997). Hayles seeks texts that ‘reflexively interact with the
inscription technologies that produce them’ (2002, p. 24). She argues that the material
artifact (the apparatus) transforms the context and circumstances for interacting with
words. This changes the meanings of the words as well. Hayles seeks the ‘reflexive
loops’ between a text’s ‘imaginative world and the material apparatus embodying that
creation as a physical presence’ (p. 25).
However, materiality for Hayles remains skewed towards specific types of textual
experience: critics must beware of ‘genre lapse’ (Glazier 2000)—a reliance on the
conventions of print and literature, which Joseph Tabbi has characterized as a
‘domestication’ of technology ‘in terms familiar to a language-based discipline’ (Enns
2002, p. 1). Thus, Hayles’ analysis of the ‘set of relationships…constituted by artistic
Image 2.4: Concatenation and other work at the Australian
Centre for the Moving Image, 2004
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practice—between a newly problematized linguistic materiality and represented
content’ (Cayley 2000) perhaps falls short of its goal.
During the last few years we have
witnessed debate concerning the
relevance of literary analysis to the
text-as-apparatus. While there is
no question that creative writers
who collaborate with the apparatus
remain faithful to many of the
rhetorical devices of print
literature, is that sufficient reason
to describe the work they produce
as literature? Another way of posing this question is whether the ‘ontology’ of a
text—that is, the way in which the text exists—has such an influence on its reception,
that it predetermines the categorisation of that text?
The idea of the hypertextual apparatus unshackled text from strict linearity when it
was proposed by Vannevar Bush (1945) and Theodore Nelson (1965)18. As a result,
database replaces narrative, and archive replaces history—albiet an ironic archive,
representing a dual aim of ‘[d]ynamics without loss. Impermanence enfolded within
permanence’ (Wardrip-Fruin 1999, §6)19. Different media manifestations—text, audio,
moving image—have become the surface effects of the sea of data silently accumulating
beyond our senses. Instead of existing as a sui generis media artefact, we now
understand media / art objects as the more or less contingent endpoint of a process
ultimately comprised of data manipulation. The bigger the archive, the more
contingent is our experience of it. Implicit in my approach is the need to move away
from comparison with other artforms. Although I argue that understanding the
behaviour of language is essential to understanding text-as-apparatuses, this is not to
suggest that such texts therefore naturally belong within the category of literature.
An approach to the materiality of the text-as-apparatus which is less beholden to
literary analysis is proposed in Espen Aarseth's (1997) computational perspective for
‘cybertexts’, described by Hayles (2002, p. 28) as ‘functional and semiotic’. Cybertext
places ‘literary works on the same playing field as computer games and other
Image 2.5: Semtexts
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combinational worlds’ (p. 39), and creates a symbolic arena in which texts became
analyzable outside of literary convention. The methodology focuses on the ‘mechanical
organization of the text, by positing the intricacies of the medium as an integral part of
the literary exchange’ (Aarseth 1997, p. 1).
Thus Aarseth’s motivation is to express ‘the perspective of the text as a material
machine, a device capable of manipulating itself as well as the reader’ (p. 24). The user
becomes ‘a more integrated figure than even reader-response theorists would claim’
(p. 1) however, Aarseth adds elsewhere that individual ‘traversals’ (Montfort 1999)20
of a work should not be confused with the work itself (Aarseth 1997, p. 46). In other
words, the text-as-apparatus is ultimately conceived as analysable without regard for
the trilogical relationship. Aarseth wants to distinguish between experience and object
(p. 45); however, I see no analytical value in doing this. Instead the work must be
analysed as a performed and experienced object. I seek to conceptualise engagement,
not try to conjure ideal textual abstractions that can neither be tested nor
experienced.
Aarseth also proposes the pivotal relationship between scriptons (strings as they
appear to readers) and textons (strings as they exist in the text) (Hayles 2002, p. 40;
Aarseth 1997, p. 62)21. This approach privileges programming over surface phenomena
because the real action is ‘in the mathematical reality beneath the surface, where the
relations and objects of the system are being processed’ (Aarseth 1997, p. 39). This
focus sidelines interpretation and privileges ‘truth’22, unity, logic and rules—hallmarks
of the programmed text—over multiplicity, emotion, irony and nuance—hallmarks of
the interpreted text.
In contrast, John Cayley (2002) has foregrounded the relations involved in the text-as-
apparatus. He suggests that ‘[t]he flickering signifier cannot simply be seen as
something which goes on behind the screen; it emerges when code is allowed, as I say,
its proper place and function: when the composed code runs’ (Cayley 2002).
Programming code transforms signifiers ‘from writing as record of static or floating
simultaneities into writing as the presentation of atoms of signification which are
themselves time-based’. Code and text together represent the material conditions for
the performance of a work, which is like an instrument. Wardrip-Fruin (2003) writes
of ‘textual instruments’ which are ‘tool[s] for textual performance which may be used
to play a variety of compositions’23. Wardrip-Fruin describes the process in performing
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his n-gram instrument Babble!, in which alteration takes place as a result of user
decision. He expects the finished instrument will be
like a complex toy, that one can develop a sense for, that one can get better at
playing with. We expect it will be like an instrument, that one can learn how to
improvise on or play toward goals, for which one can learn the sources,
tunings, and means of playing that will lead to different effects.
The theoretical frames developed by these creators do suggest a trilogical
conceptualisation: instruments have their own affordances, which are implicated in
interpretation. Cayley (2002) suggests that programming the signifier ‘brings
transactive mediation to the scene of writing at the very moment of meaning creation’.
I take this to mean that performance and interaction pervades interpretation.
Talan Memmott has developed a networked phenomenology, expressed in a number of
works, that similarly expresses many features of trilogue and text-as-apparatus.
Trilogical relationships are expressed as ‘the (authorial) process of development, the
processing (or computation) that occurs through interacting with the work as
application, and the analytical (or sensorial) process for the reader/user’ (Coverley
2003).
Perhaps as a result of the nature of his mainly poetic publications, Memmott expresses
a phenomenology that seems romantic, value-laden and even perhaps transcendental.
Memmott’s networked ‘I’ is
not 5'8'' with brown hair when I am there. Identification is not dependent upon
appearance or presence but upon the collective significations of my fragmentary
Agents – I govern remotely. These agents, particles of {i} are dispatched deep
into the netherworld to serve as diplomats for myself.
‘§.Opera’, 2001c
Memmott’s ‘networked phenomenology’ (Coverley 2003) implies a transcendental
territory in which ‘The HEAD, the State that determines the projective state of I is
[N]either above [N]or below, always @, always going some(w)here. Even in forgetting,
the projective state of I is re:membered @body’ (Memmott, 2001b). This hybrid, code-
infected syntax signifies a mode of being both apparatus and human. Memmott’s phrase
‘@body’ seems to infer bodily contingency and echoes ideals of networked
disembodiment expressed by John Perry Barlowe (1996) and Mondo2000, and critiqued
by Hakim Bey (2001) and Vivian Sobchack (2001), who argues that a whole culture has
developed around mainly young, white males living a techno-fantasy of escape from
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bodily limitations. While it may be impossible to avoid inscribing networks and
apparatuses with value-judgements (and Memmott is by no means the lone poet of
networked utopia), we should be wary of extending ideas of trilogue and text-as-
apparatus into utopianism. Networks and apparatuses, like all human artefacts are
open to interpretation and the politics of use. My terminology seeks to establish less
immediately value-laden tools for analysis.
These theorists are all interested in the materiality of the text, however they privilege
the centrality of the relationships that are established by the trilogical text to varying
extents. With my more overtly phenomenological approach, I seek to foreground the
relational—indeed, the text-as-apparatus can barely be said to exist without active,
performative relationships taking place.
The next section examines more closely some of the previously alluded to ‘political’
questions about the technosocial avant-garde.
T h e  f u t u r e  o f  t h e  a v a n t - g a r d e
In not substantively addressing
the impact of technology on
culture, Pierre Bourdieu (1993)
seems to imply that no mere
technology would dismantle the
existence of the avant-garde.
Meanwhile, Flusser (2005) argues
that the apparatus represents
such a radical challenge to human
self-expression and freedom that
Bourdieu’s idea of creative
freedom enshrined in the avant-
garde is almost impossible, particularly if that avant-garde is deeply involved with
technology.
My own argument is that a technosocial avant-garde is indeed difficult to sustain.
Because of the transitory nature of its product, it may collapse as soon as it forms.
Furthermore, the modernist cultural politics associated with the concept of the avant-
Image 2.6: Concatenation at Spatial, National Gallery of
Australia, December 2004
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garde may be giving way to a politics which is more inclusive, adaptive and issues
based. The challenge for the technosocial avant-garde is not that the apparatus
consumes human creativity. Rather the collaborative nature of the trilogue and the
transient textuality it favours questions the traditional status of artists, and the
modernist idea of art.
In chapter one I suggested that a technosocial avant-garde position is at best ironic;
like the artworks its members create, it is experienced as a transient position. Given
the analysis we have now developed, what more can be observed about it?
Firstly, the authorial role changes as a result of the trilogue, given that the apparatus
enjoys a type of agency, in Latour’s (2005, p. 39) sense of mediation. Glazier (2000)
commends us to ‘consider such a sentimentalised “I”, often concerned with its own
mortality, as having passed away. Innovative practice is practice that often overcomes
the “I” to explore material dimensions of the text’. The trilogue overcomes the
sentimental ‘I’ by forcing artists into radical collaborations with non-human agency.
Memmott’s Self Portrait(s) [as Other(s)] (April, 2003) programmatically deconstructs the
romantic idea of artistic genius, and implicitly problematises his own artistic status at
the same time (Coverley 2003).
Secondly, the avant-garde depends on intertextuality—what has gone before is an
important reference point, either explicitly or implicitly, for avant-garde artists who
are highly educated in their artform. Jean-Pierre Balpe (2004, p. 387) argues that
western culture’s default position is to ‘privilege memory over creation, death over
life’. Classical (print-based) literature ‘petrified itself in insane rituals of fixity’. While
literature dreams of achieving its own perfect, final form (p. 388), digital textuality
shares capacity for variation with oral tradition. This is the emergent textuality of the
trilogue—variation and performance over permanence and reification. Balpe calls for a
creative writing that emulates ‘the fecundating power of language’ because through it
‘the receiving subject continually renews him or herself”. Refocusing on the text-as-
apparatus, which reconceives the conventions of production, will assist, because ‘in its
multiplicities and its variations, what it first shows are its potentials and its changes’.
Immediacy and infinitude characterise the performance of the text-as-apparatus. As a
result:
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The text, no longer literary, has now to annihilate all reverence, because what
is in view is the movement of the literary itself and not such or such of its
singular exhibitions. So the computer produces something like an infinite
‘diffraction’ of its texts.
p. 390
Annihilating reverence opens up new ways of thinking about creativity24. We privilege
chance, accident25 and engagement over the (limited) creativity of our own minds.
Works reliant on the network, such as Bluescreen’s Streamscape (2005)26 exemplify
this trilogical impetus:
This image is neither static, nor pre-recorded. It is gradually built live using
images streamed from webcams dispersed all over the world. These images are
updated each minute and are incorporated into the landscape with the help of a
very progressive dissolve.
‘Degenerative’ by Eugenio Tisselli (2005) engages the same anti-modernist themes. The
author describes it as ‘a web page that slowly becomes corrupted’ because ‘each time
the page is visited, one of its characters is either destroyed or replaced.’ Visitors to
the site can now only view the archive of its degeneration, since the work is now a
blank page27. The archive of the original page reads:
your visit will leave a permanent mark. this page will not be the same after you
visit it.
the only hope for this page to survive is that nobody visits it. but then, if
nobody does, it won't even exist. ¿does this happen with all the products of
visual culture? ¿why is everything getting renewed constantly? ¿does everything
contain the seed of its own destruction?
¿is visual culture a ritual of cannibalism and rebirth?
the only way to aim for permanence is through constant change
Tisselli 2005
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Transience here is the new
‘permanence’: but if transient,
trilogical works represent the
direction of the technosocial avant-
garde, then the avant-garde is
indeed an ironic position, because
such works exude a praxis of
dissolution and self-effacement. The
response to the text-as-apparatus
is the nullification of the author,
literature, permanent legacies, the
archive, linearity and closure. In
their stead, Glazier (2000) proclaims
the idea of the … poet-programmer or prose-programmer is of a person who
works among the tangles of the vines that yield the work. It is of one who sets
up a series of events that culminates in the work as an action or execution of
procedures. It includes a concept of intelligence that is more concerned with
setting into motion a number of variables than trying to freeze, can, or embalm
the outcome. The concern is, more specifically, with the parameters, character,
and nuances of that motion, not with any one of its possible productions.
Perhaps the ultimate expression of this ‘anti-literature’ is 0100101110101101.org’s
Biennale.py (2001a). Biennale.py is a virus, the performance of which is invisible, and the
archive of which is non-existent (apart from the archive of its reception). This is
because the work’s text entirely addresses the apparatus. Beauty, for its creators, lies
in the ‘love poem’ inscribed into the source code and the virus-like ways it spreads
through the network (0100101110101101.org 2001b), transgressing the boundaries of
well-behaved art. This avant-garde is characterized by a praxis that is not only
transient, but sometimes invisible. Reactions to this work bordered upon the
hysterical28, probably caused by the lack of an understanding of the linguistics and
relationships inherent in trilogical texts. Using traditional analysis, how do we
understand a text that has no sensual manifestation, even briefly? As extremist
conceptual art? Nevertheless, art and literary institutions attempt to maintain this
almost impossible avant-garde (the 49th Venice Biennale commissioned Biennale.py).
The subtext of transience and dissolution that seems to pervade trilogical work
further dissolves in the maelstrom of cyberspace, that ‘sublime complexity which
Image 2.7: When you reach Kyoto at the Australian
Centre for the Moving Image, 2004
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eludes representation’ (McQuire 2003, p. 168), with its ubiquitous redirects and 404
messages. In such ‘invented worlds’, ‘data streams’ can be redirected
into different representations: selves become multiple, physics become variable,
cognition becomes extensible. The boundaries between subject and object are
conventional and utilitarian; at any given time the data representing a user may
be combined with the data representing an object to produce ... what?’
Novak 1992, p. 234
Perhaps the avant-garde always exists as a set of multiple, shifting identities. However,
if trilogical agency is as much a function of the apparatus as it is of the
programmer/artist, avant-garde identity can be seen as one in which the idea of
authorship itself is problematic. The process of creating a work like Concatenation has
revealed to me that trilogic artists must struggle with and reflect upon the self-
effacements that the apparatus imposes. Meanwhile, it is to issues of multiple
identities, expressed and mediated in possible worlds, that this exegesis now turns.
Possible worlds   55
 C H A P T E R  T H R E E :  P O S S I B L E  W O R L D S
We are engaged on a mission: we are called to give shape to the earth.
Novalis 1980a, p. 69
In chapter two, I suggested that language and its ‘reality effect’ are deeply entwined
with the technosocial landscapes we inhabit. Our media and communications devices
use specific types of languages to create specific types of realities, in collaboration
with human interpreters. Different languages, different devices, different pieces of
programming abound: as a result, realities have become coexistent and even embedded
within each other. The idea of a singular reality has become contested; indeed, Nelson
Goodman (1987, pp. 2; 18) goes so far as to argue that truth itself is malleable. This
malleability allows our engagement with ‘multiple actual worlds’ (p. 2) that are ‘of
independent interest and importance, without any requirement or presumption of
reducibility to a single base’ (p. 4).
While our proliferating worlds seem more interdependent than independent, it is
certainly true that differently mediated worlds, like computer gameverses, are
sometimes experienced as being predominantly separate from other worlds (Juul 2005,
p. 164). Salen and Zimmerman (2004, pp. 94-99) describe this in terms of the 'magic
circle' by which a gameverse is bounded, a boundary that appears to operate similarly
to the boundaries between sacred and profane space in mythic thought. Computer
games, in this sense, interrogate ‘reality’ by suggesting alternative, possible worlds.
To an extent, media such as cinema, novels, plays and plays-within-plays have long
demonstrated that different worlds can coexist. However, the performative, richly
sensual worlds of contemporary computer games offer an immediacy of ‘identity-play’
derived from ‘world experimentation’ that other artforms struggle to compete with. I
have previously suggested that our idea of reality and our sense of personal identity
seem to be two sides of the same set of concerns. The corollary of this may be as
Janet Murray (1997, p. 246) suggests, that ‘part of the task of redefining what it means
to be human lies in animating the machine, in using its system-modeling abilities to
bring forth life—cuddly, affectionate, amusing, and recognizable—from empty matter’.
Production of computer games has become a highly successful global media industry. In
potentially transformative identity-play in possible worlds, corporate media presents
their perspective on the themes and praxis of the technosocial.
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More specifically, I will argue in this chapter that computer game immersion—the idea,
that multiple realities can be subsumed by an intense experience of just one reality—is
based on a neo-romantic ideology. Romantic ideology conflates aesthetics and ontology,
and the immersion theory continues this tradition. I will commence by plotting a
trajectory of romantic and then neo-romantic ideas that can be applied to immersion
in computer games. I will show how this is a different type of aesthetic than that of the
neo-baroque, which some critical analysts of contemporary media has favoured (Cubitt
(2004); Ndalianis (2004)). With reference to realist aesthetics, I will explore the
specific type of realism the computer game encourages. I will show that this particular
type of realism is tied to its neo-romantic immersive affect, and suggest ways in which
the resulting experience has parallels to the ontologically powerful role of myth in
archaic cultures, as understood by some of the early-to-mid-twentieth century
anthropologists of mythology, who interrogated a tradition established in James
Frazer’s The Golden Bough (originally published in 1890) and include R H Codrington
(1969), Mircea Eliade (1957, 1958 and 1959) and Joseph Campbell (1968)1. This
chapter will close with some observations about the ramifications of contemporary
computer game identity-play, when the culture in which that alternate reality is
embedded tends to reject mythical themes as significant.
Like all text-as-apparatuses, the computer game functions by virtue of the trilogue
between programmer, apparatus and interpreter (game player) triggered during
performance. Through it, we enter environments that set up worlds; as a result, we
often fall into ‘analogous thinking’—we contrast and compare the gameverse with that
other world that we often privilege as ‘really real’, which I shall refer to as
‘nonmediated RL’2. Many players appear to seek an immersive experience in which
technology and art merge—often in ways that arguably parallel the experience of myth
in archaic cultures3. However, such experiences are not without ‘dangers’ and
‘paradoxes’, and one of these is dissolution of ‘nonmediated RL’ itself.
While research on the sociological implications of computer games has been
conducted—for example by Jenkins (1998) on the significance of the computer game to
contemporary adolescent boys; Taylor et al (2003) on the way that multiplayer games
bleed into ‘nonmediated RL’, and Jakobsson et al (2003) on personal relationships and
multiplayer games—the focus in this chapter is on single player rather than multiplayer
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games. The sociological interest in interpersonal relations in multiplayer games would
add a level of complexity which is easily avoided by focusing on single player games.
Many computer games present a spatial world which players explore, with adventures
and challenges along the way (role-playing games, or RPGs). RPGs are available in
single player mode (including games for consoles such as PlayStation). RPGs most
clearly articulate the themes I will explore.
What ontological insights do the trilogical engagements that these games occasion
reveal? Martin Heidegger has written productively about the intersections between
technology, aesthetics and ontology. His thought is also tied to the neo-romantic
tradition. For these reasons, his ideas offer a generative entrée into the range of issues
I wish to canvass.
H e id e g g e r  a nd  c o m p u t e r  g a m e s
In ancient Greece, according to Heidegger (1977, p. 34), ‘it was not technology alone
that bore the name techné’ :
[Artworks] brought the presence of the gods, brought the dialogue of divine
and human destinings, to radiance. And art was simply called techné. It was a
single, manifold revealing. It was pious, promos, i.e., yielding to the holding-sway
and the safekeeping of truth.
Unfortunately, says Heidegger, the compounded meaning of techné has been displaced,
and the primal power of the arts to ‘expressly foster the growth of the saving power’
(p. 35) has been usurped by an alienated technology, for example, the typewriter (see
chapter one). If Heidegger didn’t approve of the typewriter, it seems reasonable to
assume he wouldn’t approve of the computer. However, the appearances of text-as-
apparatuses that trilogically co-create and co-perform art challenge Heidegger’s
reservations.
Heidegger remains an ‘important founder … of the philosophy of technology’, but he
also supported a discredited political philosophy (fascism) ‘seen today as one of the
most destructive applications of modern technology’ (Idhe 1993, p. 103). Heidegger’s
narrative of primal fall and redemption through art is part of a dubious romantic4
mythology5 which obscures a range of value-judgements with political consequences.
He appropriates a highly selective reading of ancient Greece to political ends (Idhe
1993, p. 104-5), and various technologies are considered good and bad according to
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that value system, resulting in ‘a certain suspicion concerning modern technology
versus traditional technologies, and the older, smaller and simpler technologies versus
the newer, larger and more complex technologies’ (p. 105).
Heidegger (1971, p. 50) argues we derive truth about Being from art. Truths about
Being are usually obscured to humans (p. 51); but when we experience art ‘[t]his open
center is ... not surrounded by what is, rather, the lighting center itself encircles all
that is, like the Nothing which we scarcely know’ (p. 51). The truth about Being
determines what art may exist (p. 85)—in other words, Being and art are inter-
related.
Heidegger explores the purpose of art by contrasting it with the purpose of
equipment. Equipment, such as peasant shoes, has its own poetry because it ‘belongs
to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this
protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself’ (p. 33). In the
actual use of equipment we encounter its character. However, the poetry of peasant
shoes only arises from contemplating Van Gogh’s painting of them. It is not present in
the peasant woman's actual use of them, because when equipment is used, it becomes
invisible (a point that appears important in the idea of immersion). Equipment and art
are thus contrasted by Heidegger. It is difficult to see how the same object could be
both at once.
Heidegger’s idea can be traced to romantic ideology. John Keats (1980, p. 64), for
example, argues ‘[p]oetry lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of the world, and makes
familiar objects be as if they were not familiar’. The genesis of immersion theory can
be attributed to Immanuel Kant, who argued that ‘the delight which determines the
judgment of taste is independent of all interest’ (Kant 1952, ‘First moment of the
analytic of the beautiful’, §2, p. 42), as if at the moment of appreciation, nothing exists
beyond the work. Kant’s a priori principles form the basis of an idealist aesthetic
theory. The beautiful is conceived as ‘the Object of a UNIVERSAL delight’ (‘Second
moment of the analytic of the beautiful’, §6, p. 50). Kant’s subsequent appropriation by
romanticism6 led to the concepts of artistic genius (Coleridge 1980a, p. 75), the
ineffability of the creative process (F. Schlegel 1980a, p. 71; Crawford 2001, p. 61), and
thus to proclamations such as ‘if Poetry comes not as naturally as the Leaves to a tree
it had better not come at all’ (Keats 1980 p. 63), in which creativity is pronounced
innate and transcendental. While Heidegger distances himself from Kant’s ahistoricism,
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his attitude to the redemptive power of art maintains the romantic continuum.
Industrial and post-industrial technology has always held a vexed position in the broad
church of romantic thought. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s ideas about art—as opposed to
his ideas about technology—are implemented in the RPG, as the ‘poetry’ of whole
‘worlds’ is performed by trilogical artworks. Thus the RPG may in fact meet
Heidegger’s ideal that ‘[i]n the vicinity of the work we were suddenly somewhere else
than we usually tend to be’ (Heidegger 1971, p. 35). If viewer immersion is a
precondition for poetic revelation of truth about Being (p. 37), the computer game is
its prime contemporary site, and the text-as-apparatus can make claims to being the
techné that Heidegger nostalgically longs for.
Heidegger might have been grudgingly impressed with the idea of gameverse
immersion, in which gameplayers are so absorbed that they cease to think analogously
(‘the game world is like RL’), although as we shall see, the extent to which this really
occurs is doubtful.
In this chapter I will call the nexus between romanticism and the idea of immersive
experience in computer games ‘neo-romantic’. This can be contrasted with the
argument that it is rather a neo-baroque aesthetics that is present in computer games
and other postmodern media, presented by Sean Cubitt (2004) and Angela Ndalianis
(2004) among others7. Some of the signs of the neo-baroque, according to Ndalianis
(2004, p.17-19) are the sensual, and particularly visual, seductiveness of the artworks;
the foregrounding of framing; and the paradoxes of realism. Questions concerning
where illusion ends and reality commences often arise. Neo-baroque artworks create
labyrinthine systems (p. 25) and spatial conundrums (p. 20). The neo-baroque invokes
mythologies and classicism but subjects it to a baroque flair (pp. 24-5). Baroque and
neo-baroque periods are ones of social upheaval (p. 21) characterized by active
audience engagement (p. 25):
Whereas the seventeenth century was the culmination of a radically new
understanding of space in light of newly discovered lands and altered
perceptions of the nature of outer space and Earth’s place in relation to it, our
own era explores the mysterious realms of the computer. Cyberspace, like the
newly discovered material spaces of the seventeeth century, has expanded not
only our conception and definition of space, but also our understanding of
community and identity.
p. 27
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The baroque was widely derided as vulgar, exorbitant and bizarre by neoclassicism,
romanticism and realism (pp. 7-8), but continues to influence art movements (p. 9),
and amongst others, hypertextual environments (p. 116).
Through paradox and fantastic thematics, the neo-baroque foregrounds the
createdness of artworks; viewers experience a state of extra-diegetic amazement at
the sheer existence of the work, and to some extent diegetic immersion suffers as a
result. The neo-baroque glorifies paradox and vertigo8, while in contrast the neo-
romantic engages an aesthetic of unity, seamlessness and coherence to facilitate the
experience of immersion in a singular, monolithic reality, in the hope of gaining some
transcendental insight. Romanticism also privileges unity over multiplicity (Downes
2005, p. 27); and this privileging is a feature of the phenomenological corpus (Coyne
1999, pp. 147; 170-1), whose authors may therefore be described as infected with
romantic thinking.
My argument here is that combinations of neo-baroque and neo-romantic principles
feature in various degrees of tension in contemporary media, in much the same way
that Bolter and Grusin (1999) argue that combinations of immediacy and hypermediacy
feature in remediation (see chapter one). Although post-modern fashion favours the
neo-baroque, millions of game players appear to remain interested in experiencing ‘the
spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings’ (Wordsworth 1980, p. 11) supposedly
achieved through immersion. Neo-romantic principles may not be fashionable among
critics, but they continue to circulate. Both Heidegger and immersed game players
share an ideal with romantic poets such as Novalis (1980b, p. 134), who sought
artworks in which ‘everything seems so natural and yet so wondrous. One feels as
though it could not be any other way, and it is as if one had been dozing in the world
and were only now awakening to a true sense of the world’. Immersion, however, is
tenuous, and sophisticated neo-baroque conundrums surrounding space and ‘the real’
await gameplayers, regardless of their desire for it.
Heidegger grants language the power to create reality, but a romantic politics
intervenes in the logic of Heidegger’s position, which means he can’t grant a similar
creative and mediating role to technology. Questions surrounding the nature of the
real—truth, presence and illusion—haunt our engagement with multiple, embedded
worlds. What is the fate of the real and realism in technosocial culture? If there is no
‘nonmediated RL’, what does the ‘real’ become?
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( e ) Re a l i sm
According to one authority, realist media and art in the modernist period
‘concentrates heavily on the here-and-now, and develops … techniques for the
detailed, accurate representation of life in all its social and domestic aspects’ (Fontana
dictionary of modern thought 1988, p. 725). Consequently:
Realism cannot logically be formless, nor beyond form; it is itself an aesthetic
and contains certain logical structures. However, one of its triumphs is to limit
complex techniques and mannerisms so that … art becomes ‘humanized’. Thus
it emphasizes character, controls fantasy and idealism, and insists on
experience, fact, and the sceptical view ...
As Cubitt puts it, realism seeks to ‘reveal… truth accessibly’ (2004, p. 130). Mark
Wolf (2003, p. 59-60) suggests that the preference for realism in computer games is
not just based on increasing technical sophistication, but also on a human need for
empathy, which realism promotes. Thus realism may be tied to an Aristotelian ideal of
emotional catharsis, shared by game designers and some game theorists alike (Frasca
2004 p. 87). A game's diegetic gameverse is psychologically easier to enter if it makes
clear analogies with ‘nonmediated RL’.
 The race towards greater
representational realism in
computer game imagery (using
rasters9) was encouraged by a film
industry reliant on indexical
imagery (Darley 2000, p. 16).
Contemporary computer games
employ some of the most complex
production techniques available,
and the result is that games like The
sims 2 (2004) can conform to the
aesthetic framework of traditional
visual realism and our penchant for
analogous thought, despite their
lack of indexicality.
Image 3.1: The early vector imagery of Spacewar (1962)
seems symbolic rather than realistic.
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However, the tenuousness of visual realism in computer games, which results from the
non-indexicality of digital images, means computer games can only superficially be said
to share the qualities of cinematic realism. For this reason, the type of realism a
computer game offers should be defined in medium-specific ways. Dorothy Salonious-
Pasternak (2005) suggests one medium-specific definition of computer game realism:
Realism describes how real the game feels to its players, how vivid the depicted
world seems to be. One aspect of technology to power realism (and interaction
as well) in games is ‘real-time 3-D,’ which allows images to be created
instantaneously as players progress through a game, unlike the ‘pre-rendered’
images of earlier technology, whose limited range of possibilities rarely allow
players to forget even for a moment that it’s only an illusion.
pp. 7-8
By this definition, both The sims
and Final fantasy x (2002) (FFX)
are realistic, because realism has
become a measure of the
immersivity and believability of
game play. Gameverse realism
concerns the extent to which the
experience of being ‘in’ the
gameverse is similar to the
experience of being ‘in’
‘nonmediated RL’. The sims may
still do this better than FFX, but
not because of FFX’s fantastic
diegesis. Rather, the freedom of movement in The sims is greater, more explorative,
and therefore more lifelike.
The quality of gameverse realism thus depends on the extent of its performativity.
Marie-Laure Ryan (2001) defines two axes of text-as-apparatus experience, which are:
• internal (the operator as player character in a virtual world) versus external (the
operator as an external ‘watcher’ of the virtual world) (p. 7); and
Image 3.2: The images in The urbz: sims in the city (2004)
represent urban lifestyles and remain reasonably close to
middle American expectation. Such games offer analogous
experiences.
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• exploratory (the operator can freely explore the database but not change it or
alter the plots) versus ontological (the operator’s decisions ‘send the history of
the virtual world on different forking paths’) (p. 8).
Gameverses plunge users into the internal position; in terms of the exploratory-
ontological axis, computer games offer many ‘degrees of freedom’ (Penny 2004, p. 78).
The sims is more ontological; FFX is more exploratory. This ‘experiential realism’ is
also at play in Michael Joyce’s (1988, p. 42) idea of a constructive hypertext, which is
‘hypertext as an invention or analytic tool’. Constructive hypertexts are development
platforms, whereas exploratory hypertexts are ‘finished’. According to Janet Murray
(1997, p. 149), ‘[t]his constructivist pleasure is the highest form of narrative agency
the medium allows, that ability to build things that display autonomous behavior’.
Massively multiplayer games such as EverQuest (1999-2002) and Graal are to some
extent constructive. Many single player computer games are more exploratory. I will
call this range of realism ‘experiential realism’ (abridged to erealism). Murray (1997)
describes its impact:
In games ... we have a chance to enact our most basic relationship to the
world—our desire to prevail over adversity, to survive our inevitable defeats,
to shape our environment, to master complexity, and to make our lives fit
together like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Each move in a game is like a plot
event in one of these simple but compelling stories. Like the religious
ceremonies of passages by which we mark birth, coming of age, marriage, and
death, games are virtual actions allowing us to symbolically enact the patterns
that give meaning to our lives.
p. 143
Murray can be aligned through this quotation with the neo-romantic, ‘absolute
immersion’ school. In contrast to Murray, some theorists describe erealism in neo-
baroque terms. Darren Tofts (2003), for example, develops a witty take on the neo-
baroque perspective. He refers to a ‘realistic unreality’ which establishes carnivalesque
environments:
This certitude, that we are immersed in realistic unrealities, is the metaphysics
that allows us to tune into fantasy, live there for a time, and then re-inhabit the
real without believing that the fantasy continues beyond the book or the film. It
is fantasy's exit strategy.
The neo-baroque privileges extra-diegetic ‘reality manipulation’ over diegetic
immersion. Indeed, both types of experience may operate simultaneously—when
playing a game, you usually maintain some awareness of the frame that embeds the
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gameverse, even while to some degree, you are also immersed10. Immersion is under
threat if neo-baroque ironies surrounding reality and illusion dominate interpretation.
Erealism is a precondition for absolute immersion in computer games but, importantly,
it is not required for neo-baroque experiences.
Traditional realism relies on a nexus between the sign and its nonmediated referent:
Indeed, all the power of creating signs, all its evocative force, lies in the fact
that the sign, as a substitute, preserves its sensuous nature. Signs do not lead
us into the realm of concepts and images by breaking all contact with the
physical, experiential reality; on the contrary, they serve as a liaison, as a
bridge. The raw material of sign-creation is lively and sensuous in nature. The
more physical this material becomes, the wider the field of meaning it can
cover.
Biro 1982, p. 27
Contact with ‘nonmediated RL’ remains the core fantasy of traditional realism, but it is
betrayed by digital media. The paradoxical sign in a computer game is a manifestation
of code; indexicality does not function under these digitally mediated circumstances,
and is not relevant to interpretation11. The computer gameverse is not a substitute for
anything: it is its own entity, with a purely textual ecology. Its relationship is by
analogy, and its representational ability is paradoxical (because the images involved are
not indexical). The code can’t be described as the ‘indexical’ source of gameverse. The
text-as-apparatus occurs within a trilogue that is performative and relational; it has no
essence or source that can be considered its ur-state. A gameverse inevitably
expresses its database-driven and programmed source, however it is ‘translated’ by
the apparatus into a sensual human-centric text. Another way of expressing the
paradox is that erealistic experience depends upon the digital fantastic.
According to Flusser (2002, p. 27), it doesn’t matter if the represented object is real
or not, because the only relevance is that it affects our lives. Games are fantastic
precisely because their digital, programmed ecology is anathematic to the indexicality
of, for example, photography and film. However, computer games simultaneously take
advantage of filmic and indexical conventions. Computer games are anti-film as much as
they are in its maw.
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This lack of computer game
indexicality presents another
perspective on problems
associated with contrasting
‘virtual worlds’ and ‘nonmediated
RL’. Gameverses and
‘nonmediated RL’ are alike: both
lack indexicality. They are also
both spatial environments that
we explore and interact with in
real time. The unpredictable
nature of game action reinforces
the parallel12. What we call
erealism in a game, we call being
human, and being alive, in
‘nonmediated RL’. The experience is similar (therefore erealistic and analogical).
Gameverses are one type of the multiple and sometimes embedded realities that
together comprise RL.
Erealism promotes immersion, transcendental affect and something similar to mythic
experience. As writes Freidrich Schlegel, ‘[t]here is a type of poetry whose alpha and
omega is the relationship between the ideal and the real … and which must, on the
analogy of philosophical terminology, be called transcendental poetry’ (1980b, p. 6).
Our trilogical media are a complex type of mediated engagement with transcendental
attractions: they establish worlds within worlds which are paradoxical and vertiginous
in the neo-baroque sense; and are also immersive in the neo-romantic sense.
According to Cubitt, the ‘tragedy’ of cinematic realism is that it fails ‘in its self-
proclaimed mission to reveal the world’ (2004, p.138). An ontological gulf separates
the real world from its representation, and no amount of directorial cleverness can
overcome it. Thus ‘the thesis of cinematic realism ensures that either the world or the
cinema is condemned to unreality’ (p. 39). When you are dealing with erealistic texts,
this tragedy is spurious: such texts are too distinct to proclaim to reveal the (singular,
unified, real) world. Computer games are analogous media, not representational
media. We are invited to see parallels, to compare and contrast. The result is insight
Image 3.3: The anti-indexical, vector-style imagery of Rez
(2002), whose developers acknowledge the influence of
Kandinsky. Analogies to the cyberspace of William Gibson
(1984) are also apparent.
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about being-in-the-worlds—as multiple realities collide, embed, and possibly even
collapse, and identities that become liquid and adaptive.
Thus, tensions between neo-
baroque and neo-romantic analyses
of computer game experience arise
because of the complex nature of
experience during gameplay.
Analysis focusing on computer
games and recent Hollywood FX-
centric blockbusters accentuate
fantastic aesthetics and thematics
(Cubitt 2004, Chapter 9; Darley
2000, passim) and underplay
erealism, partly because these
projects address a range of media, much of which is not erealistic. Thus Cubitt
generalises:
For the neo-baroque sublime to conquer, it must sublimate the sense of self.
The familiar abstraction of mind and body, of observer from observed, of
subject from object, here reaches a new formation: everything will be
relinquished in favor of coherence. The new world needs to be utterly
absorbing: this is why special effects are so central to the new Hollywood ...
Affect, thrill, shock displace themselves from the audience to the spectacle.
The vanishing point is no longer in the image but in the rapt attention of the
viewer.
p. 236
Such analysis fails however to take account of the experience of game play, and
overestimates the parallels between a game and a film. A self fully sublimated would
possibly not bother to perform in the gameverse (it is also not clear why such a state
is negative, except that it is not valued by an individualistic society14). ‘Audience’ and
‘spectacle’ derive from the affordances of older media; immersion in the text-as-
apparatus is a collaborative experience which such terms seem to preclude.
‘Coherence’ is created by performance; it is dependent on the feedback loop between
player-apparatus-programming. The trilogue of programmer-apparatus-player
establishes a ‘vanishing point’ derived from the performed feedback loop. As
immersion takes hold, the possible world becomes the (only) world; that which
Image 3.4: Resident evil X: code veronica (2001)13 is an
example of fantastic themes encountered within
erealism.
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vanishes is ‘nonmediated RL’, and with it, audience and spectacle alike. This is a
different sublime to Cubitt’s neo-baroque sublime, an ideal closer to the coherent but
awful mythic sublime (numinous experience) which entails
the feeling of terror before the sacred, before the awe-inspiring mystery… the
majesty … that emanates an overwhelming superiority of power; he finds
religious fear before the fascinating mystery … in which perfect fullness of being
flowers … the numinous presents itself as something ‘wholly other’ …
something basically and totally different.
Eliade 1959, p. 9-10
The neo-baroque seems to be defined with different emphasis by Cubitt and Ndalianis.
Cubitt seems to include an impetus I would describe as neo-romantic
transcendentalism, for example:
they cajole us to step inward, into miniaturized infinities bracketed off from the
world. If the sense of presence belongs most to those who are at home in their
world, the artificial worlds of the neobaroque offer us a stronger sense of
being than we experience outside, among the wreckage of modernity, betrayed
by the reality of the world, deprived of truth or justice.
p. 247
Indeed, if immersion is achieved, gameverses do more than ‘bracket off’ their
miniaturized infinities. They consume RL. According to the neo-romantics, this
experience is more like transformation than escapism—what is a positive for the neo-
romantics meets with neo-baroque disdain.
Neo-romantic and neo-baroque approaches, then, offer different visions of the
ontological and even ethical significance of gameverses. According to Heidegger (1971,
p. 37), an artwork may be neither a poetic painting of an actual object, nor a
reproduction of the general essence of an object ‘[y]et truth is put into the work’. For
the neo-romantics, this truth takes place by analogy rather than by indexicality. The
next sections argue that the power of neo-romantic immersion may stem from the
same psycho-social experiences that give rise to intense mythic experiences in archaic
cultures, although contemporary society limits its impact. Exploring how the
traditional mythologising impetus manifests in contemporary society offers a different
angle on the significance of computer gameplay, erealism, and immersion.
F l o w  a nd  im m e r s i o n
This section focuses exclusively on neo-romantic affect (the neo-baroque is suspicious
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of immersion, and indeed, misunderstands its psycho-social allure15). My interest here
is the intersection of identity and ontology, and immersive experience is a rich source
of technosocial reflection on these issues.
Playing Resident evil 4 (2005) can
result in physiological responses
including elevated heartbeat and
perspiration, as well as emotional
exhaustion and stress. Time passes
without the player noticing. This
lack of self- and RL- awareness is
referred to as ‘flow’ in the
literature about computer game play. According to Juul (2005, p. 112), flow results
when the game is at the correct level of difficulty for the player's ability. In such
environments, the distinction between game and not-game loses its importance. Its
equivalent in romantic thought is described as ‘that present, where one is caught in
illusion—single hours, in which one is, as it were, within all the objects one
contemplates and experiences the infinite, incomprehensible, simultaneous feelings of a
cohesive pluralism’ (Novalis 1980b, p. 135).
First conceptualised by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi in 197516, flow describes a state in
which ‘we are performing both supremely well and effortlessly and ... participants feel
their options for performance are virtually unlimited’. Players lose self-awareness yet
still use their skills (Yellowlees Douglas and Hargadon 2000, p. 158-9). Hayles (2001,
p. 317) suggests that one of the beguiling features of what I term trilogical texts is that
they promote bodily estrangement, and the result is immersion in information.
Flow is a precondition for immersion. One of the most frequently-cited definitions of
immersion is from Janet Murray (1997):
Immersion is a metaphorical term derived from the physical experience of being
submerged in water. We seek the same feeling from a psychologically
immersive experience that we do from a plunge in the ocean or swimming pool:
the sensation of being surrounded by a completely other reality, as different as
water is from air, that takes over all of our attention, our whole perceptual
apparatus. We enjoy the movement out of our familiar world, the feeling of
alertness that comes from being in this new place, and the delight that comes
from learning to move within it. Immersion can entail a mere flooding of the
mind with sensation … Many people listen to music in this way, as a pleasurable
Image 3.5: blurb for Diablo II: lord of destruction (2000)
at the Diablo website
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drowning of the verbal parts of the brain. But in a participatory medium,
immersion implies learning to swim, to do the things that the new environment
makes possible.
pp. 98-99
Immersion is a participatory activity (p. 99) which must be ‘carefully structured and
constrained’ and ‘appropriate to the fictional world’ (p. 105). Players actively collude
in creating immersive experience (p. 110), and delight in the sense of agency resulting
from electronic environments (p. 126)17. I have suggested an ontologically-inflected
idea of immersion, which is when you are aware of only one world, to the exclusion of
the other world/s that the one world might be embedded within.
The intensity of the experience, rather than particular technologies, affordances or
even content, leads to immersion. I agree with Salen and Zimmerman (2004, p. 451)
that players get immersed in meaning (p. 452)—and, as Nash (2003) points out, the
text could be a poem, or anything else18. Fashions for immersion come and go (Salen
and Zimmerman 2004, p. 451), and the computer game is the latest iteration of an
immersive sensibility.
Salen and Zimmerman (p. 450-1) accuse Murray of an ‘immersive fallacy’—a belief that
simulated realities can be so immersive that ‘the frame falls away so that the player
truly believes that he or she is part of an imaginary world’. They argue that
A player’s relationship to a game character he or she directly controls is not a
simple matter of direct identification. Instead, a player relates to a game
character through the double-consciousness of play. A protagonist character is
a persona through which a player exerts him or herself into an imaginary
world; this relationship can be intense and emotionally ‘immersive.’ However,
at the very same time, the character is a tool, a puppet, an object for the
player to manipulate according to the rules of the game. In this sense, the
player is fully aware of the character as an artificial construct.
p. 453
Relatedly, Juul (2005, p 190) takes issue with Murray’s holodeck-inspired idea that the
ideal immersive system would be indistinguishable from the real world. Indeed,
contemporary games are quite unlike the holodeck, and Murray’s example now seems
somewhat naive. Neo-baroque knowledge of artificiality may impede immersion, and
this is one of the reasons why immersion is generally unsustainable. It seems more
plausible to say that game players move between different types of states; they swing
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between the neo-romantic immersion and the neo-baroque irony as they flip between
different worlds and different identities.
Regardless of how commonly is it achieved, the ideology of immersion remains
culturally attractive. Six neo-romantic gameverse features facilitate it.
1. The illusion of power
When you are dealing with a trilogue, empowerment and collaboration are more
productive terms than domination and control. The programmer has control of the
gameverse (if anyone does). Users can configure texts, but only within parameters
determined by the programmer19. However, the illusion of power is all-important for
computer game immersion. You may not have many real choices when you are playing
Resident evil 4—the supposed non-linearity of computer game-play is, for the most
part, an illusion (massively multiplayer games are different in this regard). However
you need to feel that you have options that you haven’t taken (because they are too
dangerous or do not progress the objective). If not, the analogy between the
gameverse and ‘nonmediated RL’ fades, and so might interest.
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2. Diegetic transparency
In Winchester’s nightmare, an
interactive fiction by Nick
Montfort (1999), players
spend significant time in an
apparently pointless
exploration of a nightmarish
atmosphere described only in
words. Immersion is a tenuous
affair, as players abut the
limits of the system,
signposted by the intrusion of
extra-diegetic text. Choices
seem limited and rule-bound
as diegetic and extra-diegetic
references collide20.
Empowerment in this
world—and therefore
immersion—depends on your
knowledge of correct syntax. Rich media and massively multiplayer games achieve
erealism and empowerment, immersion and flow in arguably more intuitive ways.
Murray (1997) argues that
Eventually all successful storytelling technologies become ‘transparent’: we lose
consciousness of the medium and see neither print nor film but only the power
of the story itself. If digital art reaches the same level of expressiveness as
these older media, we will no longer concern ourselves with how we are
receiving the information. We will only think about what truth it has told us
about our lives.
p. 26
3. Mastery of the learning curve
Flow is rare when you are learning to play a game. Learning Diablo II: lord of destruction
(2000) consists of acquiring knowledge about its rules of engagement, specified in
inaccessible programming text. I deduced these rules not only from the rare explicit
Image 3.6: The programming (right) and surface texts of Hunt
the wumpus (1973).
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textual instructions displayed by the monitor, but more often from circumstantial
evidence derived from performative situations, much as I do in ‘nonmediated RL’.
Learning a computer game results from interacting with the display. This triggers
procedural operations in the programming, and an erealistic ‘feedback loop from
materiality to mind’ (Hayles 2002, p. 75) via the display results. The experience of
‘distal attribution’ in which ‘most of our perceptual experience, though originating
with stimulation of our sense organs, is referred to external space beyond the limits of
the sensory organs’ (Loomis 1992, p. 113) occurs after you have learned the computer
game (Downes 2005, p. 75).
The tension between the programming and the fact that an individual player’s traversal
might be very partial, and even relatively insignificant in terms of the programmed
possibilities, needs to be taken into account by game designers. Some games are too
hard to learn for any but the most experienced players, because, either by accident or
design, the ‘feedback loop’ does not provide sufficient information.
4. Potential, but not actual, storytelling
Your player character evolves as you play. In Diablo II, I slowly improved the capacities
of Tanet, my player character. Tanet has particular strengths and weaknesses because I
distribute the prizes she wins in particular ways. In the programming database, a range
of variables are incremented according to my distribution, and as a result of the
changing values of these variables, the ‘Tanet properties’ algorithm determines how
well Tanet performs against particular monsters. Other algorithms determine where
Tanet can go and what else she can do.
While I am playing the game, I do not construct a story about Tanet’s increasing
abilities, just as I do not ‘narrate’ my life to myself as I am going about it. However,
retrospectively I can convert game experience into a narrative. Forcing strict narrative
criteria on computer games is experientially alienating. In the process of narrativising
your player character’s progress through a gameverse, you lose contact with the
experiential richness of the moment. Immersion is an intimate gestalt which engages
players emotionally, intellectually and physically in the moment. Writing from a
ludologist’s21 perspective, Markku Eskelinen (2001, p. 2) points to the pivotal nature of
configuration in RPGs which for him distinguishes them from classical narrative23.
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Configuration has the affect of situating players in the moment. Creating narrative
interpretations requires players to be somewhat removed from the moment.
Alfred Schutz (1962) has explored the idea of multiple realities and he draws similar
conclusions about the relationship between the actual experience and deriving meaning
from that experience:
Meaning ... is not a quality inherent in certain experiences emerging within our
stream of consciousness but the result of an interpretation of a past experience
looked at from the present Now with a reflective attitude. As long as I live in
my acts, directed toward the objects of these acts, the acts do not have any
meaning. They become meaningful if I grasp them in well-circumscribed
experiences of the past and, therefore, in retrospection.
p. 212
When you make a narrative you are engaging in a type of meaning-making. We are
perhaps too accustomed to the ready-made narratives of older types of media, but we
also make our own narratives. Gameplay is a venue in which narrative construction
takes place.
According to Henry Jenkins
(c.2001) story-telling is, for game
designers, wrapped up in the
worlds they design and the spaces
they sculpt—these are ‘spatial
stories’22. Space and spatiality in a
good game is more than simply a
container in which story-telling
unfolds; it becomes the
ontologically significant scope of
an embedded reality in which a
coherent world with its own
physics, history, bestiary and anthropology unfolds.
5. Personal transformation
Jaron Lanier (1992, p. 166) suggests that when the trilogue achieves transparency ‘you
don't see the computer any more—it's gone. All that's there is you. So, it's teaching
you to be you’. As Tanet’s abilities improve, I evolve as well. Juul (2005, p. 96) points
Image 3.7: In the online multiplayer game  Graal (1998-
2006), three player characters rest after a battle.
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out that learning games means improving your skill; it also means learning to function
in another universe, and developing a world-view situated in that universe.
As I have suggested, our idea of reality and our sense of personal identity seem to be
two sides of the same set of concerns. Aarseth (2004, p. 50) suggests that ‘unlike
literature, games are not about the Other, they are about the Self’. As I shall shortly
argue, the transformative power of games is ideally extended by their mythic themes,
for
myth … speaks to the whole man, his entire moral-spiritual being, including his
subconscious, causing an aggressively sensuous effect, which is essential for
man to be truly touched. Is there a more glorious and fruitful transcendence
than the ideal of a fully realized, harmoniously complete man who is able to
overcome his own narcissism, enlarge his world, traverse all his ‘circles of hell,’
and thus become one with the causes of a wider humanity? Myth is a bridge
between the ‘I’ and the ‘not-I,’ between the heterogenous self-conscious and
the homogenous image of the world. It is aversion and wish fulfillment; it is the
distant and consoling promise of a possible unity and the creation of a sensible
and balanced world.
Biró 1982, p. 74
This redemptive immersive gestalt24 operates on emotional, intellectual, ethical, sensual
and even physical levels.
6. Subsuming the multiple real
Playing spatial games means creating worlds. You know the qualities of a world by the
qualities of the space that can be experienced there. The space of the game hardly
exists without the player’s demi-urge, who by ‘launching’ the game, creates it.
Realities have different flavours and different strengths. Ultimately, if naive distinctions
between ‘nonmediated RL’ and gameverse worlds collapse, then the idea of immersion
as a mediated, artificial experience also collapses. Reality is where we are in the
moment. Paradoxes of reality and fiction encountered while juggling multiple realities
may be neo-baroque, but their resolution into a momentary experiential unity is neo-
romantic. Our nostalgia for such experiential unity underpins immersive appeal:
whether, or how often, it is actually achieved is another question.
Positions on immersion depend on whether you privilege neo-baroque or neo-
romantic ideals and aesthetics. Neo-romantic immersion with no distance, no irony, no
createdness, in which self is sacrificed to flow, is a form of psychosis to some, and an
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impossibility to other critics. Nevertheless, game play experience continues, in spite of
criticism. I will now turn my attention to the subjective experience of immersion in
RPGs, with reference to another type of traditionally immersive experience, mythic
experience.
Be i n g  p r o g r a m m e d
In chapter two I explored the programming aspect of trilogical texts. The programmed
text exists outside the ephemeral time and space of the gameverse, and our mediated,
partial dialogue with it (a traversal) resembles a dialogue with a permanent but
obscure and possibly unpredictable god. Indeed, supernatural powers commonly
feature in RPG diegesis, as if game developers seek to represent their own experience
of world creation within the gameverse. The fantastic textual ecology of signifiers
freed from indexicality is reflected by these fantastic RPG gameverses. This parallel
with godlike power is reflected in romantic art theorist Wilhelm Heinrich
Wackenroder’s (1980, p. 56) belief that ‘God views the whole realm of nature or the
entire universe in the same way as we see the work of art’.
As being (player character) is programmed, so the trilogue ‘programs’ Being (player
experience): interpretation derives from the trilogical feedback loop between player
performance (experience), possible world (and its player character), and the
inaccessible, permanent code/data.
If indexicality does not apply to computer game images, the ideas about affect
associated with indexical media such as the photograph, famously analysed by Fredric
Jameson (1979/80), may seem irrelevant:
The concrete activity of looking at a landscape—including, no doubt, the
disquieting bewilderment with the activity itself, the anxiety that must arise
when human beings, confronting the non-human, wonder what they are doing
there and what the point or purpose of such a confrontation might be in the
first place—is … comfortably replaced by the art of taking possession of it and
converting it into a form of personal property.
p. 131
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However, such ‘disquieting
bewilderment’ is also an affect
produced by the majestic
landscapes of gameverses, for
example, those of the Myst series
(see Image 3.8). Just like
photographing a landscape, we can
even take screen-grabs of
gameverse landscapes (scattered
throughout this chapter) resulting
in a strange double-mediated
indexicality. In other words, we can
have an analogous reaction to a gameverse as we do to ‘nonmediated RL’.
Different games strive for this technosocial sublime in different ways. A neo-baroque
reaction of ‘how did they do that?’ prevails in Spiderman (2002), which has vanishing
points wherever you gaze. Physics engines calculate in real time what can be seen and
what not. In Grand theft auto 2 (2000), the mean streets of Liberty City are lightened
by moments of fantastic esprit, for example by car stunts and shoot-outs that defy the
game physics otherwise so carefully established by the programmers. Likewise, players
explore the bizarre alien cultures in World of warcraft (2002).
Despite these elements of fantasy,
gameverses generally fall back on
the ‘RL’ analogy to some
extent—Spiderman can go up walls,
but is otherwise constrained by
Earth-like gravity and ‘surface
accuracy’ (Darley 2000, p. 159).
However, such combinations of the
fantastic and the pseudo-indexical
do not alone account for the
gameverse sublime. Many RPGs are
populated by archetypal mythical
Image 3.8: The technological sublime in Myst III: Exile (2001)
Image 3.9: In Grand theft auto 2 (2000) you can  travel
on the bonnet of a moving car.
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characters and situations repackaged for a post-millennial age in which technology and
magic seem to have become indistinguishable (Stivers 2001, passim). As a result of
programmatic (and sometimes networked) interactivity, we experience fantasy in a
space of play outside the bounds of received morality and religion (Turkle 2001).
In other words, gameverses (and in particular RPGs) often reprise mythic themes.
Game designer Troy Dunniway (2000) recommends the hero’s journey as a good
mythic theme for games. He presents a breakdown of the activities and structures he
plans in an average length game:
Total time of game play 25 hours
Length of non-interactive elements in the game (cut scenes) 1 hour
Number of levels 25 hours
Length of levels (times # of levels) 1 hour
Amount of time spent fighting in level 10 minutes
Amoung (sic) of time spent exploring in level 10 minutes
Amount of time spent problem solving in level 10 minutes
Amount of time spent traveling (sic) in level 10 minutes
Amount of time spent waiting for something to happen (hopefully this is zero).
Amount of time spent ‘doing other stuff’ in level 10 minutes
The heroic RPG translates mythic scenarios quite fluently, as they reprise ‘universal
archetype[s] recognizeable across all the variations of culture, author, and medium’
(Murray 1997, p. 137). They respond to the role of myth to ‘bring us into contact with
the gods, heroes, and saviors that are latent at the core of our selves’ (Billias 1986, p.
15). The hero (player character) is exactly placed at the centre of the gameverse,
which is ‘the very source of absolute reality, as close as possible to the opening that
ensures him communication with the gods’ (Eliade 1959, p. 65)—the programmer gods.
That is, the player, through the player character, assumes responsibility for creating
the world and ironing out chaos, much in the way mythic heroes do.
According to Mircea Eliade (1957, p. 16), myths are impersonal; they reveal super-
human beings behaving in an exemplary manner and thus provide a model for human
behaviour (p. 23). Lack of real characterisation may therefore be an actual strength in
a mythic RPG; we are concerned more with archetypes than with characters, and the
hero archetype ‘exemplifies the course of action needed to achieve the task of
creating the self’ (Billias 1986, p. 32).
Players in RPGs thus perform mythic scenarios, via super-human avatars. There are
implications for identity-creation. Eva Liestøl (2003, p. 340) draws a parallel between
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the game Duke Nukem and the myth of the minotaur and the labyrinth. The game
performs a myth of rebirth of masculine identity, like many myths before it (p. 342):
Although the masculine body of Duke is absent, his voice reminds us of his
masculinity and of his role as combatant. If we hesitate to realise this role, our
inactivity is responded to by Duke’s ironic remark that tells us that questioning
our role is ridiculous.
p. 347
Similar mythic and heroic narratives exist in films and novels (Eliade 1957, p. 35).
However, despite Heidegger’s (1971, p. 37) belief in the ‘timeless and supertemporal
truth of artworks’, modernism has failed to come to grips with myth (Eliade 1957, p.
24). Narrative alone can’t ‘carry off’ the immediate, experiential aspects of being a
hero in a mythic universe.
On the other hand, in an RPG, ‘the navigational space of the computer … makes it
particularly suitable for journey stories which … offer additional opportunities for
exercising agency’ (Murray 1997, p. 137). Under the impact of erealism, a player feels
herself to be a witness to meaning creation and universe generation. On the other
hand, she is also co-conspirator in the creation of the world—the events that unfold and
the pace at which it unfolds. She is radically integrated in the possible world. RPG
game diegesis places her player character in an heroic gameverse where she becomes
both pivotal and responsible.
Let us consider how a specific
mythic trope is employed in a
computer game. Mana was
introduced to western thought
by R. H. Codrington in the late
nineteenth century. Mana is
spiritual power (Codrington
1969, p. 51) bestowed by the
spirits of dead people (p. 57),
which allows you to rise
through the ranks of society
(pp. 103, 115)25. Mana is a
powerful erealistic force in
Image 3.10: At this moment in Diablo II: lord of destruction
(2000), the player character enjoys high amounts of mana
(blue) and health (red).
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Diablo II. It provides the player character with supernatural powers; it is regenerative
and interactive (that is, mana stocks depend on how the player interacts with mana-
algorithms). A skillful player will make constant calculations about the extent of her
character’s abilities against foes in light of combinations of available mana, health and
weaponry.
In Diablo II, mana has diegetic significance and extra-diegetic functionality (that is,
there is a mana algorithm). Mana thus performs the interconnectedness of things in the
gameverse, and reveals the sliding scales of raw power to be negotiated and harnessed
via manipulation of the algorithmic, linguistic (code/data) text. Mana is a function of
programming and gameverse interaction, two aspects of the text-as-apparatus that are
experientially inseparable.
Joseph Campbell (1968) describes myth’s ‘fourth and most vital function’ as fostering
the centering and unfolding of the individual in integrity, in accord with d)
himself (the microcosm), c) his culture (mesocosm), b) the universe (the
macrocosm), and a) that awesome ultimate mystery which is both beyond and
within himself and all things …
p. 6; also see Billias 1986, p. 28
A similar ambition is apparent in games—their performative, erealistic gameverses
mean that individual player decisions to some extent determine the nature of the
gameverse real and identity of the player character, and through that, gameplay
experience.
Mythic thought promotes the experience of ultimate unity. As we have seen, ‘unity’ is
an ideal shared by romantic thought, Heidegger and other phenomenologists, and the
aesthetics of immersion.
Unfortunately for those seeking mythic immersion, the neo-baroque is the antithesis of
unity and coherence. It is also a dominant aesthetic, a position which is perhaps
supported by secular late capitalism. As a result, whatever media technology we
use—from the printed page to Game boy advance, immersion in mythic texts consists
of brief and possibly stolen moments from our customary awareness of plural realities.
Any sort of transcendental, unified experience quickly unravels into nostalgic memory.
As the romantics themselves knew, the romantic ideal of unity and coherence is never
satisfied:
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And when the soul, resting, as it were, under the willows of exile, breathes out
its longing for its distant home, what else but melancholy can be the keynote of
its songs?
A. W. Schlegel 1980, p. 34
Living your myths via technology is limited by neo-baroque ironies that always
encroach upon immersion. Similar ironies have perhaps always encroached upon the
possibility of mythic experience derived from textual engagement. To these failures of
immersion I will return in the following section. In those failures we may uncover
reasons why the computer game has become such culturally contested media.
One types of complaint against computer games is that they lack affect compared to
other types of media. In a 1945 article, Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued that films
should be simultaneously sensually and psychologically coherent. A film’s meaning
derives from the integration of its many elements, including, for example, its
temporality, because:
a movie has meaning in the same way that a thing does: neither of them speaks
to an isolated understanding; rather, both appeal to our power tacitly to
decipher the world or men and to coexist with them… A movie is not thought:
it is perceived.
p. 343
Film attempts to reveal the bond between mind and body ‘and the expression of one in
another’ (p. 344); in other words, affect in film is derived from revealing that what is
inside is reflected in and can be represented by what is outside (p. 354). However,
computer games, as an example of postmodern and neo-baroque media, are derided as
lacking affect. Jameson (1984) berates a
virtual deconstruction of the very aesthetic of expression itself, which seems to
have dominated much of what we call high modernism, but to have vanished
away—for both practical and theoretical reasons—in the world of the
postmodern. The very concept of expression presupposes indeed some
separation within the subject, and along with that a whole metaphysics of the
inside and outside, of the wordless pain within the monad and the moment in
which, often cathartically, that ‘emotion’ is then projected out and
externalized, as gesture or cry, as desperate communication and the outward
dramatization of inward feeling.
p. 61
Jameson suggests that we need to maintain distinctions between media and ‘RL’ to
enjoy affect. The ‘depth’ and drama of high modernism is based upon the ability of the
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signifier to externalize the signified, stunted in the postmodern ‘culture of the surface’
(Darley 2000, p. 159). For Darley, Jameson and others, computer games are superficial
compared to the subtle psychological and philosophical heights of modernist high
culture, and therefore they only appeal to unsophisticated users26. In subtle ways,
Heidegger’s romantic myth about the split between art and technology, and the fall
from techné, is reprised in this criticism.
In their commitment to a distinction between media and ‘nonmediated RL’, often
enshrined in the term ‘virtuality’—a term attractive in its very vagueness—erealism
and its rich ontological implications are ignored. Furthermore, there is a strong
undercurrent of quite familiar neo-romantic aesthetic theory at work in computer
games, experienced as I have argued when you actually play them. It is more
productive to explore of this cultural continuum than claim that such media wholly
redefines cultural engagement (either positively or negatively).
Indeed, the phenomenology of experience is key to any assessment of erealistic media.
Meaning has become an emergent property of transactions in the fluctuating
gameverse; it is derived from gameplay rather than narrative or character, and
therefore it is impossible to pin down (you can’t quote it). As I will suggest below,
these transient texts may evade critical approaches, because they are not easily
amenable to traditional critical explorations.
De a t h  a n d  t h e  R P G
Myths bring order out of chaos (Billias 1986, p. 23) because they provide perspective
on human origin and destiny (p. 19); they function on a nonrational level, fulfil psychic
and spiritual needs, and narrate the human dilemma which is ‘the discordance between
our fundamental reality (symbolized as the divine image at our core) and our actual
mode of being (symbolized as sinful, guilty, and alienated from or unaware of that
core).
If neophyte game players have to learn the ways of a mythic universe before they can
really function within it, to what extent do parallels exist with the experience of
initiates into the mythic universes of archaic cultures? Novice shamans27, according to
Eliade (1958, p. 87), get two types of instruction—ecstatic (dreams, visions, trances)
and traditional (social, historical and cultural). When you play a single player RPG, you
might get the ecstatic training (erealistic immersion), but you will never get the
The technosocial mediascape 82
traditional training. There is no public recognition involved in being an RPG player;
indeed, there may instead be public approbation.
The initiations of neophyte shamans are shrouded in social symbolism. For example,
they are painfully separated from their mothers to reinforce a symbolic break from
childhood (Eliade 1958, p. 8). In archaic societies, a common world-view, created
through myths, is shared and valued (Billias 1986, p. 17) which ‘serves to support the
current social order and help integrate the individual organically within the group’ (p.
27).
Like the mothers from these religious cultures, the mothers of computer game players
may also be disturbed by their sons’ game-induced ‘ecstasy’, but in contemporary
culture the socially-sanctioned resolution is an addiction clinic, rather than months of
intense initiation rituals:
To gain the right to be admitted among adults, the adolescent has to pass
through a series of initiatory ordeals: it is by virtue of these rites, and of the
revelations that they entail, that he will be recognized as a responsible member
of the society.
Eliade 1958, p. x
Whereas for archaic cultures ‘[personal] wholeness is not fully understood or
achieved except in a context of the community. Myths … are not just about me; they
are about us’ (Billias 1986, p. 22), the mythic power of computer games in
contemporary culture collapses when it clashes with broader mainstream secular
culture. Our culture valorises heroic behaviour most clearly in the sporting arena, a
status open to only a few. However, heroes remain ‘an important part in the
formation of European adolescents: the characters in tales of adventure, heroes of
war, screen favourites, etc.’ (Eliade 1957, p. 33). What, then, happens then to the
millions of adolescents who experience intense and heroic experiences without the
social integration that helps them reconcile them with the rest of their lives?
In Singapore in 2002, 17-year-old Lei Pui Sang, while playing Diablo II, suffered a heart
attack and died (‘Teenager died after playing computer game for 10 hours’, 2002). He
had been in the habit of playing the game all night, after working (at a computer) all
day. Playing through the night was the only time he could find for game play.
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The popular press constantly warns us that in gameverses you can lose touch with
what is ‘really real’ and become addicted to fantasy (Campbell 2006; Miller 200228).
Can you be so immersed in an embedded gameverse that you are completely unaware
of your physical condition? Or did Sang decide that his physical condition was
irrelevant? Were there two simultaneous deaths, one for each world? Or did Sang’s
player character continue within the game for some time after Sang’s death, slowly
running out of health while it waited for further direction? Indeed, absolute immersion
is impregnable to all but the most speculative analysis.
The death (and resurrection) of a player character is reasonably common when playing
RPGs. Initiates into archaic mythic cultures also have intense experiences which
engage themes of life and death. ‘[T]he body’s abandonment of the soul during ecstasy
is equivalent to a temporary death’, argues Eliade (1958, p. 95):
Initiatory death is indispensable for the beginning of spiritual life. Its function
must be understood in relation to what it prepares: birth to a higher mode of
being.
p. xiv
Playing alone at night made sustained immersion more possible for Sang, because social
sanctions against gameplay were avoidable. Sang immersed himself in the unified
gameverse, night after night, for ten-hour stretches. The game ceased to be a game,
because he had isolated himself to such a degree that he avoided the intrusion of any
world beyond it. Under these circumstances he could intensely immerse himself in the
theme of life and death that RPG gameplay, and Diablo in particular, offers. In absolute
immersion, there is no nostalgia, because there is no other possible world.
Under these circumstances, the death of your player character can be shocking. At
often unexpected moments, the gameverse disintegrates before your eyes, and
immersion comes to an abrupt halt. You have fallen from grace; you are back in the
non-mythic world of the mortal and the mundane. The affect is instantaneous nostalgia
for lost mythic unity.
Heim (1993, p. 136-137) warns against computer games and their mythic experiences.
In ‘RL’, mortality/natality ‘impose existential parameters on reality, providing us with a
sense of rootedness on earth’. Heim advocates avoidance of game scenarios featuring
death (p. 137); he also believes that gameverse temporal progression should be
different enough from RL to make it clear that it is not RL. Players should not be able
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to take gameverses too seriously. Heim therefore seeks to denude games of the very
properties that grant them their experiential intensity: he also thereby confirms
mainstream society’s suspicion of them.
On surrendering so completely to the gameverse, Lei Pui Sang seems to have turned
his back on Singaporean culture. The question of day-to-day mainstream identity failed
to hold interest in the face of his exploration of self, world and ontology offered by
mythic gameplay. The intensity of this experience seems to have meant that
momentary experience was all-engaging, and repercussions or reflections upon his own
future being were too remote to register.
Immersive experience is hard to analyse. It is secretive. Traces of an anonymous,
deleted post on the Melbourne Goth Forum, retrieved by Google but unavailable at its
original URL, offers the nearest thing to Sang’s elegy:
Lei Pui Sang , the Diablo II Martyr. " Let's think the unthinkable , let's do the
undoable , let's prepare to grapple with the ineffable itself , and see if ...
http://www.gothic.org.au/forum/viewthread.php?tid=3636 (Googled 25 July
2006; original syntax)
Eliade (1959, p. 51) muses that ‘certain traditional images, certain vestiges of the
behavior of archaic man still persist, in the condition of “survivals,” even in the most
highly industrialized societies’. We glimpse archaic vestiges of behaviour in this
extract, which suggests a secret society of arcane significance. Indeed, the network
itself seems to have censored the critic’s access to exchanges concerning what could
be described as the immersive, transcendental mysteries of the trilogue.
Kids ignoring their health for ‘mythic’ immersion; desperate parents committing their
kids to expensive detox clinics—it would appear that both positions lack insight into
the role of the mythic imagination in adolescent rites of passage. Meanwhile, however,
Heidegger can surely rest content: artworks really do open up worlds (1971, p. 41). A
sculpture of a god or a computer game really ‘is a work that lets the god himself be
present and thus is the god himself’ (p. 42).
Iain Thomson (2000, p. 437) suggests that Heidegger sought ‘a work of art which
would transform our entire ontological self-understanding in one fell swoop’.
Heidegger’s well-known disdain for technology, in that it deflects humans from
ontological insight, seems undermined by the success of immersive computer games. In
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their generative incorporation of romantic concepts, these trilogic texts hold an
insurmountable irony for Heidegger. Technology, supposedly the implacable foe to
Being, reveals itself to be a means to neo-romantic ‘truths’. It is perhaps unfortunate
that such ‘truths’ generally fail to capture mainstream sympathy.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R :  I D E N T I T Y  I N  T H E  S P A C E  O F  F L O W S
Locality is always in deferral, transition, translation,
mediation and recontextualisation.
Hjorth 2005c
From the computer game, that most immersive of technosocial media, I now shift
focus to possibly the most neo-baroque media—that designed for the mobile phone.
It is well-nigh impossible to forget context and frame when you are using a mobile
phone. Awareness of location and the chance encounters resulting from personal
mobility promotes neo-baroque reflection, such as those expressed by Larissa Hjorth
above. Pocket-size ‘microworlds’ can not disown their embeddedness within the
larger, immersive, physical world around us.
This chapter explores what ‘rich media’ thematics and aesthetics might be appropriate
for the distinctive mobile context. Before doing that, I will make some introductory
observations about the experience of these embedded realities, and the way in which
telecommunications companies are structuring and promoting the device. If the mobile
phone is another technosocial device in which personal identity is at play, I will argue
that mobile media needs to address identity issues in contextually appropriate ways,
and will refer to ways that my own work, RL~, explores appropriate mobile aesthetics.
Through this focus on the mobile phone I will reprise the technosocial problematic
that has been explored from various angles throughout this work. How do humans and
their devices cooperate to reinvent the field of human activity, and consequently,
reconceptualise who we are or can be?
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 Various theorists have considered
what happens to interpersonal
relationships when they are
mediated by the mobile phone.
‘Co-presence’, argues John Urry
(2001, p. 258) evolves as ‘virtual
travel (especially via new mobile
devices that travel with one “on
the road”) produces a kind of
strange and uncanny life on the
screen’ (also see Ito and Okabe
2005; Hjorth 2005c). Alternatively,
Larissa Hjorth (2005c) considers Heidegger’s idea of ‘undistance’: ‘[t]the ubiquity and
yet interiorised saliency of mobile telephonic practices create a dynamic of being both
everywhere and nowhere , simultaneously home and away’. We use the phone to
reinforce our friends’ simultaneous presence and absence, which is elsewhere described
by Ingrid Richardson (2005) as ‘telepresence’—‘a kind of distant presence’ (also see
Loomis 1992, p. 113).
The impact on consciousness of these embedded mobile microworlds is a ‘double
awareness’, which Daniel Downes (2005, p. 75) argues is ‘one of the defining
characteristics of our experience of communication in cyberspace’. Those like myself
who are sympathetic to relativist epistemologies have little trouble with the idea of
multiple realities and double awareness. Mid-twentieth century social phenomenologist
Alfred Schutz (1962) suggested that there are ‘probably an infinite number of various
orders of realities, each with its own special and separate style of existence’ (p. 207).
These orders of realities are in effect
finite provinces of meaning upon each of which we may bestow the accent of
reality. We speak of provinces of meaning and not of sub-universes because it
is the meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure of the
objects which constitutes reality.
p. 230
Indeed, cyberspace has already undermined naive perceptions of border between ‘RL’
and mediated realities (Novak 1992, p. 243). Since Novak wrote, we have further
extended our mediated realities into ‘portable microworlds or pocket technospaces’
Image 4.1: some networks address transience1
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which our attention oscillates between (Richardson 2005). We generally focus
attention on these different realities in a serial mode: ‘[a]ll these different experiences
are experiences within my inner time; they belong to my stream of consciousness; they
can be remembered and reproduced’ argues Schutz (1962, p. 258). Dreams, myths,
looking at art, are all different provinces of meaning, and while you are ‘in’ them, they
are ‘as “real” as anything’ (p. 237). Richardson (2005) however, adds a note of neo-
baroque caution: we are simultaneously aware of both the ‘here’ and the ‘there’, and
therefore the concept of immediacy changes:
[M]obile media elicit variable levels [of] attention and inattention that shift
between actual and telepresent space, partially depending on the demands of
the immediate environment and the extent to which the interface becomes
ready-to-hand in a Heideggerian sense (i.e. its function and usability recede
from explicit awareness).
The formerly separable contexts of personal communication and media are currently
merging in the mobile apparatus (Richardson 2005). As a consequence, Ingrid
Richardson exhorts us to see handheld devices ‘both as communication tools and info-
mediatic assemblages within which the technologies and practices of communication,
information and media come together’. The mobile text-as-apparatus can be as simple
as a text message (SMS) or as significant as mobile video or game. Within its specific
locative and transient but connected context, the mobile phone, the way it is used, and
the media and communications it affords, remain concerned with technosocial issues of
identity and humanness, reflected in, but also moulded by, trilogical exchange.
Wardrip-Fruin (1999) suggests that
‘the Web disappoints us with its
too-perfect reflection of our
ambivalent relationships with
impermanence and openness:
dynamic and unstable, diverse and
overwhelming’. Perhaps the Web,
with its broad expanses of textual
real estate, is too easily interpreted
as designed to endure; an
impression compounded by theImage 4.3: permanence is about stopping time; it is
transcendental.
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metaphors of ‘page’ and ‘site’.
In contrast, fantasies of permanence are hard to sustain with mobile phone media.
Phone memory is too limited to use as an archive of media; downloaded phone media
is generally of brief duration; phone-based media consumption occurs in short spurts.
As a result, individual mobile texts are history almost as soon as they arrive in your in-
box.
The mobile device privileges transient engagements. All text-as-apparatuses lack
continuous existence; they exist ‘on demand’ when users call them up; the rest of the
time they are latent and quiescent. Furthermore, when the text-as-apparatus is
performed, we experience a transient text. It changes with our interactions. When we
have finished, we close it, if not trash it. Its footprint on our minds is (hopefully)
significant, because its footprint on our desks is not. Our handheld devices deliver
contextual experiences, not only because neo-baroque embeddedness is difficult to
ignore. The mobile text arises as a result of situational context. The media and
communications we make and consume on our mobile devices are a response to
circumstance (if not specific location).
As with the other digital apparatuses, mobile phones collude in trilogic practices that
create transient artefacts. However, their use-context means that mobile devices
actively foreground experiences of transience. I argue in this chapter that the mobile
phone ameliorates our experience of transience, while at the same time, justifying,
confirming and representing transience as an aspect of contemporary lifestyles—we
can even set our text messages to self-destruct 40 seconds after they are read2.
Whether these devices promote or merely respond to transience is a moot point.
Meanwhile, many people replace their phones every eighteen months to keep abreast
of the changing technological environment. The phone demands momentary
engagement, but also commitment to the contemporary. Now is what matters, when
we are using our phones. We have collapsed future and past into brief but fashionable
moments of mobile communication and consumption.
M o b i l e  p ho n e  a s  t e l c o  ‘ t e x t ’
The way we use our phones is highly dependent on what telecommunications
companies (telcos) allow us to do with them. Unlike the Web, mobile phone networks
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have always been the province of big business. Telcos and electronics manufacturing
corporations drive their development. While smaller groups and individuals may
develop specific applications which do not require cooperation from big business, the
core affordances of these apparatuses seem destined to remain constrained by
combinations of economics, legislation and protocol beyond the province of
individuals. If the mobile phone represents and ameliorates experience of transience,
this representation is filtered by corporate interpretations of what is good for
us—that is, it has to be good for them too.
90% of Australians have mobile phone access3, but the terms and conditions of that
access has traditionally favoured communication over media making or consumption.
This situation is changing. Bandwidth—the determinant of the speed at which we can
transfer messages and media between devices—is increasing. For example, at time of
writing Telstra was marketing a single national 3G network on the 850 MHz spectrum
(‘Next G’) that will improve our capacity to interact with the ‘rich media4’ affordances
of 3G phones (video, audio, still image and games), which have been particularly
limited in rural and regional Australia.
Corporate telecommunications companies (the major Australian players are Telstra,
Optus, Vodafone and Hutchinson/3) and their media-making collaborators have yet to
completely succeed in converting communications phone culture into a rich media
income line (ringtones aside); however, specific forms of mobile media commerce are
slowly emerging.
One model of preferred mobile phone consumer behaviour is Telstra’s ‘integrated
model’, which seeks to stem revenue decline resulting from the downturn in
traditional fixed telephony and the inefficiencies that result from running three
different wireless networks. According to Telstra, this means creating ‘a world of one-
click, one-touch, one-button, one-screen, one-step solutions that are simple, easy and
valued by individuals, businesses and governments alike’ (Robbiati 2006). In this vision,
rich media content will be distributed over multiple devices for seamless, integrated
customer experience, enabled by collaboration between Bigpond broadband and
national 3G networks. Whether or not such seamlessness is possible, the corporate
payoff is also speculative: when customers become accustomed to this seamless,
integrated rich mediascape, they’ll be required to pay for it. Telstra’s ‘pricing
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dynamics’ will then evolve ‘from commoditisation of access, to a model of value-based
pricing’ (Robbiati 2006).
This vision of consumer behaviour contains a particular idea of what consumers need
and want. Technology, suggests Steve Woolgar (2005, p. 29) ‘is congealed social
relations’, and
depictions of new technology constitute a text which ‘performs community’.
The technology text inscribes and prescribes certain identities, roles and
groups and the relations between them. The technology text makes available a
moral universe which depicts the rights, responsibilities and expectations
associated with the entities which populate it. It follows that the adoption (or
rejection) of a claim about a particular technology is equivalent to the adoption
(or rejection) of a performed community.
p. 325
The ‘text’ of Telstra’s integrated model confirms the rhetoric of late capitalism, which
valorises adaptation to transience. This rhetoric includes viewing Australian employees
reliant on the economic conditions of earlier periods of capitalism (such as
manufacturing) as marginal as their industries move offshore. It exhorts us to see
working life as routinely disrupted rather than continuous. Routine geographical
relocation—if not nomadism—is its domestic analogue. Adaptation to continuous
change is the pre-requisite to working with technology. The only people who want
things that last are the poor, according to Zygmunt Bauman (1999, p. 14). This culture
of routine change is predominant in the information age6.
In other areas of our lives, change
rather than stability is apparent.
Pervasive transience is given a
positive spin in terms of the
freedom of the individual, and
distilled down to greater consumer
choice, argues Bauman (2000, pp.
90; 97). Even marriage is a shopping
exercise, which has evolved from
‘“til death do us part” to “until
further notice”’ (Farouque 2005).
Nomadism encourages ‘digital
Image 4.2: is nomadism dangerous?
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homelessness’ (Hoy 2005), the technosocial solution to transient lifestyle. Increasingly,
our digital devices—wifi, the laptop, the mobile phone—facilitate and promote
particular behaviours and identities for those in the right social position.
The mobile phone, as conceived by telcos, addresses transience and makes it cool.
According to mobile phone marketing, it’s hip to be nomadic but connected.
Hutchinson’s (2006) 3Broadband Zone promises that
you’ll be the one who can make video calls, experience high-speed email, catch
the latest video news updates at a bus stop, watch sports video highlights of
the 3 Test Series cricket in a taxi, get score updates of the English premier
league at a train station, or watch movie trailers in a supermarket queue. You
can even shoot videos and email them to your friends, have your emails read to
you and play video games.
Similarly a Telstra I-mode press release promises a ‘superior total communications
solution’ by ‘providing our customers with services that are compelling, relevant,
timely and—most of all—easy to use’. Telstra will accomplish this by ‘stimulating a
vibrant content market with thousands of content sites for customers to choose from’
(Telstra 2004). Optus and Ninemsn (2005) are joining forces to integrate mobile and
broadband services:
Optus customers will receive communications services including e-mail, MSN
Messenger, calendar and contacts. When combined with the new portal and a
personalized browser, customers will have a level of integration between their
PC and mobile phone not yet seen in Australia.
The telco ideal consumer is wealthy, technically sophisticated, at least as interested in
media consumption as in maintaining contact with friends, and always on the move.
This consumer is presented with an imperative involving convergence and rich media.
Content providers and aggregators like Legion Interactive, instrumental in bringing
such sexy mobile add-ons to the mainstream convergent media scene as SMS voting in
reality TV7 and mobile phone soft porn wallpaper8, are actively touting the economics
of mobile content to media producers, even though ‘rich media’ is currently only a
small proportion of the $1 billion per year mobile data market (Sinclair 2005).
The future envisaged for the mobile consumer by telcos and handset manufacturers
suggests that we may actually surmount transience via our devices; physical isolation
will dissolve via permanent and instantaneous connection to anyone, anywhere, and
geographical movement becomes secondary when we are permanently connected to
permanent media, reliable experience, just a download away. Converging the mobile
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phone with the Web results in a networked apparatus that can disseminate islands of
semi-permanent and reliable audience experience (rich media) within a sea of chance
encounter and changing geography. Our double awareness is also, indeed, a double
identity. Mediation redeems the brutish facts of non-mediated life.
George Myerson (2001) argues that
telco rhetoric entails a radical re-
invention of communication, and
while his work predates the push
to rich mobile media, it contains
useful insights into the ways in
which we are being asked to
reconceive of communication and
the mobile device.
According to Myerson, telco
advertising takes as its departure
point the ideal of intense (p. 9) and large scale interconnection (p. 19).
Communication is equated with individual freedom and control (pp. 19-20) via a
rhetoric of ‘getting what you want’ (p. 20). In other words, communication is
equivalent to consumption. Marketing campaigns stress data flow in systems, and
Myerson infers that the basic premise of ‘mobilization’ is that ‘communication works
best when there is only one person involved’ (p. 21).
Thus, prior to the ‘rich media revolution’, Myerson was already worried about the fate
of mobile phone communication: ‘the potential tragedy is that this most rich of
technological developments is being packaged in such an impoverishing vision’ (p. 53).
Myerson quotes telco marketing which idealises the phone as an ordering device that
by-passes two-way human interaction altogether (p. 28). He opposes this to Habermas’
ideal of communicative action which
refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action
who establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or by extra-verbal
means). The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation
and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of
agreement. The central concept of interpretation refers in the first instance to
negotiating definitions of the situation which admit of consensus.
Image 4.4: Is the mobile phone for shopping?
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Habermas 1996, p. 136
Instrumental uses largely inform the mobile phone’s marketing, but instrumental
communication, according to Habermas, is a limited ideal. It ‘follows technical rules of
action and assesses the efficiency of an intervention into a complex of circumstances
and events’ (p. 160; my emphasis).
Written prior to the 2.5-3G ‘revolution’, Myerson’s analysis barely conceived of
coupling the mobile phone with capture devices (camera, video) or it being radically
integrated with the Web. Seven years later, Telstra is promoting a 3G network
coupled with their Bigpond broadband service to create seamless, ubiquitous
connectivity (Robbiati 2006).
However, the problem with Myerson’s analysis goes beyond the historical moment in
which it is situated. Myerson shares with Heidegger a limited concept of the apparatus.
He desires a transparent apparatus, which the neo-baroque, embedded-in-multiple-
realities mobile phone rarely if ever achieves. He privileges dialogue, and therefore
only acknowledges trilogue in the negative terms implicit in the systems thinking of
telco marketing: the trilogue (that is, the mediating role of the apparatus) means that
dialogue (between humans) is reduced to instrumentality rather than meaningful
exchanges brimming with negotiated meanings.
Throughout this exegesis I have been arguing against a techno-deterministic, or ‘media
ecology’ (Downes 2005, p. 19) concept of media technology. I have been suggesting
that trilogical communication does, indeed, change the nature of communication
because it extends it into the realm of programmed language and data, a type of
linguistic ‘ontology’ favoured by the early Wittgenstein; that is, rational, logical and
stripped of confusion. However, trilogical communication also entails human language,
with all its contextual and nuanced complexity. The trilogue occurs when one language
meets the other: when one type of interpreter meets the other type of interpreter.
The trilogue doesn’t privilege machines and protocols. As Downes (2005, p. 18) says,
‘we are changed not by technology but by experiences’. Our trilogical engagements
lead to new understandings about ourselves, our identity/ies, and our relationship to
the world. Myerson’s reading of mobile phone networks privileges the monolithic
power of the corporations and their technologies. It leaves little room for evolving
meanings derived from engagement and experience.
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There may be negative aspects of ubiquitous networking9, but not because meaning is
dictated by the apparatus or corporations. Indeed, the evolution of mobile phone
usage is a good example of the ways that individuals co-opt the device to their own
ends. Matthew Fuller (2002) has reflected upon critical analysis and its reaction to the
unexpected uptake of text messaging. For him, the base-superstructure model, in
which property relations determine use, may account for the development of
professional mobile media at the expense of innovative mobile art practice. However,
critical analysis has failed to account for
the way that this technology has been over-run and conceptually if not
infrastructurally reinvented by hordes of what are seen as rather insignificant
non-experts. Teenagers, illegal workers, gossip-mongers and so on. All of these
subsist and thrive on their powers of connection, of existing in a dimension of
relationality rather than of territoriality. It is in their capacity to generate a
poetics of this connection that they have reinvented this technology.
Artists, too, have found ‘tactical’ ways of using the phone, despite telco restrictions.
For example, Bluestate (2006) by John Tonkin and Mark Pesce uses the mobile phone’s
bluetooth local networking functionality to create data maps of the city as a social
space. Bluetooth technology by-passes corporate control10. Myerson’s focus on the
marketing of corporations to primarily shape how mobile phones are used fails to
account for ways in which identity, connectivity and community can be explored,
behind the backs of the telcos and handset manufacturers. Usage spawns new uses. A
technosocial perspective highlights the ways in which human behaviour and devices
collaborate in creating and exploring human identity.
Myerson is nonetheless right to
point out that telcos privilege an
impoverished vision of
communication for economic
reasons, although this vision may
not be reflected in actual use
contexts. The corporate mobile
phone ‘text’ suppresses mobile P2P
(peer-to-peer)
communication—not merely
personal texting between friends,Image 4.5: Is the mobile phone for playing games?
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but the larger scale ‘swarming’ behaviour that facilitates democratic expression
(Rheingold 2003).
Telcos conceive mobile users as alone in the world with needs and wants satisfiable by
consumption, including media consumption. Media as diversion from the excesses of
transience is a model far removed from the traditional image of the family-centric
living-room TV; it more closely resembles the ‘private radio’ of nineteenth century fin-
de-siècle telephone-based public broadcasting undertaken by Telefon Hirmondó
(Marvin 1999), strengthened by unshackling it from broadcast schedules. Mobile media,
as conceived of by the telcos, is essentially diversionary: transient media to fill the
temporal cracks in our otherwise full and productive lives. A challenge for mobile
media makers is to expand mobile media from the media ghetto of soft-porn wallpaper
into responsive and engaged meaning-making.
P h o ne - t o - W e b :  e x p a nd i ng  P 2 P
Mobile devices can be co-opted to many different ends. The way we read the mobile
phone as a ‘text’, and the way we use our phones, might depend on who we are:
consumer, prosumer, professional media producer or telco representative.
Furthermore, any one apparatus needs to be considered in the light of a repertoire of
technological practices (Haddon 2005, p. 7). There may be many reasons for choosing
a particular technology, not least, because of the other technologies that you do and
don’t use. Leslie Haddon (p. 12) contends that ‘thinking in terms of repertoires helps
to move the emphasis from being a user of communications to being a manager of
communications’. Once again, this suggests the need for technosocial analyses
concerned with empowerment, identity and interactive choice. People, not just
corporate institutions, are moulding their own experience, sense of self, and place in
the world, through their use of media and communications technologies11. Can we
make mobile media that responds to this challenge?
The idea that users simply respond to a consumerist agenda set by corporate interests
under-plays the tactical possibilities that engagement with the technosocial mediascape
presents. Prosumer mobile phone media—messages, images, and increasingly
video—are forwarded from user to user, and possibly edited en route. Such work has
no end-point or destination. It is a quotidian artform, performed by being in transit.
The conclusion of performance is really the exhaustion of circulation12. Furthermore,
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as consumer-made mobile phone media is increasingly interfaced with social software
databases, tactical media-making potentially extends out from your circle of
acquaintance into a glocalised community of interest.
Since Myerson published his seminal critique, telcos and content providers have cross-
bred the accessibility of the Web with the economics of pay TV: by forcing the
consumer to pay for their downloads, they drive a lucrative wedge between libertarian
ideals of free information that still circulate online, and the mobile phone network.
However, prosumers are at the same time integrating the phone and the Web in a
model of seamlessness with nothing to do with turning media into money.
Prosumers are co-opting the phone for rich media creation. We both produce and
consume video, audio and still images on our phones. According to Okabe and Ito
(2004), most camera phone images are captured for personal visual archiving ‘as a
resource for personal identity construction’. However, we are expanding our
audiences by publishing our mobile phone media to websites such as moblogs and
audioblogs. It is also possible to maintain a textual blog from an Internet-enabled
mobile phone. Phone-made media that seemed private, transient and unscaleable are
becoming quasi-permanent and public. Nevertheless, the expression of personal points
of view remains pivotal (Okabe and Ito 2004).
Moblogging is the phenomenon of publishing media produced on the phone to the
Web. This is usually accomplished by sending an email with an attached image to a
particular email address that results in uploading the image to a web server. From
there, users may display their media in any way that the blogging system allows, and
surfers can access it just as they access any website. Moblogs commonly combine
photos and text; less common are video and audio moblogs.
Randomly sampling moblogged media often suggests that, like other prosumer
publishing, individual mobile media artefacts derived from quotidian, transitory and
insignificant events are unexceptional to those outside the community of interest.
Michael Froomkin (2003, p. 860) comments on the soap-operatic nature of many blogs.
This impression is compounded by moblogs. However, a series of moblogged artefacts
connecting transient events to infer temporal progression and personality,
contextualised by geography and culture, can create startling, if perhaps unfathomable,
self-portraits.
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Example 1: playgirlzzz02 (2005)
playgirlzzz02’s sassy self-image
begs a number of questions about
desire, representation, self and
technology. Her knowing gaze into
her mobile phone’s lens, and her
self-publication of her image on
the web, explore both intimacy
and distance; she seems to be
trading on the distance the
technology creates as much as she
circumvents it with her erotic self-
portraits. She confronts the
viewer with a body that can never
be possessed while at the same
time suggesting its availability. Her moblog is about the paradoxes of virtual
community, embodiment and desire, and the limits of virtual communication.
playgirlzzz02 is both consumer and producer. This is a tactical act, in Michel de
Certeau’s (1984, p. xix) sense—ordinary people, subject to the will and power of big
organisations, nevertheless finding ways to transform opportunities and events to their
own ends. Feenberg (2000b) agrees that ‘the tactical standpoint is far richer’:
It is the everyday lifeworld of a modern society in which devices form a nearly
total environment. In this environment, the individuals identify and pursue
meanings. Power is only tangentially at stake in most interactions, and when it
imposes itself, resistance is temporary and limited in scope by the position of
the individuals in the system. Yet insofar as masses of individuals are enrolled
into technical systems, resistances will inevitably arise and can weigh on the
future design and configuration of the systems and their products.
p. 229
As Myerson demonstrates, telcos are concerned with strategies—the prerogative of
powerful organisations to ideologically dominate and manipulate the less powerful.
However, even with such a tightly controlled technology as the mobile phone, it is
possible to create spaces for tactical expression.
Image 4.6: playgirlzzz02’s moblog
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Example 2: GunFu (2004-2005)
Other mobloggers lead lives in
which the quotidian is
extraordinary.
GunFu’s moblog is a primary
source for a complex and
contested moment in American
foreign policy and Middle Eastern
politics. Concerned mainly with the
minutiae of everyday existence as a
US soldier in Iraq, his moblog is a
personal account of his experience,
greatly salted by the ironies of
‘innocence abroad’, and an
obsession with firepower spiced
with moments of real terror. We experience the life of the unsophisticated soldier
who plays his role of survival and aggression in the midst of a strategic and political
situation about which he appears to have little interest or understanding.
As an asynchronous (and therefore
potentially leisurely) practice that
transforms private mobile-to-
mobile use into public publishing,
moblogged media can be
interpreted, repurposed and
republished by others (copyright
issues aside). Commenting and
trackback potentially integrate
moblogged media into a larger
community of discourse.
To date, few mobloggers extend
their entries much beyond the
Image 4.7: GunFu on firepower13.
Image 4.8: GunFu reflecting on life after war13.
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image, and with notable exceptions exchanges within the moblogging community are
superficial. However, the ‘remix’ culture that is being expanded by mobile phone
capture and transfer offers new artistic and collective directions. For example WJ-s
(Kyles and Roquigny (2006)) is software that ‘offers artists a tool to create live
multimedia performances from this digital soup’ (Varley-Jamieson 2005)14.
These rudimentary examples of discourse and remixing could be greatly expanded by
the semantic web (Berners-Lee et al 2001) (also known as Web 2.0).
‘Tagging’—attaching publicly available and searchable metadata to your
media—encourages more sophisticated combinations of mobile media and networked
communication. For example, your mobile video may become searchable, according to
people’s names, geography, etc. Users may then be able to track one person’s
appearance in mobile phone media across separate mobile videos. Another scenario
entails compiling all mobile media concerning a particular location at a particular time,
with potential ramifications for surveillance and law enforcement. A more artistic
project might recombine mobile video to create a documentary of a music event like
the Big Day Out with many different points of view, organised on the fly at a specific
URI by the next-generation version of Technorati (2002-2005) or Bloglines (2003-2005).
Such possibilities may overcome one current limitation of moblogging, which is that
everyone’s mobile media remains separate, and interconnection is rare. The
emergence of Flickr-style social software for mobile phone prosumer video, such as
SeeMeTV (2006) may start to shape connections between individual media-makers.
Mark Bernstein (2001) envisages hypertexts which are ‘extensible and recombinant’;
they are modular and potentially ever-expanding, diffuse and decentralised. Users ‘will
always want to do things that nobody (and no computer) could anticipate’. How
hypertextual and algorithmic structures will play themselves out on the networked
mobile devices of the near future will always be influenced by the protocols and the
financial disincentives that telcos and handset manufacturers impose upon us. Clever
tactical responses to such constraints continue to evolve.
At stake in the citizen’s ability to make connections between media items is the
possibility of collective discourse and community building. Froomkin (2003, p. 855), for
instance, believes that blogging enables ‘new types of Internet-based discourses with
the “communicative power” that Habermas proposes and, in time, [will] educate and
mobilize citizens to demand that their governments make better and more legitimate
Identity in the space of flows   101
decisions’15. Although it is sometimes difficult to find evidence of such a rational
collective project emerging from cyberspace, there is evidence that blogging has some
impact in nations such as Singapore, in which mainstream political and social discourse
is tightly controlled (see, for example, Mr. Brown (1997-2006)16). We are increasingly
able to engage with the individual point-of-view. Even the television news is featuring
prosumer mobile phone ‘amateur vision’, in particular footage from natural disasters,
warzones and other unpredictable events.
Educational contexts offer other venues for combinations of mobile phone and Web.
Blog-based online communities have been employed in education for some years.
James Farmer (2005) argues that weblogs facilitate the three foundational aspects of a
social constructivist learning environment—social, cognitive and teaching presence.
Extending educational contexts into domains like searcheable moblogs might create
new competencies in the student-centered classroom17. The mobile phone has already
become a ‘naturalised’ aspect of secondary school children’s lives (Mifsud 2005, p.
240). Harnessing its ubiquity and popularity to deliver ‘learning on demand’ may
technologically enhance learning experiences (Wagner 2005, pp. 42-3). Instructional
technology and instructional design programs should embrace ‘the value of experience
design for learning’ (p. 49). In my own teaching practice, we are developing projects
that involve a student-centered and tactical approach via mobile media creation.
However, Myerson (2001) cautions that telco mobile phone marketing rhetoric refutes
contemporary ideals in education and democracy:
Habermas would not see acquiring the maximum information in the minimum
time as a good definition of learning. But it is the definition implied by the
mobile rhetoric of data-pushing and swift access.
p. 56
The limited pedagogical vision implicit in the consumerist telco model can be
contrasted with that of John Seely Brown (2001), whose innovative use of earlier
generation mobile technology like walky-talkies for distributed many-to-many problem-
solving not only increased worker satisfaction but impacted impressively on costs by
leveraging the social fabric of the organisation:
What we are really saying here is that we are constructing knowledge all the
time, in conversation, through narrative. We are personalizing it that way, we
are constructing it, for ourselves.
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P2P behaviour in this sense subverts dominant media relationships and challenges the
telco rhetoric surrounding mobile phone rich media. What this analysis points to is a
sharp divide in ideas of the mobile device imaginary. While ‘Faster, neater, sharper!’
(Myerson 2001, p. 62) seems to be the catch-call of a telco industry intent on
establishing pay-per-view mobile ‘television’ as the ideal purpose of the mobile, as the
mobile apparatus becomes more greatly theorised as a cultural artefact, it is to be
hoped that it will be exploited by niche discourses performed in an arena beyond the
reach of consumption patterns and income streams.
A  t e c hno so c i a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  o n  r i c h  m e d ia  p r o d u c t i o n
Throughout this exegesis, I have
been exploring ways in which the
more intimate, ontological aspects
of personal identity are facilitated
and indeed, produced via our
experience of the media and
communications technology we use.
In the remainder of this chapter I
will flesh out the sorts of rich
media thematics and aesthetics that
might be suited to the phone, with
particular reference to my own narrative project, RL~18. It may seem that to focus on
this more passively consumed rich media lessens the focus on identity creation.
However, as we shall see, a mobile phone text-as-apparatus is a peculiarly intimate and
contextual text. Because of this use-context, mobile phone ‘rich media’ addressing
issues of personal identity may have particular piquancy.
The RL~ project is more a prosumer than an avant-garde project, but at the same time
illustrates ways in which these positions are cross-fertilising each other. Creating
media for new technosocial contexts demands a thoughtful amalgam of the familiar and
the novel. Audience resistance may be partly overcome by reprising familiar themes.
For example, soap opera is a durable type of story telling. It has been successful across
different media and cultures, and its elements can be discovered throughout the
Image 4.9: Boy-meets-girl: some formulae work in any media
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history of narrative, from Greek mythology to Neighbours. Formulaic character-driven
narratives are easy to relate to and can be adapted to many types of media.
However the affordances of different apparatuses leave their imprint on story telling.
As we shall see, mobile phone media is constrained by screen size and file size, but
perhaps of more interest, the very mobileness of the mobile phone can be
appropriated by story-tellers in unique ways. The mobile phone is a very personal
device. Marisa Maio Mackay from mNet Corporation argues that phones have become
an extension of the individual
and that’s often irrespective of age…The more that people play with mobile
phones, the more they personalise them. It is really an extension of
themselves—to demonstrate who and what they are—whether it is through
wallpapers, ring tones—it is really about who they are.
quoted in Hjorth 2005b
Maio Mackay concludes that the mobile phone functions in this sense as ‘a form of
identification’. Rich media producers would therefore be wise to customise their
products to respond to the intimate status of the phone as constant companion and as
personal expression. The mobile phone is a networked apparatus which expresses,
defines and alleviates human transience. It is nodal: wherever we are, our bodies
become spatial locations in the network. We are satellites, with all the overtones of
distance and connectedness that this metaphor entails.
Succinctness, speed and privacy—these words seem to summarise the reasons behind
the rapid uptake of mobile phones. In a survey of Japanese youth mobile phone use, Ito
(2005, p. 7) finds that Japanese youth may send up to 56 messages per day to each
other. Mobile rich media can respond to the intimacy of the apparatus, and the
transient contexts in which we use it19. One approach is to combine mobile media
with P2P interactivity, precisely to personalise user engagement. For example:
Sprint's mobile phone drama …. [The spot consists] simply of images and voice
dialog….But the service does include one feature that the Verizon mobisodes
lack so far: community. Viewers of the mobile phone segments (600 so far)
routinely email and leave voice mails for the actors, who improvise up to 90
percent of their lines. Those fan communications are often stitched right into
the plot. Stewart St. John, The Spot's executive producer, calls the concept
‘blurred reality.’ He'd love to see a groundswell of fans that could lead to a real
TV series.
Stroud 200520
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The producers of The spot respond to this proliferating media climate with a
customised niche product promoting a community-oriented media experience. The
spot’s marketing video promises ‘journals from the spotmates’, an intimate media
experience recalling the email communications of Online Caroline (2000-2001), which
trade on the idea that Caroline is a personal friend. The spot subscribers are texted
the spotmate’s thoughts from the perspective of best friend. Lines of intimacy are
being blurred, if not crossed. ‘Spot on’ also gives you the ability to text or MMS the
spotmates back (Sprint 2005). In these ways, The spot recognises the transient,
quotidian and intimate context in which mobile media is consumed.
A different response to the intimacy of mobile phone media is Jim Shomos’ and Paul
Baiguerra’s Forget the rules (2005) whose by-line is ‘why just watch when you can
control what happens?’ Forget the rules is an interactive drama/comedy simultaneously
delivered to phone, web and pay TV. You are asked to vote on the scenario for the
next week’s episodes which the producers then write, produce and edit over the
following four days. The producers intend to make community with the audience by
dismantling the divide between audience and producer.
Both The spot and Forget the rules offer valuable lessons about producing media which
addresses intimacy and community, transience and identity: pre-eminent themes that
simultaneously represent our phones as ‘communication tools and info-mediatic
assemblages’ (Richardson 2005) which are radically incorporated in daily life.
A mobile aesthetic: Noirishness
Our experience of transience and
nomadism can be transmuted into
feelings of alienation and danger
quite easily. Fernando Paragas
(2005) describes the ironies of
mobile phone use in Manila. While
‘mobile phones serve as a link
between the student-informants
and the people who are concerned
for their safety’ and ‘imbue the
chaotic streets with someImage 4.10: umbilical devices for risky situations
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semblance of order by helping locate people through micro-coordination’ (p. 125),
they
are also becoming threats to one’s security …, as seen in the incidence of
mobile phone-snatching incidents … at least on one occasion this has led to
murder … Further, a mobile phone is said to have detonated the bomb that
exploded in a bus in central Metro Manila …
p. 119
Leaving the safety of our homes and the familiarity of our families, we confront a
cityscape pervaded by risk and unpredictability. The mobile is an umbilical device.
With it, we reassure ourselves in the face of alienation. This paradigm has emotional
parallels with a particular era of movie making
whose characters circle warily around each other in a world of night clubs and
truck stops, backlit theatre of memory where women’s faces disappear in
cigarette smoke and the world is erased by the blare of rumba bands.
O’Brien 1991, p. 43
Most of us circulate in an urban
environment represented by
politicians and the mainstream
media as routinely threatening. We
cling to our connectivity
apparatuses in case of an ever-
lurking emergency. At the start of
the twenty-first century, a noirish21
interpretation of everyday life often
pervades its representation.
It is not possible to recreate either
the mood, culture or technology of the noir period of cinema (1945-1955 American
culture), nor the impact of French existentialism that summarised, if not
philosophically instigated, noir (Porfirio 1976, pp. 213-215). However, a noirish
psychology has infected the way we view ourselves; life in the big city is pervaded with
potential threats. The premise of my own mobile phone drama is that users identify
with aspects of this psychology, particularly when it is presented on an apparatus
specifically designed to ameliorate the alienation resulting from transience.
Image 4.11: 60 years of violent urban space
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My own project, RL~ (2005-2006)22
is a microsoap following the life
and loves of the plucky but
somewhat misguided Sarrorn, who
herself inhabits a dangerous city.
My narrative engages noir
conventions. For example, its initial
scene mimics the start of Sunset
Boulevard (1950), in which the hero
Joe Gillis (William Holden) narrates
events leading up to his own death
(Porfirio 1976, p. 216)23. This first
person narrator directly addresses
the viewer on her mobile phone and asks for help. This is powerful device when the
viewing apparatus is one that normally delivers messages from our friends.
Implicit in the mobile phone microscreen is claustrophobia, a psychological condition
associated with noir (Walker 1993, p. 26). The mobile phone microscreen opposes
itself to cinematic space, and as a result, communicating claustrophobia is by no means
challenging. The producers of Appointment (2005), ‘a super-modern love story made
for the small screen’ (Hoo 2005) also respond to the claustrophobic microscreen:
‘The gestures I make are very limited,’ said Luo Ji, who plays one of Gang's
suitors. ‘Your emotions should only come from facial expressions. It's quite
difficult acting.’
Appointment has little dialogue and few wide shots. I use similar artistic direction in
RL~. However, because of the way in which the RL~ images are produced (from a game
engine) their quality is limited, and close-ups capturing facial expression and nuanced
acting are virtually impossible. I have tried to turn gross ‘over-acting’ into one of the
quirky features of the environment. This stylised, schmaltzy ‘acting’ also lends itself to
noirishness.
Other producers of mobile phone narrative have also responded to the noir analogy.
Image 4.12: impossible first person narratives establish
the psychology of noir
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For example, Marsha Berry’s Julia's
obsession (2005a) combines text
and moving image to create a
poetic and mysterious environment.
She notes that she is ‘drawing on
silent screen and early talkies
where the visual refers to moods
and states of mind’ (Berry 2005b),
but also believes that ‘noir is
definitely part of it’.
Dean Keep concurs. The aesthetics
of his mobisode Missing Emily
(2005a) respond to the same environment:
Scary things suit the small screen as they can be viewed in spaces of isolation.
The environment can add value to the content.
Keep 2005b
The claustrophobia and mystery of
Berry’s and Keep’s projects is also
explored in some of my episodes
(particularly episode seven).
Michael Walker (1993) offers this
characterisation of a series of noir
films, particularly those associated
with Alfred Hitchcock:
In these films the noir atmosphere
of claustrophobia, entrapment and
threat is focussed on a heroine
with whom we closely identify.
Here the male is the dangerous enigma and the heroine’s experience of him is
the structural equivalent of the hero’s experience of the femme fatale in film
noir.
p. 18
While moral standards have changed since the 1940’s Production Code stipulated the
promotion of marriage and domesticity (Walker 1993, p. 19), entrapment and
Image 4.13: the poetry of violence
Image 4.14: claustrophobia
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claustrophobia remain the essential psychological trauma of Sarrorn, the main
character in RL~.
The solitary contexts in which we use our mobile phone further compounds its
noirishness. Kylie Robinson, creator of Girl Friday (2005) enthuses:
I love the fact that entertainment and communication from my mobile is a
solitary and intimate experience. It’s changed the way we behave socially, flirt,
date and correspond. This gives me an opportunity as a storyteller, to
encourage an intimate connection between the user and live action characters.
It also helps to blur the boundaries between reality and fiction by allowing me
to utilise tools on the mobile such as SMS and MMS for the purpose of the
narrative. It’s also about portable entertainment, disconnecting you from the
desk and giving you freedom with interactive content. I also find that it’s a
more active viewing experience from the handset—the audience are already in
the process of clicking buttons, listening, texting, calling etc.
quoted in Hjorth 2005a
Our mobile phones simultaneously represent to us that we are very alone and very
connected. Such a circumstance encourages us to play with ideas of identity and place.
Noirishness is not necessarily a negative frame of mind. It is a technosocial condition,
attached to specific types of text-as-apparatus and responding contextually to the
world around us. It is a result of our double awareness and double identity, as we
embed our mediated lives within our geographically transient experience.
Practical constraints
Writing drama for mobile delivery presents particular challenges. Matt McCullough of
Steamfish Productions agrees:
The killer for the lo-spec phones is the file size they can handle and the lateral
thinking game that's involved in telling an engaging story within that.
That being said—it demands efficiency in the use of design and screen language
and working within those constraints has, to some degree, been quite
liberating.
quoted in Pace and de Silva 2005
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My solution to these challenges is
influenced by the way that my
microsoap is being produced. As a
prosumer work with no budget, I
am reliant on image capture from
computer games, in particular The
urbz: sims in the city (2004), a
PlayStation game based on The sims
2 (2004). Reasons for taking a
‘machinima’ approach were not
merely because it offers an
alternative to casting actors and
shooting video. A thematic of RL~ is the relation between nonmediated and mediated
realities. This is a thematic we experience whenever we use our networked phones
‘on location’. I weave into my narrative reflections upon the mediascape, and the
complicated and even paradoxical concept of reality that results when mediation is
always present. Using machinima also sets up a remediating practice (Bolter and
Grusin 1999 passim), not without its own ‘realistic’ ironies.
Specific challenges include:
• The one-minute narrative
With sound effects, that’s 170 words. The voice-over is terse, every word pregnant
with the temporal breathing space it takes up. Sometimes in RL~ the narrative is purely
visual. The stills sometimes illustrate the voice-over, and sometimes tell a slightly
different but related story. Since viewers can re-watch episodes as much as they
desire, dense scenarios seem viable.
Creating a ‘cliff-hanger’ at the end of each 80-second episode is unviable. Instead, I
cluster episodes together to create a ‘chapter’ of plot events. This also allows me to
suggest passing time. Even if you watch the episodes one after another, having to start
the next episode suggests temporal disjunction.
• Trade-off between image and audio
Image 4.15: remixing media
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Because of the need to limit the file size (most of my files are between 200-300 kbs), I
have opted for a combination of stills with continuous audio. Other ‘mobisodes’ have
taken a similar approach. Acquiring images from a game engine limits the range of
images I can get. For these reasons, the voice over must flesh out what may only be
implicit in the images.
• Distribution
Robinson suggests various principles informing her own larger-scale cross-media
production, Girl Friday:
a. Only relevant story elements will be delivered via mobile…
b. The user must be able to contribute/correspond with the program…
c. The live action content for the mobile must be personal and aimed directly
at the user.
d. The content must be available on demand
e. The content should be customised to the user where possible…
f. Users without 3G must receive alternate content…
quoted in Hjorth 2005a
Media producers seeking to make money from mobile products by controlling
distribution to specific phone models, payment plans, or to customers of specific
telcos, risk ghettoising their product. However, once a consumer has downloaded a
video onto their phone, that media may be copied (depending on file type). Every
bluetooth transaction or MMS is a potential violation of traditional copyright law.
The political, cultural and legal systems that protect media and art are challenged by
mobile, connected devices and digital information they create and exchange. At the
moment, many of these potential issues are circumvented by protocological, technical
and corporate control, on top of the prohibitive cost of downloads.
Mobile rich media exists at a nexus of political, legal and technological complexity
which currently stymie not only consumption but production as well. For example,
Mobile Journeys (2005) required a dedicated technical person to crunch out
compressed versions for apparatuses that share neither specifications or protocols. As
Nathan Mayfield and Tracey Robertson of Hoodlum Entertainment exhort:
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You have to serve your audience and make sure it is narrative first and
technology second. We had the best technology at the time to develop it, but
as far as the audience was concerned it was entry-level technologies.
quoted in Rennie 2005
I want people to be able to access
RL~ on the move, whilst
experiencing the transience of their
own lives—acquire, watch and
trash while waiting for train or
doctor. This media circulates and
then at some point, demand
withers and it dies. To flourish, this
media must be MMSed between
friends. Transient distribution is
viral distribution. Producers who
prevent this form of file exchange
are betraying the reasons we love our phones.
T h e  s p a c e  o f  f l o w s
As we have seen, mobile media has unique formal and thematic considerations. Many
of these considerations are also evident in the way we use our phones to
communicate. For example, since text messaging does not presuppose geographical
specificity, a lot of text messages concern location—‘In mshpt, where r u?’ The
swarming mentality of SMS-enabled teenagers (Mitchell 2003, p. 32), and
approximeetings (Plant 2001, pp. 61-4; McCamish, 2004, p. 3; Mitchell 2003, p. 157)
results from unshackling communication from location. Location: it is pre-eminent in
all aspects of mobile phone use. While telco marketing puts a positive, and perhaps
superficial spin on nomadism, there are other interesting perspectives that can be
explored by mobile media makers.
Image 4.16: killing time
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I have suggested that noir
‘existentialism’ pervades mobile
media: ephemerality is the core
experience that mobile phones and
their media have become the
symbolic inscriptions of. This noir
existentialism
places its emphasis on man’s
contingency in a world where there
are no transcendental values or
moral absolutes, a world devoid of
any meaning but the one man
himself creates … Its negative side,
the side to which its literary
exponents are most closely drawn, emphasizes life’s meaninglessness and man’s
alienation …
Porfirio 1976, p. 213
The phone inhabits and projects an environment charged with uncertainty, change and
human transience. We can get a measure of ‘virtual’ relief from the device in our
pockets, but it is an ironic relief: the digital information that the phone sends, receives
and displays may compound our sense of enclosure in ephemerality. Values like
heritage, timelessness, permanence, tradition, value and curatorial care24 seem lost in
the context of the essentially disposable nature of movement, phones and their media.
Perhaps as a result of positive
marketing campaigns, we tend to
congratulate ourselves for our
sophisticated nomadism. However,
the more we rely on the ever-
present network to intercede on
our behalf when our also-ever-
present geography becomes
excessive, the more we experience
ourselves as ontologically ‘between’
material space and the space of
flows (Stadler 2002). As types of
Image 4.17: transience, alienation, cities
Image 4.18: living for the moment
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co-presence and telepresence shape our experience, the relevance and meaning of
space is changing.
For example, sociologist Manuel
Castells (1996, p. 407) defines
space as ‘the material support of
time-sharing social practices’. The
overwhelming barrier of physical
distance that constrained us in
previous eras seem no longer so
relevant to what we mean by space.
Indeed, there are now different
types of space: static space is (old-
fashioned) location-based space,
but the ‘space of flows’ is the space
of information age. It consists of
three elements:
• the medium through which
things flow (digital
communications technology);
• the things that flow
(information);
• the nodes amongst which things
flow (people and apparatuses)
(Stadler 2002).
The mobile phone exists at the intersection of two types of space. Through it, we
trilogically learn to negotiate, and even reconcile, different realities, different spaces
and ultimately different identities. The mobile phone is a trilogic node in cyberspace
which can’t be meaningfully separated from the geographically-specific human that
‘wears’ the node. We live ‘between’ networked and geographical space. We have
doubled consciousnesses, operating on different planes with different types of
awarenesses; it is as if we are multitasking our ontologies, as we negotiate the co-
Images 4.19 and 4.20: there are many networks, some inhabit
static space, and others inhabit the space of flows
The technosocial mediascape 114
existence of two ways of being. Identity shunts between whatever space engages it
more urgently: both enclose our friends and our interests. Both enclose, and expand,
our selves.
Identity is ‘both and assertion and an assessment’, argues Louis Hyde (2006).
Sometimes it asserts itself simply if we believe in it. Indeed, identity is the ultimate
mashup (Shapiro 2006). The contemporary self experiences moments in which identity
is disjunct with geographical specificity; at those times the self is recontextualised by
the text-as-apparatus, reaching out from the space of flows to transcend the specificity
of transient locations. Self is reclaimed through trilogic networked mediation.
There are, according to Slack and Wise (2005, pp. 149-150) ‘technologies of identity’
which ‘not only create and alter identity, but reinforce or challenge particular notions
of identity, including the questions of what it means to exist or to be human’. As
engagements with technologies change, so does identity—it becomes fluid and
malleable (p. 163). ‘What connects to what?’ is the question we ask our networked
apparatuses: ‘I’ to it, and it to you, and the trilogue begins. Individual identity plays
itself out in tension with trilogues that themselves evolve.
Trilogical engagements constitute a ‘fundamental shift in subjectivity’ (Mitchell 2003, p.
62), as fixed identities dissolve into fluid ones (also see Bauman 2000 passim). Ideas
about identity result in communication, self-expression and media consumption; those
acts feed back into our next ‘identity mashup’. These trilogical feedback loops take de
Certeau’s faith in the deviousness of consumption (1984, pp. xii-xiii) to a new level.
Castells agrees (1996, p. 408). The resulting networks are ‘the space of places,
function, meaning, domination, and challenge to domination, in increasingly complex
and contradictory patterns’.
In retrospect, Martin Heidegger’s complaint against the monolithic nature of
technology appears historically specific. The ‘hardware era’ of ‘heavy modernity’
(Bauman 2000, p. 113) in which Heidegger lived valued territorial conquest, because
‘wealth and power was firmly rooted or deposited deep inside the land’ (p. 114). If we
surmount the literalist idea of space, the logic of heavy modernity subsides, and with
it, some of the basis for Heidegger’s critique of technology. Geography is not
redundant; however, the traditional cost of mobility—isolation—is ameliorated by the
technologies of ‘light modernity’ (p. 119). We are no longer so deeply concerned with
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literally colonising territory as we ‘surf’ the space of flows with ease. Ultimately,
‘durability loses its attraction’, according to Bauman (p. 126). As our technosocial lives
privilege the transient, ‘the work of culture’ may be changing:
Indeed, throughout human history the work of culture consisted in sifting and
sedimenting hard kernels of perpetuity out of transient human lives and fleeting
human actions, in conjuring up duration out of transience, continuity out of
discontinuity, and in transcending thereby the limits imposed by human
mortality by deploying mortal men and women in the service of the immortal
human species. Demand for this kind of work is nowadays shrinking.
p. 126
It remains to be seen how telcos and corporate media, still perhaps rather too
accustomed to the values of heavy modernity, reinvent themselves for the light, fluid,
double consciousnesses and multiple identities that are emerging. Our use of the
mobile apparatus extends beyond the vision of corporate media. As we radically
integrate our apparatuses in our lives, we embark together upon the reinvention of
humanness. As Donna Haraway (1985, pp. 28-29) proclaims, the cyborg—humans who
are embedded in technology and vice-versa—is our ontology and our politics; it
structures the possibilities of transformation. As non-professionals progressively
embrace the role of media-maker as well as consumer, the trilogical experiment means
that communication and representation have become predisposed to this cyborgian
world-view.
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C O N C L U S I O N :  F L U I D  I D E N T I T I E S  A N D  M U L T I P L E  R E A L I T I E S
Truth, far from being a solemn and severe master,
is a docile and obediant servant.
Goodman 1978, p. 18
This exegesis has introduced a particular approach to media that I have called
technosocial analysis. I have developed this theory because it seems to best express
the range of concerns that I explore in my own practice, which encompasses many
different activities that nevertheless have one thing in common—an engagement with
contemporary media and communications apparatuses.
All media has technosocial implications, however those implications are foregrounded
in contemporary networked, digital and interactive media (and their mediums). In
particular, this media privileges intimate exploration of issues of personal identity and
ontology. Such exploration extends beyond individual identity and accordingly my own
critical investigation has extended into more philosophical and ontological realms.
More broadly, our media and their apparatuses engage ideas about what it is to be
human.
Identity and ontological meanings arise from technosocial engagement. I have not been
referring to a narrow concept of meaning derived from a close reading of a specific
text. Rather, I have explored a type of meaning arising from the trilogue (human
programmer—apparatus—human user) that is embedded within the performative text-
as-apparatus. These meanings are ontological: they concern what it is to be human in
the broad sense, and what it means to be a specific individual, in a specific moment, in
a narrower sense. We create some of these text-as-apparatuses ourselves; others are
explored more than created. Either way, through praxis—through performing the
text—we also create the technosocial self.
These text-as-apparatuses are linguistic objects, even if they display very little text to
the human user (for example, in a rich media computer game). They are linguistic
because they depend for their functionality on the existence of programming code,
data, and protocol that is inscribed in software and digital databases. The symbolic
meanings we discover or encase in our digital texts result from ‘translations’ into the
sorts of ‘language’ that the apparatus can interpret. The linguistic ‘ecology’ of digital
textuality impacts on the terms and conditions of the trilogue. As a result, identity and
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ontology are explored in collaboration with the apparatus. The self evolves as a function
of the way we perceive our media, and ourselves, as interdependent with the apparatus.
Language itself is the ultimate mobile technology—it flows between geographies,
between cultures, and even between entities. It finds ways to insinuate itself and do
the work of world creation. Language fires our technosocial engagements; it is at the
heart of the trilogue, it is the oil that makes the text-as-apparatus perform. Language
is the precondition for the technologies I have explored. However, media technologies
can be in themselves a type of language. They, too, carry meanings beyond what is
overtly contained in their texts.
Our increasingly ‘intelligent’ apparatuses challenge us to conceive ourselves as
collaborators in extra-human relationships. However, our media and communications
apparatuses are not like pets; they are not seeking to please us. While they enjoy a
limited sort of agency, they are not intuitive. They are bound by rules. We adapt
ourselves to their capacities, and have rich and ongoing relationships with, and
through, them.
Contemporary media and communications technologies—and the idea that they exist
together, as a suite that we choose from—mean that we consciously consider the
ways we behave, or could behave, with technology. These technologies help us explore
who we are or want to be. Some, like networked social software, help us explore
collective identities; others, like single player computer games are more private and
intimate.
The media and apparatuses that I have focused on do not represent an end-point in
the trajectory of media evolution. Although trends may be discernable, specific
technologies are as transient as the texts we make.
In chapter one I introduced three technosocial ‘positions’:
1. The prosumer. It has become ‘a commonplace of postmodern mass media that we
are all insiders now’ argues Nicholas Mirzeoff (1999, p. 99). The idea that we can
all play producer was a theme followed up in chapter four.
2. The technosocially-sophisticated avant-garde artist, the focus of chapter two.
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3. Corporate media producers, who are attempting to reinvent themselves in the face
of the changing mediascape. I considered some of the media they produce in
chapter three.
In chapter two I explored the experiences and relationships established when you
create programmed media. The focus of these experiences concerns the trilogue,
which hinges on the unique and pivotal role of language in digital media. As my project
work for Concatenation demonstrated to me, being a programmer/artist obliges one to
think in terms of a text with two different ‘audiences’ with different interpretive and
linguistic capacity. Writing programming is an act of ‘translating’ a text for one type of
interpreter into outcomes that another type of interpreter finds meaningful.
I concluded in this chapter that the identity of the technosocial avant-garde artist is
difficult to sustain, given the notorious ephemerality of this type of textuality.
Indeed, the transient nature of these texts, and the human experience of transience
that it reflects if not promotes, is a theme returned to on several occasions
throughout this exegesis. Underneath diverse and ephemeral surface phenomena,
people are interrogating, exploring and manifesting ideas about humanness and
transience. Still-dominant modernist ideals about permanence (and progress and unity)
may be threatened by mainstream culture’s engagement with transience as lifestyle
choice and aesthetic.
Chapter three explored the experience of computer games via my own technosocial
practice as a player/consumer, and specifically the impact of immersion on ideas of
reality and identity. Traditional ideas of realism derived from other types of media do
not seem appropriate to computer game experience. This is because the performative
nature of computer games establishes an ‘experiential realism’ (erealism), whose
impact is derived not from indexicality but from an analogy to momentary living in the
nonmediated world.
In chapter three I also argued that immersion, and the neo-romantic ideology that it
relies upon, is an opposing aesthetic principle to the postmodern neo-baroque. I
suggested that absolute immersion in a computer game is the technosocial equivalent
to archaic mythic experience. This religious impulse is prevalent in RPG gameplay.
Heroic journeys are common to computer games and mythology; computer games may
regenerate myth from ‘dead’ story to ‘lived’ performance. The power of myth is
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obscure to all those except initiates, thus immersion in computer games is widely
derided, and ultimately fails.
In contrast with immersive computer games, multiple realities and the multiplied ‘I’
dogs our every step when we integrate the mobile device in our lives, the focus of my
discussion in chapter four. The aesthetic here is more neo-baroque than neo-romantic:
we have embraced the pervasive presence of multiple realities enthusiastically. Perhaps
this is because the mobile phone, and the online network it maintains access to, offers
some relief from contemporary feelings of nomadism, transience, contingency and even
threat.
However, the mobile phone as media device is not yet well conceptualised. Corporate
media, prosumers, artists and consumers all have different interests. Its affordances
are further constrained by telcos, who have their own agendas. As a result, a variety
of types of mobile media vie for legitimacy. I argued that those mobile text-as-
apparatuses that engage technosocially—that explore personal identity and humanness
in a way sympathetic to a transient context—are more valuable, and I suggested
directions that corporate ‘rich media’ can take, with reference to my own work.
Prosumers, who publish mobile media to the Web, are already showing how this
device can be technosocially co-opted.
Mobile media is locative. The textuality that emerges contextualises the self in relation
to a geography that has become layered with information. This results in double
awareness, multiple realities and mashup identities as our bodies act as moving nodes
in the always-on network, and attention alternates between different types of reality
as whim or necessity moves us. We alternate between geographic space and the space
of flows.
In summary, the technosocial offers a conceptual lens through which media and
communications technology impact upon identity creation. We create media that
broadcasts who we are; via our trilogical engagements, we then revise and create new
statements about identity. Identity is, indeed, a mashup: it is performed differently in
different contexts.
Several issues have been left unexplored by the current work because of length
limitations. For instance, does technosocially explored identity translate into collective
or politically engaged activity?1 Does the desire for collectivity recede in the face of
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technosocially-facilitated individualism, or can the self-interest of thousands of
individuals create meaningful communities of collective interest? Future qualitative
research using the conceptual frameworks promoted here may provide an opportunity
to explore and analyse technosocially-mediated collective behaviour.
This exegesis might be read as perhaps exhibiting a problematic implicit Platonism,
derived from privileging the role of language in world-creation. For some critics, such
as Heim (1993, p. 89), ‘[c]yberspace is Platonism as a working product’. The threat of
this, as Heim conceives it, is that:
At the computer interface, the spirit migrates from the body to a world of
total representation. Information and images float through the Platonic mind
without a grounding in bodily experience. You can lose your humanity at the
throw of a dice.
p. 101
Having reflected on the various aspects of technosocial practice and associated project
work I am more of the view that humanity is a fluid thing, changing with our
environment, and therefore, not easily ‘lost’. However, if there is a necessary
connection between idealism and believing that worlds are linguistically dependent,
that is an appellation I will happily bear.
My approach could also perhaps be accused of mind-body dualism2, but the decision
not to dwell on this issue is more due to spatial limitations than to the logic of my
position. Marcos Novak (1992, p. 241) muses on the cyberspace paradox that ‘even as
we are finally abandoning the Cartesian notion of a division of mind and body, we are
embarking on an adventure of creating a world that is the precise embodiment of that
division’. The way forward is perhaps clearest in regards the mobile phone, whose use-
context has a transparent relationship to location and embodiment (Richardson 2005).
I have been agreeing with Heim (1993) an indeed, Heidegger (1971) that as language
formulates the way we conceive of the world and our relation with it, programming in
the text-as-apparatus flavours the experiences that result. Humans negotiate multiple
types of language, and engage in acts of translation between one type of language and
another.
The issue of language and technology brings us back to Martin Heidegger, a figure who
has ‘haunted’ this exegesis as both a scourge and a prompt. As I argued in chapter
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three, Heidegger belongs to a romantic trajectory, broadly contrasted with
postmodern and neo-baroque analyses.
Heidegger believes there are good and bad technologies, determined by his preference
for straight-forward embodied relations with the environment (Idhe 1993, p. 107). As
Idhe has shown (1993, p. 111), this is a value-laden, and ultimately political analysis,
which remains under-acknoweldged by Heidegger. While Heidegger recognizes that
technologies are contextual (p. 108), this prevents him from conceiving of technologies
as objects of fascination in their own right (p. 109), which is clearly an aspect of our
use of contemporary communications technologies.
Heidegger’s focus on ‘heavy modernism’—major infrastructure, plant and equipment
(1977, p. 16)—means that he interprets the essential facts about technology in a
particular way. He believes that the purpose behind developing this technology is to
create a ‘standing-reserve’ (p. 17; also see Idhe 1993, p. 106-107) of ready-to-use
resources (in particular, energy) to meet the contingencies of human existence, and as
a result
man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-
reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes
to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve.
Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the
posture of lord of the earth.
1977, p. 27
As a result, the universe becomes a human construct, and man (sic) ‘always encounters
only himself’, and any wider sense of being in the world is lost.
In many respects, it is easy to sympathise with Heidegger’s condemnation of this older
style of technology. However, the technologies of ‘light’ modernity, including digital
technology, were beyond Heidegger’s ken. Heidegger opposed technology and art, but
the text-as-apparatus demonstrates their synthesis. It even appears to facilitate the
ontological engagement that Heidegger seeks from art (for example, immersion in the
possible worlds of computer games).
As Idhe (1993) perceptively notes, the Heideggerian negativity addresses the way
cultures use technology rather than technology per se (p. 113). For Heidegger, artistic
inspiration was poetry. Language ‘not only puts forth in words and statements what is
overtly or covertly intended to be communicated; language alone brings what is, as
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something that is, into the Open for the first time’ (1971, p. 71). Within our digital
machines, language rules3. I have referred to Wittgenstein’s life-long project
concerning language, and indeed, have found constructivism to offer an antidote to
Heidegger’s apparent blanket condemnation of technology. The linguistic apparatus has
overtaken God as the entity against which we compare, measure and test ourselves.
Perhaps, however, this competitive, defensive way of thinking about our relationship
to the apparatus is giving way to deeper and more useful understandings of
collaboration, evolution and identity-building. It is in experiencing, and then
articulating, such relationships that my own practice has been instrumental.
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Preface
1. ‘Apparatus’ is Flusser’s (2005) term. Adapting from him, I will use it to mean any programmed or programmable
machine. Often these machines are networked. Flusser uses ‘apparatus’ in a negative sense, to imply a functionality
which exceeds human dignity.
2. Not a term I will use, because appropriate use is tied to a close reading Heidegger which I will not be undertaking. I
will be using the term ‘identity’ to refer to both sociological and ontological explorations of the self.
Chapter one
1. Resnick adds that ICT hasn't always lived up to its promise (2001, p. 3), and points to the possibility that
technologies can mould people’s behaviour in directions that may not be conducive to democracy.
2. The problem with a language-essentialist idea of reality is that ‘[t]he technological convergence that allows
messages to be coded and transmitted into an electronic public sphere also threatens our conception of self by arguing
that language is reality. Our messages are split first from the mind and then from the physical body. Technological
enframing seems to be accompanied by a fragmentation or dispersal of the subject that supports a dualist separation
of mind and body, machine and human. This suspicion of technology is related to a theological and philosophical
suspicion of the body and a desire to “escape the flesh” through technological means’ (Downes 2005, p. 34). Downes
is wrong to assume that a language essentialist position ultimately derives from such a ‘philosophical suspicion’.
However, I agree that these are challenges for a technosocial theory that is ‘language essentialist’. Downes argues
that Heim, Heidegger (and by implication, me) have a ‘transcendental’ concept of language: via language, ‘symbolised
thought becomes placeless' therefore ‘digital writing, or electric language, is a form of expression that abstracts
communication from embodied experience' (p. 26). This leads to accusations of Platonic idealism. Downes avoids
Platonism and Cartesianism by arguing that unmediated perception is possible, which is not a solution I can share.
Downes’ charge can be overcome by expanding the concept of the trilogue (see chapter two) into the realm of
embodiment, however this project is beyond the scope of the present work.
3. Praxis—the activity of doing something—is a central theme of phenomenological inquiry. Don Idhe (1993, p. 2) for
example, eschews the more 'transcendental’ extremes of the phenomenological tradition; instead he wants to stress
the primacy of praxis. In textual analysis, this focus has led to reader-response theory, although for Idhe, this critical
practice possibly suffers from the ills of ‘social constructionism’ (p. 5). I would say that the technosocial contexts
extends beyond reading into writing, and the relationship between the two, which emerges out of praxis.
4. During the last 30 years, the figure of the cyborg has been a powerful trope for imagining human-apparatus
relations, however it will not be the focus of the current work, partly because of the range of work that has already been
done, and partly because my focus is limited to the production of art, media and other communication. Aarseth has
reflected upon the relevance of the cyborg but also avoids using it: ‘If we see the text as a kind of machine, a symbiosis
of sign, operator and medium... then the cyborg perspective is already implied’ (Aarseth 1997, p. 55).
5. A technosocial position agrees with Ströhl (2002, p. xiid), who views media and apparatus as an extension of the
body's organs therefore undermining any attempt to ultimately distinguish a text and its performance or interpretation.
In other words, relations, not things, are real (p. xiii).
6. The field of cultural production is contained within the field of power. Creators are relatively dispossessed members
of the field of power, and their power is determined by the position they assume within the field of cultural production.
Indeed, there are ‘few fields ... in which the antagonism between the occupants of the polar positions is more total’
(Bourdieu 1993, p. 46) as they struggle with each other to impose ‘the legitimate definition of literary or artistic
production’ (p. 46).
7. Indeed, Lenhart and Fox (2006) find that ‘the American blogosphere is dominated by those who use their blogs as
personal journals. Most bloggers do not think of what they do as journalism.
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‘Most bloggers say they cover a lot of different topics, but when asked to choose one main topic, 37% of bloggers cite
“my life and experiences” as a primary topic of their blog. Politics and government ran a very distant second with 11%
of bloggers citing those issues of public life as the main subject of their blog.
‘Entertainment-related topics were the next most popular blog-type, with 7% of bloggers, followed by sports (6%),
general news and current events (5%), business (5%), technology (4%), religion, spirituality or faith (2%), a specific
hobby or a health problem or illness (each comprising 1% of bloggers). Other topics mentioned include opinions,
volunteering, education, photography, causes and passions, and organizations.’ (2006, p. ii)
8. The BBC’s model for convergence, aimed for implementation by 2012 (Sherwin 2006), is glocal, convergent and
cross media (Jenkins 2001). Resnick (2001, p. 19) suggests that the ‘social capital impacts are ambiguous: if weak ties
with a larger social network displace stronger ties with a few people, there are both gains and losses to social capital’.
9. ‘Audience’, a term with connotations of mass broadcasting and passive consumption, seems inappropriate. Ben Neill
(2002, p. 4) argues for a parallel, technosocially-fostered development in rave culture: ‘In this type of event, artists are
not the center of attention; instead it is the role of the artist to channel the energy of the crowd and create the proper
backdrop for their social interaction.’
10. ‘Social Software can provisionally be said to have two strands. Primarily it is software built by and for those of us
locked out of the narrowly engineered subjectivity of mainstream software. It is software which asks itself what kind of
currents, what kind of machine, numerical, social and other dynamics it feeds in and out of, and what others can be
brought into being?
The second current is related to this. It is software that is directly born, changed and developed as the result of an
ongoing sociability between users and programmers in which demands are made on the practices of coding that
exceed their easy fit into standardised social relations’ (Fuller 2002).
11. The ambitions and scope of metadesign are related to those of ‘second wave’ critical technical practice, created by
Phil Agre (1997). Wardrip-Fruin and Moss (2001, §3.6) describes this practice as ‘using crucial tools to re-see technical
problems and solving technical problems via these insights, a combination which may be motivated either by reaching
a technical impasse or by a crucial/social engagement (or both)’.
12. Participatory design values ordinary people's views; and practices the relevance of philosophy, sociology and
anthropology with the understanding that democracy can be manifest in the process (Wardrip-Fuin and Moss 2001,
§3.1).
13. A traditional aesthetic criterion is that artworks possess unity. Many phenomenologists believe that unity is the
starting point for human experience. Don Idhe (1973, p. 133) conceives of language as a unified system. Heidegger
devalues the ‘ontic’, which pertains to the ‘fragmentary world of empirical observation, representation, and
correspondence’ (Coyne 1999, p. 258). For example, according to Heidegger, ‘Being-in-the world’ … ‘stands for a
unitary phenomenon’, which is ‘a state of Dasein which is necessary a priori, but it is far from sufficient for completely
determining Dasein's Being’ (Heidegger 1965, p. 303; Coyne 1999, p. 148). In phenomenology ‘There is clearly no
escaping the unity theme’ argues Coyne (1999, p. 279). Multiplicity and unity exist together as facets of human
experience, where experience of unity appears to be prone to momentary collapse into the fragmentary ‘ontic’. It is not,
therefore, surprising that phenomenological aesthetic theory tends to reify this principle.
14. Found Magazine (c.2001-2005) is one of several websites dedicated to found objects, which exemplify the
migration of the flâneur attitude from street to Web.
15. Derived from Manuel Castells’ concept of the space of flows, discussed in chapter four. Flusser makes a similar
point about photography. Photography is quantum, atomised, grainy—this structure is ‘characteristic of all things
related to apparatus, and ... even those camera functions that appear to slide (eg film and television pictures) are
actually based on punctuated structures’ (Flusser 2005, p. 67).
16. See Teer-Tomaselli (2006) on John Reith and the BBC.
17. While positioned in the tradition of natural history documentary exemplified by David Attenborough (Scott and
White 2003, p. 321), there is nevertheless always a question at the back of the viewer's mind: ‘How did they do that?’,
and sometimes the producers seem unable to resist bringing such questions to the fore. The most famous of these
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moments is from episode six, when Tyrannosaurus Rex salivates on a nonexistent camera lens (p. 323). This scene
simultaneously realizes immediacy (presentation of the real) and hypermediacy (foregrounding the technology). This
neo-baroque attitude, which seems to exist in tension with the more immediate, immersed and romantic view of media
experience, is discussed further in chapter three.
18. This is a type of audio compression. Files are uploaded to a website, and then may be downloaded to a stand-
alone MP3 player, most famously an ipod.
19. For work which explores the limits of traditional copyright, see Olia Lialina’s My boyfriend came back from the war
(1996-2005) and Mark Napier’s Riot (2000), among many others. Cory Doctorow’s (2005) defence of copyleft is an
impassioned introduction.
20. Similarly, Heim’s definition of ‘virtual reality’ (1993, p. 160) seems like immersion. We can trace uses of the term to
refer to experiences derived from the transparency of the technology so that ‘we lose consciousness of the media and
see neither print nor film but only the power the story itself’ (Murray 1997, p. 26).
Chapter two
1. Meadows (2003, p. 26) notes that programmers and interface designers are writers: ‘the roles of the reader and
writer get blurry because both roles (reader and writer) are adding information and meaning to a dataset’.
2. Some artists not only program the apparatus, but invent the hardware that encases and materializes their concept,
for example Intimate transactions by Keith Armstrong (2005). This type of work is not my focus because it does not
represent my practice. However it and many other works reveal the apparatus as far from a black box. As a result,
most of the dire predictions that Flusser makes about the fate of humans in a world ruled by the apparatus are
questionable.
3. Macromedia Director™
4. Cramer (2001) says ‘Computers operate on machine language, which is syntactically far less complex than human
language. The alphabet of both machine and human language is interchangeable, so that ''text''—if defined as a
countable mass of alphabetical signifiers—remains a valid descriptor for both machine code sequences and human
writing. In syntax and semantics however, machine code and human writing are not interchangeable. Computer
algorithms are, like logical statements, a formal language and thus only a restrained subset of language as a whole’
(my italics). The italicised sentence indicates the distinction I am making between ‘significance’ (for the computer) and
‘meaning’ (for humans).
5. Memmott uses the term ‘recombinant’ (Coverley 2003).
6. ‘Authorship in electronic media is procedural. Procedural authorship means writing the rules by which the texts
appear as well as writing the texts themselves. It means writing the rules for the interactor's involvement, that is, the
conditions under which things will happen in response to the participant's actions. It means establishing the properties
of the objects and potential objects in the cultural world and the formulas for how they will relate to one another. The
procedural author creates not just a set of scenes but a world of narrative possibilities’ (Murray 1997, p. 152-3).
7. Logic students learn to 'translate' every day language into symbolic logic, according to Heim (1993, p. 20-1).
However, ‘When the computer automatically and invisibly converts input into algebraic bytes, the user is shielded from
the translation into modern logic. Instead of the human mind puzzling over how language fits the system, the computer
does the fitting; it transforms our alphabet into manipulable digits’ (p. 21).
8. Elsewhere Wittgenstein defines these as the propositions of natural science (Monk 2005, p. 25).
9. Limited because Wittgenstein ultimately wants philosophers to ‘transcend’ the limitations of expressing logic and
philosophy in language, and do away with it (Monk 2005, pp. 18-19).
10. ‘[T]here is no nature that is not already mediated, not only by the personal construction of the psyche but by the
social constructions of media technologies, from the ritual of the caves to virtual reality. The social does not die, and
being does not fade, because both are becomings, in mutual mediation’ (Cubitt 2003, p. 79). Distinguishing between
RL and the technosocial on the grounds that one is nonmediated and the other is not, is false. Chapter three will
develop this theme to a greater extent.
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11. An online version of Queneau’s work has been created by Magnus Bodin (c.2001).
12. As explained by William Burroughs (1963). Cayley (2004, p. 212) argues that traditional literature already had the
signal qualities of the digital, and Grysin’s cut-up method reveals that ‘programmability’ is certainly not digital per se,
nevertheless programmatic manipulation goes hand-in-glove with the apparatus. See also The cut-ups by Antony
Balch et al (1966). Comparisons may be made with ‘Screenfull’ (2005) and the contemporary remix culture, whose
most mainstream manifestation is DJ and VJ practice.
13. Glazier argues (2000) ‘…one must stop associating innovative digital practice solely with hypertext. Link-node
hypertext only constitutes a small part of the range of possibilities before us and may, indeed, be a specific ideology
within print technology, as Aarseth has commented, rather than an actual digital technology’.
14. Tzara’s dada-iste programme is outlined in Tzara (1918). Memmott also shares a concern to find ways to use
recombination that nevertheless maintain coherence (Coverley 2003).
15. When you reach Kyoto (2004) is not a part of my PhD because it is a collaboration with Brian Kim Stefans.
16. As defined by Richard Dawkins (1978, p. 206): ‘a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation’. ‘Examples of
memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes, fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes
propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate
themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called
imitation’.
17. This term is used in the sense that Freud appropriates from Jentsch concerning ‘doubts whether an apparently
animate being is really alive; or conversely, whether a lifeless object might not be in fact animate’ (1925, §1). According
to Royle (2003, p. 23), the uncanny changes as society changes and now increasingly concerns technology. Seeing
ourselves in the machine is uncanny (Coyne 1999, p. 214). Aarseth (1997, p. 129) identifies what is basically the
uncanny fallacy as a fundamental problem in computer poetics in terms of ‘the aesthetic relation between a human
narrator and a machine narrator and what happens when the latter is forced to simulate the former’. The problematic
dissolves in the trilogical relationship, in which oppositions between programmer and apparatus fade into collaboration.
Bojana Kunst (2005, p. 420) makes a similar connection.
As Slack and Wise (2005, p. 122) point out, one of the risks of actor-network theory is that it tends to promote the
anthropomorphism of the machine and therefore you restrict ‘the attribution of agency to technologies alone and ignore
the activity of the network’.
Works such as those by Mez and Ted Warnell are characterised by Florian Cramer as ‘prime examples for a digital
poetry which reflects the intrinsic textuality of the computer. But they do so not by being, to quote Alan Turing via
Raymond Queneau, computer poetry to be read by computers but by playing with the confusions and thresholds of
machine language and human language, and by reflecting the cultural implications of these overlaps. The “mezangelle”
poetry of mez (Mary Ann Breeze), which mixes programming/network protocol code and non-computer language to a
portmanteau-word hybrid, is an outstanding example of such a poetics’ (Cramer 2001). These works play on the
uncanny.
John Cayley (2002) criticises the linguistic neologisms/creole approach to electronic literature ‘as if the distinction
between natural and programming language has broken down and the two scripts are mingling promiscuously inside
the computer’.
18. In Flusser’s opinion, the apparatus turns linear textual culture into magical, image-based culture. However, the
proliferation of text-as-apparatus contradicts Flusser’s postulation of an anti-textual, anti-linear historical trajectory.
Such works do not sideline text (although they may obscure it), however they question linearity and permanence with
algorithm and transience.
19. Indeed, Wardrip-Fruin (1999, §7) argues that for Vannevar Bush, ‘The origins of hypermedia contain traces of the
quest for eternal life’, a bizarre vision in which ‘… we are not only immortalised by our additions to the paper train
(which are stored identically in innumerable memexes), but can preserve and pass on our very pathways of thought’.
20. Montfort (2002) defines a ‘session’ as ‘what happens during the execution of an IF [interactive fiction] program. The
session begins when an IF program starts running. It ends when the program terminates’. A ‘traversal’ … ‘is what
happens in one or more sessions, and one or more interactions, when the interactor completes a work of IF by going
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from the beginning until no more can be narrated.’ These terms may be loosely applied to any programmed media. In
particular, a ‘traversal’ may be made without reaching an endpoint, beyond the endpoint of exhausting a user’s
attention.
21. Aarseth (1997, p. 62) suggests ‘[s]criptons are what the ideal reader reads’. For a technosocial approach there is
no ideal reader, but various readers with various and limited experiences. Situating humans within the trilogical
relationship seems a more nuanced and contextual approach to the problematic of a textuality whose materiality is
non-trivially distinct, thus forcing humans into specific types of engagements with it—either as creators or as users.
Ted Nelson’s original distinction was between back-end and front-end. See Nelson 1974, p. 9; Wardrip-Fruin 1999,
footnote 5.
22. Ullman (1997, p. 6) observes that the programmer enjoys experiences of being right which may be far more
absolute than the sort of rightness and truth we can experience in RL. The binary transparency of the programmed text
represents perhaps a nostalgic consummation for those for whom postmodern aesthetics remain problematic.
However, there are many ironies derived from locating ‘truth’ within the ‘ontology’ of programmed textuality: we commit
to truth being a feature of the linguistics of apparatuses.
23. See also Stefans 2003. The idea of a programmed text as an instrument that is performed—a key feature of the
text-as-apparatus—can be related back the ‘happenings’ of the 1960s, in which risk and the possibility of failure were
inherent (Kaprow 1961, p. 86). Such events were understood to be transient, emergent events, tied to specific
environments (p. 85-86). Cramer (2001) and Cayley (2002) note the parallel between Fluxus events and programming
art ‘where the record of inscription is problematised (the work is an event, or the publication of a set of materials which
must be manipulated by the reader/user), and where the presence/absence dialectic has been sidestepped by
representations which may literally absent an artist-author’ (Cayley 2002).
24. Many writers reject new technosocial directions that seem to question their status. Robert Coover decries the fate
of the writer’s voice (Hayles 2002, p. 44).
25. ‘...the possibility of unintentional sign behavior makes cybernetic media creatively emergent and, therefore, not
subsumable by the traditional communication theories’ (Aarseth 1997, p. 124).
26. Projected as a part of Transmedia: 29:59 into Toronto's Yonge-Dundas Square. Also available at
http://www.year01.com/transmedia2959/.
27. The disturbing thing about this archive—for the archiver, at least—is that this is a pseudo-archive. The code is html
and not php. If the code were the original php, then the archive itself would continue to decay, and thus the archive’s
hope of capturing the performance of the work would be in vain.
28. Some reactions are quoted by 0100101110101101.org on their website:
‘The artists have created a mini-hysteria over their piece. More than 1,400 of the shirts have been sold at $15 apiece.
And they've sold three CD-ROMs, at $1,500 each (the collectors chose to remain unnamed for legal reasons). Yet the
potentially damaging code is available for free on the artists' homepages’—Reena Jana, Wired
‘These radical artists are in the Venice Biennale... they are selling their work... 0100101110101101.ORG have taken-
over as most famous net artists by criticising fame...—Sarah Thompson, Easyweb
‘Is it Art? Do you care? It is skillfully crafted; it has a poetic component; in its expression it is a statement about Art. But
if it's Art, it may be the most aggressive self-replicating piece of art I've ever seen’—Pike van Kemenade, Deaf 04
(http://www.0100101110101101.org/home/biennale_py/feedback.html).
Chapter three
1. This is a very specific way of conceptualising myth, and I am referring to it because it ties into the neo-romantic
argument I develop in this chapter. The anthropological tradition discussed is quite distinct from, for example, the
structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss (1969); the psychoanalytic archetypes of Carl Jung (1969), or the post-structural
cultural analysis of Roland Barthes (1972).
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2. I have argued in earlier chapters that this concept is problematic. However, it continues to feature in discourse
surrounding the computer game, so it will be referred to using quotation marks. Gameverses often seem to be
interpreted in a ‘contrast and compare’ way with ‘nonmediated RL’. The complexity of analogous thinking is
compounded when players interact with game characters, and possibly avatars of other players, within the game
scenario in terms of their ‘nonmediated RL’ life. For example, Chinese players of the massively multiplayer game The
fantasy of the journey west (1997-2006) recently protested against a ‘rising sun’ Japanese flag motif displayed within
the game (Hutcheon, 2006). Loomis (1992, p 113) suggests that is the precisely the exposure to simulated worlds that
promotes knowledge of the mediated nature of the world; however there does appear to be evidence to the contrary as
well. Loomis exhorts us to carefully separate the physical from the phenomenal world when we philosophise about the
real.
3. This argument will be fleshed out at the end of this chapter. When myth is properly integrated into a culture (actively
believed in and incorporated into daily life) it has particular potency. Billias (1986, p. 18) lists these potencies, which
include: ‘help[ing] humans in their quest for the religious self’ through narratives which ‘deal with the Absolute Reality at
the core of the self, the essence of the self, which is both transcendent (true for all times and places) and immanent
(true here and now). Myths convey concrete information about how Absolute Reality should be approached (p. 18).
Myths may be false, but they belong to an eternal present and bespeak infinite truths (p. 20), in which humans keep
rediscovering themselves (p. 19) through ‘a special kind of story that describes the basic mysteries of life and provides
a way to respond to them’ (p. 20).
4. Traditionally capitalised as a proper name of an aesthetic theory, I have followed Ndalianis’ lead by using lower-
case, for fear that it would be incomprehensible to have a ‘baroque’ and a ‘neo-baroque’ in the same sentence as a
‘Romanticism’ and a ‘neo-Romanticism’.
5. It also occurs at the start of the essay ‘What are poets for?’ (Heidegger 1971, pp. 87-140). Romantic theorists
generally considered the world to be in a graceless state. ‘The world must be romanticised. So its original meaning will
again be found’, argues Novalis (1980c, p. 3). Anne-Louise-Germaine de Staël (1980, p. 26) expressed this fall in
terms of a mythology surrounding the simplicity and nature-harmony of the ancient Greeks. See also Idhe 1993, p.
105.
6. For example, Coleridge seems to adopt Kant’s idea that beauty is disinterested (Coleridge 1980b, p. 98).
7. See Ndalianis ‘Introduction’ (2004) for an excellent survey of related texts.
8. Baroque works ‘invite the spectator to test the nature of his or her own reality through the work's construction of
alternative realities that actively invade real space’ (Ndalianis 2004, p. 160). A theme of the baroque is what is realist
and what is illusion? (p. 196).
9. In contrast with vector images, rasters are pixellated images which can give the impression of photography. This
pseudo-photography and pseudo-cinematography has reached such a point of perfection that image designers are
paradoxically obliged to add noise to images that otherwise seem too perfect (and therefore ‘unreal’) (Manovich 2001,
p. 137).
10. Even Heidegger recognises that artworks are ‘distinguished by being created so that its createdness is part of the
created work’ (1971, p. 62).
11. Using Pierce’s terminology, Darley suggests that computer images are iconic, not indexical ‘in the sense that
photography is an index (not necessarily reliable) of there having been something in the world (staged or not)
previously’ (Darley 2000, p. 88).
12. Juul’s interesting observations on the relation of play time to event time are significant here (2004, p. 131-142).
Compare play time and event time to Eliade’s concepts of sacred time and profane time: ‘The experience of sacred
time will make it possible for religious man periodically to experience the cosmos as it was in principio, that is, at the
mythical moment of Creation’ (Eliade 1959, p. 65). It would be wrong to take the parallel too literally—it is hard to see,
for example, how Resident evil 4 could be considered a sacred experience. However, there is a some experiential
parallel with stepping out of profane time into the ‘magic circle’ temporality of games and myth.
13. Image has been greatly enhanced for printing purposes.
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14. Downes also worries about self sublimation (2005, pp. 70; 76). Immersion dissolves the sense of self 'because the
illusion presented on the screen is more compelling than reality’ (p. 79); the result may well be psychosis (p. 79).
Downes is not the first to link immersion to psychosis. Heim believes that psychosis sets in if we don't maintain the
contrast between virtual and real worlds (1993, pp. 135-137). Murray points out that such apocalyptic thinking
accompanies many introductions of media types (Murray 1997, p. 21). The basis of this criticism—that there are ‘fake’
worlds, is the basis of my disagreement with them. Self is always in world, but self is fluid, and worlds are multiple.
15. For example, Ndalianis’ use of ‘immersion’ is undefined and rare. On page 102, immersion is related to labyrinths.
She prefers concepts like suspense (p. 104); the focus is always on an intertextual knowledge that seems to work
against immersion. She describes situations which I would interpret as going in and out of immersion without
recognizing it (p. 106). The focus on magic (how did they do that?) (p. 227-8) rather than momentary experience is a
neo-baroque perspective. The neo-baroque celebrates something like the trilogical uncanny (p. 241) discussed in
chapter two. No doubt the lack of dealing with immersion is partly a result of Ndalianis’ project being more historical
than phenomenological, but the different focus also extends into the ‘ideology of aesthetics’.
16. ‘In the flow state, action follows upon action according to an internal logic that seems to need no conscious
intervention by the action. He experiences it as a unified flowing from one moment to the next in which he is in control
of his actions, and in which there is little distinction between self and environment, between stimulus and response, or
between past, present and future’ (Csikszentmihalyi 1975, p. 36).
17. Seymour Papert has a related concept of proximality or ‘closeness to the object’. Papert (1993, p. 201) describes
one subject, Kevin, who ‘psychologically places himself in the same space as the screen turtles. He experiences his
spaceship as tangible, sensuous, and tactile. He is down there, in with the sprites, playing with them like objects in a
collage. Kevin talks about these objects using gestures of hand and body that show him moving with and among them.
In speaking of them, he uses language such as ‘I move here’.
This seems to meet Ivan Sutherland’s (1965) ideal. He sought ‘the ultimate display’, in which ‘the computer can control
the existence of matter. A chair displayed in such a room would be good enough to sit in. Handcuffs displayed in such
a room would be confining, and a bullet displayed in such a room would be fatal. With appropriate programming such a
display could literally be the Wonderland into which Alice walked’.
18. Immersion is not technology-specific. It derives from the intensity of meaningful situations. Adam Nash (2003) for
example suggests: ‘I've had truly moving, memorable experiences (and yes, I'd call it immersive) looking at a 160x120
QuickTime window on my computer monitor, and have also been completely bored in an iMax theatre. When I think
back on a novel I have read, I don't think of the physical situation I was in whilst reading (aside: reading is interesting
because the beholding of a novel often takes place over temporally and spatially disparate situations), I enter the world
in which the novel takes place. That, to me, is true immersion.’
19. Much has been made of operator power to construct the text. Rosenberg (1994) explores the notion of a ‘wreader’
(writer/reader). ‘Media essentialist’ (Eskelinen 2002, p. 1) hypertext theorists such as Bolter (1991) and Landow (1997)
argue that hypertext surrenders authorial power to the operator. In my opinion, a user who lacks power to change the
instantiating text (apart from configuration) may be empowered, but he is not an author.
20. Diegesis ‘designates the universe of the first narrative’ (Genette 1980, p. 228). Authorial voices impeding in the
narrative are extra-diegetic (p. 229). These terms ‘designate … relative situations and functions’ (p. 229).
21. Juul (2005, pp. 15-17) defines ludology simply as ‘games as something unique’, which has historically been
opposed to narratology (games as stories).
22. ‘Spatial stories … respond to alternative aesthetic principles, privileging spatial exploration over plot development’
(Jenkins c.2001). Similarly, Aarseth’s (1997, p. 114) concept of intrigue ‘constitutes a multidimensional event space
and unfolds through the negotiation of this space by text and user’.
23. Narratives have ‘metaphorical’ algorithms, and therefore narratives and games similarly require a user to ‘uncover
their underlying logic while proceeding through them’ (Manovich 2001, p. 225). Ryan suggests that ‘the abstract
cognitive structure we call narrative is such that it can be called to mind by many different media, but each medium has
different expressive resources, and will therefore produce different concrete manifestation of this abstract structure. Put
in simpler words: there are plot types and character types that are best for the novel, others are best for oral
storytelling, and yet others are best for the stage of the cinema. The question, then, is to decide which types of stories
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are suitable for digital media.’ Ryan suggests that the answer to this question lies in determining what is distinctive
about digital media—which is its ability to respond to changing conditions (Ryan 2001). I agree with Ryan and
Manovich (2001) that different materiality facilitates different user experience. The ‘narratives’ of RPGs are described
as ‘spatial stories’ or fictional worlds’.
24. Romantically expressed, for example, by Keats (1980, p. 65): ‘Poetry redeems from decay the visitations of the
divinity in Man’.
25. ‘A man comes by chance upon a stone which takes his fancy; its shape is singular, it is like something, it is
certainly not a common stone, there must be mana in it. So he argues with himself and he puts it to the proof; he lays it
at the root of a tree to the fruit of which it has a certain resemblance, or he buries it in the ground when he plants his
garden; an abundant crop on the tree or in the garden shews that he is right, the stone has mana, has that power in it.
Having that power it is a vehicle to convey mana to other stones. In the same way certain forms of words, generally in
the form of a song, have power for certain purposes; a charm of words is called a mana. But this power, though itself
impersonal, is always connected with some person who directs it; all spirits have it, ghosts generally, some men. If a
stone is found to have a supernatural power, it is because a spirit has associated itself with it; a dead man's bone has
with it mana, because the ghost is with the bone; a man may have so close a connexion with a spirit or ghost that he
has mana in himself also, and can so direct it as to effect what he desires; a charm is powerful because the name of a
spirit or ghost expressed in the form of words brings into it the power which the ghost or spirit exercises through it.
Thus all conspicuous success is proof that a man has mana’ (Codrington 1969, pp. 119-120).
According to Ernst Cassirer (1953, p. 65), it is difficult to conceptualise mana because its nature changes when put into
language. It needs to be experienced to be understood. This is probably true of all mythic experience.
26. Stereotypically, RPGs offer violence to teenage boys. Other theories of the reason why computer games appeal to
this demographic include Jenkins (1998) theory that computer games aim to recompense boys for their loss of space in
which to explore traditional boy culture.
27. Also known as medicine men and described by Eliade (1958, p. 95) as ‘specialists in the sacred’.
28. Such stories are ubiquitous in the popular press, for example ‘Addicts hooked on games’ (June 19 2006).
Chapter four
1. Stills from the following films were used in the collages in this chapter: Destination murder; The locket; On
dangerous ground; Sunset Boulevard; Pickup on South Street.
2. The technology is called StealthText (2006), developed by British company Staellium.
3. As of June 2005, according to the Australian Communications and Media Authority (2005, p. 24).
4. Ellen Wagner (2005, p. 51) argues that the following attributes are important to rich mobile internet experiences:
• ‘Ubiquity: How widely available is the media player that will be required for the viewer to see the application on the
device display?
• ‘Access: How widely available is the wireless network that will distribute the mobile content?
• ‘Richness: Do pages load quickly? Do animations play in a smooth and seamless manner?…
• ‘Efficiency: How large is the client that will be required to make use of a particular media player? How fast will the
application load and play?
• ‘Flexibility: Will the application be viewable on a variety of devices? Can content designed for use with one kind of
device or operating system be played on other devices with some expectation of comparable quality?
• ‘Security: Is the interactive mobile device protected from worms and viruses? Is the shared content protected from
being intercepted unintended recipients?
• ‘Reliability: Will content be displayed in a consistent manner, regardless the browser, device, and screen
• ‘Interactivity: Does the application allow users to interact freely display and the content?’
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5. Heim has a similar approach: ‘When we look for the essence of a technology, we are engaging in speculation, but
not in airy speculation. Our speculation involves where we plant our feet, who we are, and what we choose to be.
Behind the development of every major technology lies a vision. The vision gives impetus to developers in the field
even though the vision may not be clear, detailed, or even practical. The vision captures the essence of the technology
and calls forth the cultural energy needed to propel it forward. Often a technological vision taps mythic consciousness
an the religious side of the human spirit’ (1993, p. 118).
6. As Manuel Castells says ‘The development of the network enterprise translates into downsizing, subcontracting, and
networking of labour, inducing flexibility of both business and labour, and individualization of contractual arrangements
between management and labour. So, instead of layoffs what we often have are layoffs followed by subcontracting of
services on an ad hoc, consulting basis, for the time and task to be performed, without job tenure and without social
benefits provided by the firm’ (1996, p. 402). Bauman (2005, p. 147) refers to research that suggests that young
Americans can expect to change jobs 11 times.
7. Products include X Factor (2005) and Big Brother (2001-2006).
8. See for example http://images10.blueskyfrog.com/graphics/bsfemail_ad/fz_newprod.html. As Hjorth (2005c) argues,
companies like Legion Interactive seems incapable of coming to terms with niche demographics, including active and
inventive female mobile phone users.
9. For example, Bojana Kunst (2005, p. 420) explores chaos, paranoia and uncanny affect (see chapter two).
10. ‘The inspiration for BlueStates is drawn from the recognition that most of us, most of the time, carry that most
common of 21st century appliances, the mobile phone. Most of these mobile phones are equipped with a wireless
technology known as Bluetooth. A Bluetooth mobile phone user creates a radius of electronic awareness—what we
call a ‘bluesphere’—extending as much as ten meters from their body. When two Bluetooth devices pass in proximity
to one another, each senses the other. Data is exchanged—and promptly ignored. BlueStates: Exploring Relational
Space uses its own, custom software sensors—which run on mobile phones, PDAs and computers—to listen intently
to the bluesphere. These sensors contribute to a database record of proximal encounters, and this data is then used to
build views into the social life of the city's residents’ (Tonkin and Pesce 2006).
11. The proposed approach to analyzing the implications of trilogical engagement ties in with what Nathalie
Jeremijenko (2004, pp. 262-263) describes as the ‘structure of participation’, which is an approach which allows us to
‘pay attention to peripheral participation, the participation between users and around things; between users and things
within systems. It is an approach to human (singular)-computer (singular) interaction that reconsiders interaction as a
form of participation and escapes the simple dichotomy between social and technological’. Sociologically engaged
approaches such as ‘structures of participation’ and ‘repertoires of practices’ help contextualise telco marketing
rhetoric.
12. Other types of networked text, such as joke email, enjoy this mercurial flow through the network.
13. Entry appears to no longer exist.
14. ‘The group proposes to create ‘a strong cybernetic experience, captivating, sensual, and shifted where [....] the flow
and the extreme pleasure of surfing are moved into a performative framework’ (Varley-Jamieson 2005). David Berlind
et al (2006) discuss the nexus between remix or ‘mashup’ culture and identity.
15. Froomkin (2003, p. 767) stresses that he is referring to Habermas’ more recent writing, in which Habermas relaxes
the demand for an ‘ideal speech situation’ for a ‘discourse ethics that depends upon an ideal that is realizable, although
it does call for a far more demanding type of discourse than one commonly encounters in the political arena’.
16. I am indebted to my students Pamela Chew, Hwee Hwee Tan and Jing Han Foo for this example.
17. Such a project is currently being developed at RMIT.
18. Other types of rich media include mobile games and ringtones. They are less relevant to my own production and
therefore will not be discussed.
19. Professional media producers are increasingly in competition with prosumers in this arena, as the latter’s semi-
professional works are taken up in fine art or cinema circles. Cellbytes (2004) was screened at the 2005 St Kilda Film
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Festival (an event sponsored by Seimens). This sort of production has received the blessing of major art galleries, for
example the L.A. Center for Digital Art’s Cell-outs and phonies exhibition.
20. It is unfortunate that some rich media producers still consider this type of media with its intimate, community focus
second-best to a television series. A somewhat more honest approach is the cross-media one, such as 24: conspiracy
(2005), whose producers view the phone media as only an add-on to the main television product.
21. A neologism I have made purposely uncomfortable, to ensure that it is not considered the same as noir.
22. RL~ was distributed to mobile phones as part of the dLux media arts (http://www.dlux.org.au/) ‘d>ArtO5’ distributed
art showcase, commissioned by Mobile Journeys (http://dlux.org.au/mobilejourneys/), a national initiative.
23. Thanks to Allan James Thomas for this insight.
24. Attempts to communicate these values seem via the phone seem doomed. For example, the strange cross-
pollination of modern art and mobile digitality explored by Nokia's Connect to Art (2004) project (only available for
certain models of Nokia phones). Transferring images of large material works such as Louise Bourgeois’ ‘You and Me
1-3’ (2004).
Conclusion
1. Bauman (2005, p. 148) suggests that ‘The present-day uncertainty is a powerful individualizing force’. We can’t
predict where common interests lie.
2. The existence of implicit mind-body dualism in virtual environments and specifically in computer-based media has
been commented on by Shields (2003, pp. 8 and 14) and Bey (2001, pp. 116-117) among others.
3. Feenberg argues that Heidegger would have considered that the computer manifests an impoverished view of
language, which can never rise to the heights of poetry, which ‘opens language to being’ (Feenberg 2000a, p. 448). He
(2000a, p. 449) continues: ‘What has actually happened to language in a world more and more dominated by
computers? Has it in fact been reified into a technical discourse purified of human significance? On the contrary, the
Internet now carries a veritable tidal wave of ‘saying’, of language used for expression as always in the past. Of course,
we may not be interested in much of this online talk, but that is another story. The simple fact of the case is that these
‘posthumanist’ reflections on the computer were wrong. They not only failed to foresee the transformation of the
computer into a communication medium, but they precluded that possibility for essential reasons…’
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